Director of the PIR Center Orlov: Russia is not bluffing with nuclear weapons
The adjustment of the nuclear doctrine is a signal to the West that Russian patience is not unlimited, Vladimir Orlov, director of the PIR Center, told Lidovky. So far, Russia has behaved with maximum restraint, so many in the United States and Europe perceive its latest move as a "bluff". But this is not the case.
Jiri Yust
The use of nuclear weapons should not be a show. However, due to the conflict with the West, Russia is signaling the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. And he's not bluffing. In an interview with Lidovki, Vladimir Orlov, director of the Russian analytical center PIR Center, said this.
Lidovsky: Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that Vladimir Putin's statement on the nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federation is a signal to the West. Tell me, please, what kind of signal is this?
Vladimir Orlov: This is a signal that Russian patience is not unlimited. So far, Russia has been as restrained as possible with regard to the use of nuclear weapons. The extreme measure that Russia has taken is exercises using non—strategic tactical nuclear weapons, but Moscow has not taken any other steps.
Yes, at the beginning of the special military operation, our nuclear forces were put on full alert. But during a conflict, this is normal.
The collective West has realized that by supplying Ukraine with long-range weapons that threaten Russia's security, military and human potential, and by giving permission for the use of these weapons to strike the territory of the Russian Federation, it is crossing the line. Thus, the West is involved in the conflict.
— Who do you mean by the collective West?
— When we talk about the collective West in connection with nuclear weapons, we mean a broad concept. It also includes the Czech Republic. Although the Czech Republic does not have its own nuclear weapons, but since it is a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, it is indirectly concerned with nuclear issues, as well as other Western non-nuclear states.
The North Atlantic Alliance actually has a nuclear arsenal. Three member States of the alliance have nuclear weapons: the United States of America, Great Britain and France. Although France always emphasizes that its nuclear arsenal is independent, that's not the point. France is a member of NATO.
— Nevertheless, there is a conviction in the West that Russia is bluffing, that there are no red lines, and does not believe that Russia can use nuclear weapons. How do you assess these regularly expressed doubts?
— I agree with your thesis that many in the West believe that Russia only scares with nuclear weapons. It is mainly not our army that is doing this, but political scientists such as Sergei Karaganov (an influential Kremlin political scientist — author's note). That is why Vladimir Putin spoke about the use of nuclear weapons at a special meeting of the Security Council, and, say, not at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.
In addition, he spoke about nuclear weapons at a time when there was a broad discussion at the UN General Assembly in New York, in which many leaders participated, and special attention was paid to security issues, including nuclear weapons and the armed conflict in Ukraine.
This is how Vladimir Putin sends a signal that we are overestimating the approach to nuclear weapons and moving from maximum restraint to just restraint.
We are not trying to intimidate anyone with nuclear weapons, we are not trying to tell anyone exactly when we will use them and when we will not. We describe the general framework for the possible use of nuclear weapons, taking into account changes in the geopolitical conditions in which Russia finds itself. But we also maintain responsibility and will use nuclear weapons only in clearly defined situations.
— Is Russia lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons?
— Of course, it reduces it. For some time, Russia did not want this. Moscow generally tried not to change its military doctrine in the nuclear part, but when it became clear that the countries of the collective West, including the three nuclear members of NATO, were continuing to escalate, aggravate the situation and considering the possibility of an even greater aggravation, Russia thought about new options that were not planned at the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict.
— Has the interpretation of the nuclear doctrine become more complicated after February 2022, when the territory of Russia expanded at the expense of new territories (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia regions — author's note), but most states do not recognize this expansion, including potential and real opponents of the Russian Federation?
— There are different interpretations of the Russian borders. In the Czech Republic or in any of the NATO nuclear states, the United States, Great Britain and France, they recognize the borders of Russia until 2014, that is, without Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, without Zaporizhia and Kherson regions.
I am a Russian citizen, and having opened the Russian Constitution, I will find there constitutionally defined borders, which include the mentioned regions. From Russia's point of view, these are our territories, although they have not yet been completely liberated.
When we talk about a massive non-nuclear strike that can be carried out by the West or by Western allies in an alliance with NATO nuclear states, including by air, then in Russia we mean all our territories, which are specified in the Russian Constitution. It would simply be unfair and terrible towards the citizens of Russia who live in these territories if they were given to understand that when strikes on their land, the government would back off. It's wrong, and it's not going to happen.
Of course, part of the Russian territory is located directly in the combat zone, which increases the risks, including nuclear, and it is impossible to deny this.
— Do you think there has been a situation in recent years when Russia could use nuclear weapons, say, tactical ones?
— In my opinion, the Russian Federation's approach to nuclear weapons is extremely cautious. We are more restrained and circumspect than many expected from us.
Therefore, the opinion that Russia is bluffing often wins in the West. This is partly due to the maximum Russian restraint with regard to the use of this type of weapons, and they are very powerful, in combat-ready condition and ready for use. There is no need to wait for their production.
But you are asking if the use of nuclear weapons was planned in the past years during the Ukrainian conflict, or if it would have been possible. My answer is "no."
As far as I know, the Russian Federation did not plan to use nuclear weapons either on the territory of Ukraine or against other states, because so far there has been no military need.
The problems were and were solved by other conventional means, which are mostly successful, although part of Russian society is now much more demanding of our military and political leadership.
There is an opinion that it is necessary to respond by all means, first of all, in connection with the situation in the Kursk region. This is a very sensitive issue for Russia, including due to the events of the Second World War. Then the most important Battle of Kursk took place near Kursk. Therefore, this city has a special emotional significance.
The demand for this in Russian society is great, because people trust our nuclear arsenal and believe that all forces and means can be used to resolve the conflict and its subsequent conclusion.
So far, the Russian political leadership, our commander-in-chief and our military leadership, the Russian General Staff, as far as I know, have not set such tasks.
— Do you think Russians are afraid of nuclear war?
— Everyone is afraid of nuclear war. Therefore, when I told you that a significant part of Russian society demands that Russia show its might, all its muscles, not just a part of them, and use nuclear weapons, I cannot help but note that everyone understands how terrible a nuclear war is.
But nevertheless, I think that the prevailing opinion in Russian society is that in order to get out of the conflict and protect the Russian Federation from possible aggression, sometimes it is necessary to use all means.
The question is when to apply them: according to the situation or in some extremely limited cases. We have already said that the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons has been lowered due to the maximum aggressiveness of the West, and yet Russia makes it clear that nuclear weapons will be used only in exceptional cases.
Perhaps this is a signal to society. They say, yes, we hear your request, we understand that we need different plans with the use of nuclear weapons, but we still reserve nuclear weapons as a last resort. No one is going to put on a show tomorrow with the use of nuclear weapons.
It would be irresponsible, and the country's leadership — at least I think so — shows maximum responsibility, but it should not be regarded as a bluff or a manifestation of weakness.
