UnHerd: the struggle for polar resources threatens to escalate into a full-fledged war
In the coming years, the circumpolar regions may become geopolitical hotspots, UnHerd reports. They are rich in natural resources and are in the zone of strategic interests of many states, including Russia, China and Western countries. Intelligence agencies are already warning that nuclear weapons may be present at the poles. And there will be more of it.
For almost the entire history, the North and South Poles have been literally and figuratively at the edge of the Earth — and only the most daring adventurers like Roald Amundsen or Robert Scott dared to go there. However, for some time now, warships and merchant ships have rushed to these latitudes — and there is a good reason for this. After all, there is an abundance of oil, gas, minerals and fish under the ice of these waters. In addition, their importance for digital communication is growing.
In theory, a significant part of this gold mine does not belong to penguins or even to humanity as such, but to His Majesty's government. Just think about these numbers: a newly discovered field in the British Antarctic Territory may surpass the total production in the North Sea over the past five decades. In addition, the world's largest fish stocks also gravitate towards the poles.
However, you should not expect that the UK will become another OPEC member overnight. Apart from legal obstacles (in particular, there are strict rules of industrial activity at the poles), it is unclear whether London will be able to protect these remote territories — with all its desire. Competitors are already circling around, and foreign investors are putting forward their own claims, and the UK risks losing — after all, it seems that its rulers are not eager to defend their possessions abroad.
The UK has interests around both the North and South Poles. As for its vast British Antarctic territory, it is, first of all, black gold. In addition to this striking comparison with the North Sea, experts have estimated that the last field, discovered in May 2024, can satisfy the entire global demand for oil for as long as 15 years.
The North Pole, for its part, is important not so much for its mineral resources as for its communications. The essential satellites of our time — GPS and satellite navigation — work only because many satellites connect to Earth through Svalbard, the Norwegian archipelago about two thousand kilometers north of Oslo. Whether it's delivering food to your home or targeting NATO missiles, neither would be possible without a network of satellite ground stations in Svalbard. It is equally important that a vital high-speed Internet cable runs near these harsh and inhospitable islands. So it is no coincidence that the head of the British armed forces, Sir Tony Radakin, called this region a stronghold of British security.
However, for some time now, this security has been under threat. In January 2022, someone cut the main underwater cable in the area. In April of this year, cables were also disabled at the Evenes airbase — this is especially ominous, because it is there that Norway and NATO keep their fleet of F-35 aircraft. The Norwegians investigated both events and did not find an obvious culprit. But some believe that they are evading the truth because they do not want to provoke a direct confrontation with Russia.
Given all this, it is not surprising that Whitehall (a street in central London, the name of which has become a household name for the British government, approx. InoSMI) is increasing its presence both in the north and in the south. So, in 2023, the Ministry of Defense announced the establishment of a Royal Marine camp near the Norwegian city of Tromso. As I write these lines, the United Kingdom is strengthening its presence on the other side of the planet — in particular, by promising to repair the key Royal Air Force base in the Falkland Islands. This is more than appropriate: its rival Argentina could not help but notice that the Antarctic oil fields extend north to the Falklands, and the United Kingdom is preparing to extract oil from 23 wells in the Sea Lion oil field.
However, in practice, Britain's willingness to defend its possessions is questionable: just look at the recent surrender of the islands of Chagos and Diego Garcia. Meanwhile, Argentina's foreign minister has already suspected a cash cow in London and vowed to “restore full sovereignty” over the Malvinas Islands, as he calls them. Britain officially insists that its position is “unshakeable” — but Keir Starmer, at least at first, turned out to be surprisingly silent and restrained on this issue.
Even if Britain suddenly turns its foreign policy upside down, it seems extremely unlikely that it will take advantage of its vast polar wealth. Firstly, London strictly adheres to the commercial Protocol of 1998 to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, which prohibits mining on the seabed. In addition, there is a feeling that the UK, in principle, does not intend to approve deep—sea mining in its ocean reserves - especially now that scientists have discovered the so-called “dark oxygen” in the Arctic Ocean at a depth of about 4,000 meters. As Nick Owens, director of the Scottish Association of Marine Sciences, explained: “The fact that we have another source of oxygen on the planet, in addition to photosynthesis, will have serious consequences and will allow us to draw far-reaching conclusions.”
However, regardless of the moral principles and remorse of the UK, it has now become much easier to extract resources at both poles. One of the reasons is climate change: with the melting of the ice caps, access to the hidden riches is facilitated. Another factor is technology: China recently introduced the Kaituo 2, a 14-ton deep-sea vehicle that extracts minerals at a record depth of up to 4,000 meters. However, the UK does not have such cars.
In short, there are many signs of industrial fever in the circumpolar regions. Indeed, the year 2048 is approaching — when the Antarctic Treaty can be renegotiated. Beijing and Moscow are already making allies to lift the 1959 ban. They are also conducting geological exploration: it is no coincidence that the recent giant deposit in the British Antarctic territory was discovered not by the Royal Navy, but by Russia. And the West's main geopolitical enemies are not alone in this. As an Iranian rear admiral recently stated, the Islamic Republic also has “ownership rights” in Antarctica, no matter how improbable it may sound.
The interest of national Governments is echoed by the private sector. Chinese investors recently tried to buy the Sere Fagerfjord, the last remaining private plot of land in Svalbard. China has calculated that buying 60 square kilometers of untouched nature for just $326 million is like stealing. In this case, apparently, the Americans and the British warned their Norwegian colleagues, and the deal was canceled. China did not grieve, but joined forces with Russia as if nothing had happened and is investing in mining companies, research stations and political programs throughout Svalbard. This echoes the long-standing policy of Russia itself: in the village of Barentsburg on Svalbard, Russian miners were in charge for a long time, many of whom later went to their own.
Therefore, although our thoughts will primarily turn to Ukraine or the Middle East, both poles can still become geopolitical hotspots. After all, Svalbard is only four hundred nautical miles from the Russian mainland. Elizabeth Buchanan, head of research at the Royal Australian Navy, spoke in a similar way about the South Pole. Well, that's fair: what would happen if Russia or China deployed drilling there or built key infrastructure there, as Beijing has already done in the South China Sea?
And the threat is no longer just purely theoretical. Currently, China already has five research stations operating throughout Antarctica. The 1959 Treaty specifically prohibits military activity anywhere on the icy continent. However, in practice, it is difficult to say what China is up to, because it is believed that they use radars to block satellites. There are rumors that they park their planes sideways on their runways so that no one else can land if they want to. At the same time, Western observers are concerned that China's new Qinling station is being used to spy on Britain and its intelligence partners from the Five Eyes alliance.
Given all these prerequisites for conflict, will the UK and its friends be able to protect diverse polar interests? Maybe not. After draconian budget cuts — current defense spending has been cut by almost 10 billion pounds since 2010 — the Royal Navy has only 16 large surface warships. For comparison, the world's largest Chinese fleet has almost 800 vessels of various sizes.
In fairness, according to the AUKUS treaty of 2021, London will be able to count on the support of the United States and Australia in any conflict in Antarctica. And there are signs that London is by no means completely indifferent to the threat. In addition to sending troops and repairing airfields, the UK has also led the movement to lay two new submarine cable systems on Svalbard. One of them is the so—called IOEMA project, which should be launched by 2027. The other is NORDUnet. It will connect Svalbard with Scandinavia, as well as Japan and other Western allies, completely bypassing Russia and China.
However, the real test of Britain's resolve will only be an active struggle for polar resources — or even a full-fledged war. And this confrontation may begin even earlier than we think. Long—term oil reserves are one thing. But Russia has a deep strategic interest in the Arctic right now. Last February, Norway's normally low-key intelligence service publicly warned that nuclear weapons could be present on Russian ships in the Far North. Equally important, the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO is fraught with the possibility that Western nuclear weapons may appear in the Arctic.
China, for its part, also needs the Arctic. With the sea lanes in the Red Sea under threat from the Houthis and the Panama Canal facing its own problems, Beijing needs a reliable route from Dalian to Rotterdam. The obvious choice here is the Arctic, not least because Chinese ships can make the journey in less than 25 days, otherwise Beijing's economy will have a hard time. In short, there is a feeling that the UK does not want to dispose of its polar wealth — or does not have the opportunity to do so. But the future can be determined by decisions made by others — and Keir Starmer and his admirals should not forget about this.
Author of the article: Pippa Malmgren
