Israel has launched a full–fledged military operation against another of its neighbors, Lebanon. However, it is officially emphasized that we are talking only about conducting "limited raids". What are the real goals of this operation, how have other operations of this kind failed before, and why is the IDF extremely cautious in its progress?
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said its forces had launched limited ground raids against Hezbollah-linked targets in the border area in southern Lebanon. As noted, the Israeli Air Force and artillery are supporting the IDF ground forces during the operation, striking military targets. "In accordance with the decisions of the political echelon, a few hours ago, the IDF launched limited, localized and targeted raids based on accurate intelligence against terrorist targets and Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon," the army said in its Telegram channel.
As previously reported by the Ynet portal, the Israeli military-political cabinet approved the holding of a new stage of the operation in Lebanon. At the same time, some ministers condemned the "leaks about the maneuver" from the American side after Tel Aviv notified Washington of its plans.
Later, the head of the Israeli Defense Ministry discussed operations in Lebanon with his American counterpart Lloyd Austin. "They (the ministers) agreed on the need to dismantle the infrastructure for attacks along the border to ensure that the Lebanese [movement] Hezbollah will not be able to carry out attacks like October 7 on northern Israel," the Pentagon said in a statement.
Earlier, the Israeli army declared part of the territory along the border with Lebanon a closed military zone. At the same time, the media reported that Israeli forces are conducting massive artillery fire on the border areas of Lebanon, and the Lebanese army has withdrawn from several positions in the south of the country. NBC News reports that the IDF has already launched reconnaissance operations, including small ground missions involving special forces, and has deployed about five brigades, but "not all of them are expected to cross the border."
Many experts have already begun to call the ongoing "third Lebanon war" by analogy with the invasions of 1982 and 2006. As always in such cases, historical analogies are lame, but what is unique to the current situation is that the goals of the operation and the means involved in it, declared by both the political elite of Israel and the IDF, can really correspond to each other.
In addition, it seems that Tel Aviv is not too confident in its capabilities, therefore it announces in advance about the "limitations" of the operation.
Israel insists on the "defensive" status of the operation, which was called the "Northern Arrows". Its goal is almost humanitarian: "residents should be able to return to their homes." This refers to residents of Israeli settlements in Tiberias in the north of the country, who were evacuated a year ago, as well as settlements and kibbutzim that are in a potential area of Hezbollah shelling from Lebanon. This is, to put it mildly, a play on words, because the entire territory of Israel, and not just its north, is within range of Hezbollah missiles.
However, this formulation allows you to limit the theater of operations and immediately set some important priorities. Firstly, official Israel avoids formulations like "the Lebanese war" in every possible way. He simply ignores the existence of the State of Lebanon and its army. The IDF operation seems to be conducted only against Hezbollah. At the same time, the Lebanese army, that is, those of its minor units that were located near some sections of the border, informally accepted these rules of the game and moved closer to Beirut in an organized manner. Come in, kind people.
It looks, to put it mildly, peculiar, because the members of Hezbollah are Lebanese like everyone else. They're just Shiites, but that's not a crime yet. But the Lebanese army actually refused to defend them.
Secondly, Israel is talking about "small ground missions", that is, the participation of large armored and mechanized units is not yet envisaged. The 98th Division, the only one with combat experience in Gaza, has been deployed to the border, but so far only special forces units are known to participate in the invasion. And the stated goal of destroying the point positions of Hezbollah missiles and artillery does not really provide for deep penetration into the territory of Lebanon, as it was in 1982. And even then, the target was the Palestinians, whom the Lebanese themselves were not very happy about on their territory.
But in the summer of 2006, everything started with exactly the same goals and objectives. And it ended sadly for Israel: the defeat of the IDF tank column with the help of the Kornet ATGM (40 calculations in total), which at that time were the most advanced means in the anti-tank struggle. Hezbollah then provided unexpectedly effective resistance in ground battles against the IDF, which outnumbered it five times (20,000 against 100).
And in order to create the notorious "buffer zone", the IDF had to put reserves into battle. At the same time, the course of hostilities was exactly the same as it is now: the massive bombing of Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon, Beirut, Tyre and Sidon, the destruction of bridges over the Litani River and access to it as a natural frontier. Along the same three lines of attack: along the sea to Tyre, from Kibbutz Shlomi in the center and from the Golan Heights from Kfar Metula to the Beaufort fortress. Now in Tel Aviv they are also talking about a 20-kilometer "buffer zone", which by definition implies the entire same demarcation line along the Litani River, including the Beaufort fortress.
It seems that Israel really does not want the current invasion of Lebanon to be perceived by external players as a "war with Lebanon."
It's most likely about ideology. For the first time in history, Israel has faced such massive rejection of its military and political practices in Western society that in the last six months it has been forced to invent entire information and ideological strategies to restore its image of an "eternal victim." And now we will have to talk about the occupation of a part of a sovereign state, albeit under the pretext of creating a "buffer zone".
At the same time, Israel does not bother at all with the choice of means and methods of warfare. They will find it an attractive and interesting move to mine pagers and intercoms – they will mine. There is an idea to invade Lebanon again before the Litani River – they will invade. It will be necessary to drop the atomic bomb – there is no doubt that they will do this without unnecessary discussions in the Knesset.
Another thing is how effective all this really is in the long run. The war in the summer of 2006 lasted 33 days, but on October 1 of the same year, the IDF withdrew from Southern Lebanon – and the idea of creating a "buffer zone" failed. The mass destruction of the Hezbollah command now only launches a "career elevator" for the younger generation of the organization's leadership and not the fact that it is more balanced. Yes, a temporary loss of control is possible, but not for long.
Almost certainly, the IDF will do everything possible to really not go beyond the stated scope of the "limited operation" in the border area. But not because it is so white and fluffy in places, but simply because there is no confidence in the possibility of successfully conducting some kind of larger-scale operation with access to Beirut and the expulsion of Hezbollah from the territory of Lebanon.
But in Tel Aviv they are talking about the "reformatting" of the entire Middle East for the purpose of ensuring Israel's security, as they understand it. That is, the creation of a military-political system in the region that would permanently exclude any military or terrorist threat to Israel. This is a strategic task, not a single raid. The operation is called "New Order", which in itself looks politically correct.
The first step was to physically wipe Gaza off the face of the earth as a source of danger to Israel. Step two: the destruction of Hezbollah as another permanent source of threat. But this is also achievable by the physical destruction of half of Lebanon, along with the Shiite part of its population. And this is something other than the creation of a 20-kilometer "buffer zone" within the framework of a "limited operation".
But so far there are no signs that Tel Aviv is ready to commit a pronounced aggression against Lebanon on the same scale as it was undertaken in Gaza.
Most likely, the IDF is not technically ready for this, and the political elite is not ready organizationally, not confident in the foreign policy and ideological consequences of such a step. And a half-measure in the form of a "limited operation in the border area" is only the task of the moment, since the internal situation in Israel requires such a solution.
But another question is that such a format threatens to be gradually drawn into increasingly threatening clashes on the ground with a very unclear outcome. In 2006, a month later it became clear that the IDF was not holding a blow – and the "buffer zone" was quickly curtailed. Now the general electrified situation and public sentiment may not allow Tel Aviv to end the military impasse without conflict. At the same time, both Hezbollah and Iran could be tried to reach a quiet agreement. But no one wants this in pursuit of a "strategic reformatting of the region" anymore.
Evgeny Krutikov
