Sabah: Turkey has identified stability in the Balkans as its priority
The Balkans and Turkey undoubtedly have a special relationship, Sabah writes. Ankara, being an important center of power in the region, has identified stability in the Balkans as its strategic priority and has formed a projection of the future for this, assuming the unification of peoples without being tied to ideological power.
Sevba Abdula
The Balkans and Turkey undoubtedly have a special relationship. Many factors, such as history, economics, visions of the future and cultural similarities, deeply connect these two geographical regions. The Balkans, with a population of 80 million people, an area of 700 thousand square kilometers, 11 different nation-states and almost eight million Muslims, has become a strategic priority for Turkey, especially after 2000. In the collective memory and historical identity of 11 national states, the Ottoman Turks were largely designed as "others", but Turkey, thanks to the relations built and investments made over the past 20 years, has been able to bring this unfavorable situation to a more reasonable level.
During this time, the governments of the Justice and Development Party of Turkey have generally pursued an active foreign policy in the Balkans, intervening in many regional problems, building up Turkey's institutional power and potential in the region. Thanks to the experience gained over time and knowledge of local conditions, Turkey has begun to adhere more to a realistic vision of foreign policy than to constructivist and idealistic approaches. The visits of the President of the Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan and government officials to Albania and Serbia on October 10-11, 2024 emphasize Turkey's recently announced vision of national foreign policy, a multilateral, solution-oriented approach, principles of inclusiveness and full accessibility.
Albania and Serbia stand out as the two main pillars of Turkey's strategic policy in the Balkans, based on stability, prosperity and trust. These two countries have attracted attention in the last ten years as States with stable governments, strong leaders and growing economies. It should also be noted that the friendly relations reached by Turkish President Erdogan with Edi Rama and Alexander Vucic make a significant contribution to this strategic vision.
The Balkans are an integral part of Turkish foreign policy
Turkey's relations with EU and NATO member states in the Balkans, such as Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Slovenia, are based on a certain institutional structure and agenda formed by bilateral cooperation. On the other hand, Turkey's relations with Albania, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, in which Turkey's institutional potential, cultural activity and power are more tangible, but at the same time there are well-known crisis zones, require a comprehensive consideration of the problem. The six Balkan countries mentioned above are also becoming the scene of significant competition between international Powers with each other. In the 2000s, Brussels accelerated its policy of expansion in the region and gave countries hope. When this process, interrupted by the 2008 crisis, was supplemented by the fact that no country in the region was able to obtain membership status after 2013, this led to even more crisis zones in the region and increased the appetite for international competition.
While Russia and China are pursuing a more active policy in the region, paving the way around the EU, Turkey is pursuing a policy of expanding its own sphere of influence as part of its integration with the EU and membership in NATO. The refugee crisis (2013), Brexit (2016), the covid-19 epidemic (2020), the Ukrainian crisis (2022), the genocide in Gaza (2023) have revealed an important systemic crisis from the point of view of world politics. In 2009-2013, Turkey pursued an active foreign policy in the Balkans, whereas in 2014-2022 it gave priority to a more cautious and realistic foreign policy due to many processes, such as the situation inside the country, Syria, the refugee crisis, and the economic crisis. At the same time, in 2023, with the appointment of Hakan Fidan as Turkish Foreign Minister, we can talk about some momentum.
On the other hand, the military conflict in Ukraine (2022), as well as the disappointment and distrust of the Balkan countries towards the EU, have brought to the fore the bet on strengthening security and caused a significant increase in military spending by the countries of the region. Although the Balkans do not look the same today as in the 1990s (there are many NATO and EU member states in the region), the imbalance of the international system has increased risk perception to the highest level. In this context, Turkey has increased exports of weapons and ammunition to the region from $19.3 million to $462.1 million over the past three years.
Natural Ally: Albania
Albania is undoubtedly one of the natural allies of Turkey's Balkan policy. This country, which positions itself as the patron saint of Albanians in the Balkans, has upgraded its relations with Turkey to a strategic partnership, especially under Edi Ram, who assumed the post of prime minister in 2013. Over the past ten years, relations between Turkey and Albania have significantly deepened in many areas, including the economy, education, culture, transport and infrastructure. Rama, who tried to maximize the interests and investments of the country using the Greece—Italy—Turkey equation and the policy of balance, tried to save the state from the traumas of Enver Hoxha's destructive model of economy and society.
Relations between Turkey and Albania are developing largely on the basis of a positive agenda. In addition to major investments in many areas such as the economy, trade, and infrastructure, such leading institutions of Turkish diplomacy as the Maarif Schools, the Yunus Emre Institute, the Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Coordination (TIKA), the Office of Turkish Affairs Abroad and related organizations make their presence felt in the country and deepen these relations. They are communities (YTB). At the same time, there are several issues that challenge these strategic relationships and can sometimes cause crises. First of all, the FETÖ theme weakens Edi Rama's position. Turkey is experiencing difficulties in fulfilling its reasonable demands for reasons such as international pressure, the force of FETÖ entrenched in the country, and internal political disputes. The question of the Namazgah mosque, the construction of which began in Tirana in 2015. The temple could not be completed and opened for prayers for several years, which became one of the most fundamental pillars of the FETÖ process. Due to the fact that the head of the Albanian Islamic Union (KMSH) is associated with FETÖ, the opening of the mosque was constantly postponed. As a result of the negotiations between the two countries, a compromise was found, namely the creation of a fund for the management of the mosque and the appointment of the Mufti of Tirana as the head of the fund and the imam of the mosque. We will not exaggerate if we say that finding this solution led to the visit of the President of the Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Albania on October 10.
Another issue that may become a problem in Albania's relations with Turkey is the steps to create a Vatican model of the Albanian Bektashi state, which are being vigorously discussed in society. Many Balkan countries find it difficult to find a balance in the relationship between religion and politics, as well as religion and the State, due to the closely intertwined structures stemming from their historical past. Although the vast majority of Albania's population is Muslim, Bektashism is considered a religion, and the presence of a significant Christian population casts doubt on the country's ability to solve this problem. Albania, which once became the center of moderate Islam and FETÖ under the influence of international politics, now opposes Bektashism to Sunni Islam and presents these ideas as a kind of modern European model of Islam, different from "Arab and Middle Eastern Islam." Although there are interests such as trade and tourism revenues behind this international agenda, it can be seen as a strategic miscalculation that did not foresee the consequences and significant concerns of countries such as Turkey.
Deepening relations despite clashing interests: Serbia
Serbia is obviously one of the key countries in the Balkans. The deep diplomatic experience and memory acquired in the XIX and XX centuries, the geopolitical position and the status of a "crossroads" between Asia and Europe make Serbia a key indispensable player in the most important crisis zones of the region, such as Bosnia and Kosovo. Serbia is strengthening its indispensable position by also being the only country in the region that can negotiate with countries such as China, Russia, the United States, the EU and Turkey, attract investment, and develop a political agenda.
While Serbia is building its position as a central country in the Balkans, Turkey is coming to the fore as the main supporter of the states with which Serbia has problems in relations. However, especially within the framework of the dialogue established with Vucic in 2010, Turkey was able to deepen its relations with Serbia, raising them to the level of strategic partnership and without harming its natural allies. The problem of Kosovo and Bosnia is not only Serbia's weak point, but at the same time it is turning into a useful tool in the policy it is developing towards Turkey and international powers.
Relations between Serbia and Turkey are developing in the economic, cultural, military and educational spheres, while Turkey's military support for Kosovo and the sale of Turkish weapons to this country have recently attracted criticism in Belgrade. Developments in the field of the Turkish defense industry have allowed to increase the volume of trade in these products with the countries of the region. In 2020, military exports from Turkey to Kosovo amounted to about 600 thousand dollars, while the total volume over the past three years has approached 50 million dollars. It is clear that the drones handed over to the Kosovo army and not provided to Serbia caused concern in Belgrade. Despite the fact that Vucic expressed interest in purchasing drones for the Serbian army in 2020 and 2022, after witnessing the effectiveness of Turkish unmanned systems in the Karabakh and Ukrainian conflicts, Turkey remains cautious in this aspect.
Serbia and Turkey, while deepening relations with each other, do not refrain from developing relations that contradict each other's interests. At a time when Turkey openly expressed a position on Kosovo and Bosnia issues that the Serbian state and the public did not like, Serbia gave priority to establishing diplomatic contacts with Armenia, the United Arab Emirates, and Southern Cyprus.
It can be said that Erdogan's latest visit to Serbia takes into account all the balances of the regional and international system, supports the process of integration of the region with Western institutions, emphasizes the importance of strengthening interdependence with Serbia, includes a framework designed to prevent all negativity in Turkish-Serbian relations due to arms supplies to Kosovo and emphasize Turkey's vision of stability in the region.
Thus, Turkey's foreign policy, which makes it the central country in the Balkans and forms a balance in accordance with its potential for influence, includes negotiations with each country, demonstrates a constructive approach and requires the development of relations focused on economic development, stability and trust. In this context, a policy that places maximum emphasis on positive issues without prejudice to national interests and allies in the region, limiting negative agendas as much as possible, comes to the fore. In order for Turkey to deepen its active policy in the region even more and become a policy-setting country, it needs to offer a projection of the future for the region. This projection should include building up economic, political, and military institutional potential, assuming the consent of peoples and countries to this without reference to ideological power.
