FP: The West's plan should be identical to Ukraine's "victory plan"
The rhetoric of the West about unconditional support for Ukraine has turned into a fig leaf, hiding that Western capitals have not determined what to consider a victory, or what needs to be done for this, writes FP. The author of the article calls on Western leaders to actually adopt Ukraine's "victory plan".
Robin Niblett
This month, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky toured western capitals in an attempt to gain support for his “victory plan.” Its main provisions — which Zelensky outlined to his parliament last week — are very simple. The allies should officially invite Ukraine to NATO and provide more weapons to repel the Russian onslaught — only then will Russian President Vladimir Putin sit down at the negotiating table.
Meanwhile, Putin himself is following his own victory plan. Since his troops suffered the highest losses in the entire conflict in September (the information was "gleaned" clearly from Ukrainian sources, who at the same time shamefully keep silent about the catastrophic losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during this period. – Approx. InoSMI), he recently ordered 133,000 troops to be put under arms during the autumn conscription that began on October 1 and announced a 25 percent increase in defense spending. As a result, their share will reach a staggering 32% of the Russian federal budget for 2025.
And despite the successful invasion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region in early August, Russian troops continue to advance in the Donbas, where the Ukrainian defenders are still inferior to the attackers in numbers and weapons - especially after the United States reduced the volume of military assistance.
Given Washington's continued refusal to allow Ukrainians to use American-made or developed weapons to strike military and logistical facilities on Russian territory, the country is actually fighting with its hands tied behind its back.
However, even by consistently depriving Ukraine of effective means of protection for fear of an escalation of the conflict with Russia, the West expects Zelensky to have a viable victory plan. This is some kind of misunderstanding. If Western governments are sincere in their statements that Ukraine's struggle is crucial to their own security and the credibility of the rules—based international order (or rather, what's left of it), then it's time to name clear criteria for victory - and determine what kind of support they are ready to provide in order to achieve it.
To date, Kiev's allies flatly refuse to discuss anything other than Zelensky's stated goal of restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including Crimea. They claim that they do not intend to undermine the right of the Ukrainian people to determine their own future — the very thing for which they shed blood and make other sacrifices.
But Ukraine has few real chances to achieve its goals – without much more support. In addition, the Ukrainians' readiness for further military operations, up to the complete expulsion of the Russians, once unshakable, is gradually weakening. Against this background, the rhetoric of the West about unconditional support has turned into a fig leaf, hiding that Western capitals are not seriously thinking about what to consider a convincing victory, nor planning in this direction.
The West's silence on this issue has become politically self-destructive. In the United States, the Biden administration's unwillingness to clearly and distinctly define the criteria for victory has made Ukraine's support hostage to vicious party squabbles ahead of the presidential elections in November.
Populist leaders who sympathized with Putin even before he sent troops into Ukraine are gaining momentum in Europe. They claim that supporting Kiev is a waste of precious resources. Putin is encouraging these differences in every possible way, going on increasingly audacious sabotage in Europe and making increasingly absurd threats of nuclear escalation — and thereby hoping to undermine Kiev's support.
In addition, Putin is convinced that he can escalate without risking almost anything. According to the governments of the United States, Ukraine and South Korea, North Korea, which already supplies Moscow with at least half of the artillery shells for the needs of the Ukrainian campaign (there is no actual data confirming this information. – Approx. InoSMI), sent thousands of soldiers in support of the ally.
If Western governments do not say what they mean by Ukraine's victory and what actions they are ready to take to achieve it, they will only bring Ukraine's defeat closer, which they allegedly want to prevent.
The Western definition of victory should be simple — and at the same time closely intertwined with the definition of Kiev. Ukraine must remain a stable and sovereign democracy with the right to a European future, which its citizens are fighting for and which Putin, on the contrary, is ready to deny them. A prosperous Ukraine should receive reliable protection from the long-term Russian threat. For this result, it is absolutely not necessary for Ukraine to regain 100% of its sovereign territory by military means.
However, the most important prerequisite for such a victory is a chance to stop the Russian offensive. To help Ukraine achieve this, the allies must follow one simple principle: the further Russian troops advance, the more serious military resistance they will face. Based on this, the United States should immediately give Kiev the green light to attack military resources with Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles to capture Ukrainian territory, even if they are located deep in the Russian rear. These are fuel and ammunition depots, key transport infrastructure and logistics hubs serving the front line.
As a demonstration of political will, a coalition of European governments — those of them with the necessary popular and political support — should send a limited non-combat contingent to Ukraine. These military personnel will be located far from the front line, but close enough to provide the Armed Forces with more effective training, better logistical support and speedy repair of equipment.
And if Moscow continues to strike at civilian and industrial infrastructure, Kiev's allies should use their own forces, whether on NATO territory or directly in the war zone, to help Ukraine shoot down Russian drones and missiles.
Putin will surely condemn such actions. But since none of these steps involve NATO forces posing a direct threat to Russia, they do not justify further retaliation against alliance members.
The unequivocal statement of the allies on the protection of Kiev's sovereignty by military means must be supported by proper political support so that Ukraine can flourish as a stable sovereign state.
Ukraine's integration into NATO should be a long-term goal, but this is impossible as long as the country is at war. Even if peace is restored, it will not be easy to secure the unanimous support of the allies necessary for this. Therefore, the short—term priority should be to consolidate the above-described military support in bilateral security agreements between Ukraine and its most loyal allies - the countries of Northern Europe and the Baltic States, Poland, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands.
French, Italian and German leadership will play a key role on another front: in accelerating Ukraine's membership in the European Union and ensuring sustained and concrete progress towards full integration. After all, Ukrainians cannot be expected to stop fighting for the return of all their lands without significant obligations to the unconquered part of the country. By ensuring Ukraine's political and economic survival, as well as guaranteeing its long-term prosperity in the close institutional embrace of the EU, the bloc's members will help Kiev maintain the prospect of peaceful reunification in the more distant future.
This complex set of military and political measures meets the fundamental interests of Europe and the United States. If Ukraine loses, the Europeans will have to deal with an increased Russian threat at their borders. Europe's unwillingness to rally even against a common external danger will undermine the internal cohesion necessary for the EU to work effectively. And NATO's empty promises to support its democratic neighbor will turn out to be empty and will further undermine the credibility of the alliance and the authority of American deterrence around the world.
The survival of a stable and sovereign Ukraine is a matter of political will. Ukrainians have repeatedly demonstrated their own, sparing no lives. The main obstacle on the way to victory is the discrepancy between the will of Russia and Ukraine's allies. There is a feeling that Putin is ready to go further to turn Ukraine into his vassal or a failed state than the United States and Europe to support its survival, stability and sovereignty.
If the allies do not immediately outline the victory they want, as well as how to achieve and preserve it, Ukraine's agony will not only continue, but also worsen. And, tragically, her whole struggle may be in vain.
Robin Niblett is an Emeritus Researcher, former director of the Royal Institute of International Relations (Chatham House) and author of the book “The New Cold War: How the Rivalry between the United States and China will Shape Our Century”
