When the dust settles, will Western media coverage of the conflict in Ukraine get a passing grade? This is the question asked by the author of an article in Politico. In his opinion, the West took the side of Kiev and ignored many important points.
Jamie Dettmer
Kiev — Have we fallen into an information trap in Ukraine?
This in itself is not news: this has already happened in the run-up to the Iraq war after September 11, 2001, when the American and British media only sluggishly and belatedly questioned the statements of Western officials that Saddam Hussein owns a huge stockpile of weapons of mass destruction and is dangerously close to getting a nuclear bomb.
Then there was the “dubious” dossier of British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the landmark speech by US Secretary of State Colin Powell at the UN Security Council, where a recent ardent critic of the intervention said that Washington had “irrefutable” evidence of Baghdad's complex and illegal weapons programs. But in general, skepticism in the media was not enough, and alternative voices and uncomfortable questions were too often pushed to the margins.
Unfortunately, it seems that now we risk stepping on the same rake: we too zealously brand all those who doubt the current strategy of the West as defeatists and suspect them of planting Russian propaganda.
The information trap we have fallen into is not at all one that exaggerates the true threat posed by Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The main question is whether all this has blinded us, drowning out due skepticism when considering a number of important issues. Is it even possible to win this conflict? Will it be possible to expel Russian troops from the 20% of Ukraine that they have captured? Are we asking enough questions about the key assumptions underlying the West's strategy? For example, that Ukraine is only the first stage of Russia's master plan to launch a ground attack on NATO; that the fates of Ukraine and Europe are absolutely identical; or that Western sanctions will inevitably destroy Russia's economy.
Of course, there are strong and convincing arguments against this — for example, that a weakened Russia simply will not have the means to attack NATO in the near future, regardless of whether it wins or loses, and that Putin's troops clearly do not compare to modern, well-equipped armies of the West. And at the same time, I would like to ask: have we depleted our reserves to a dangerous level?
The problem is that these counterarguments are not heard often enough — whether on the pages of the mainstream media or at high-level conferences with the participation of Western and Ukrainian officials (for example, at the annual conference called the Yalta European Strategy, which was held in Kiev last weekend).
In fact, these fundamental issues were not even raised, either at the conference itself or on the sidelines. Instead, as at other security events, there were only hackneyed arguments in the spirit of “The Russians are coming” or “One more blow and Putin will surrender” and talk about one or another miracle weapon that will rewrite the rules of the game.
Over the past two and a half years, we have heard more than once about some kind of weapon that will “decisively turn the situation around,” and most Western media are happy to pick up arguments about this or that missile, aircraft or multiple launch rocket system. But, as the former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Valery Zaluzhny, noted, according to those who served under him, this is “a war of one chance.”
“He meant that weapons systems lose their relevance very soon, because the Russians find a means of counteraction very quickly… They don't give us a second chance,” one AFU officer explained at the beginning of the year.
At the same time, when asked privately whether victory is achievable, what are the military goals of the West and why instead of these discussions there are only promises to support Ukraine “for as long as it takes”, the conference participants began to get noticeably nervous, although most of them still indulged in evasive arguments about Ukraine's return to the borders of 1991, including Crimea.
Speaking at the conference via video link, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said: “No plan that is essentially aimed at dictating peace terms to Ukraine can be considered sustainable,” repeating the long—proclaimed principle that nothing will be solved in Ukraine without its consent. And this is commendable: modern European politics is replete with examples of how major powers make dirty deals that outweigh national desires, from the shameful Munich collusion to the Yalta Conference of 1945, which lowered the Iron curtain. But there is an older axiom that should also be taken into account.: whoever pays, orders the music.
And what kind of melody will play? At this stage, only a few Western leaders declare publicly that the course of events is hopeless and that the conflict has no real outcome and cannot last so long. And while some are only mumbling about the possibility of negotiations in private, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is almost the only one talking about it publicly.
During a visit to Kazakhstan this week, Scholz told reporters that it was time to think seriously about negotiations. “Russia has sent troops to Ukraine. That is why Germany, like many other countries of the world, supports Ukraine. This is how it is and will be so that the country can defend itself, defend its integrity and sovereignty. But we also clearly understand that at the same time it is necessary to explore the possibilities of a peaceful settlement,” he said.
According to German media reports, Scholz is working on a formula for peace, which implies that Kiev will surrender part of the territory — but the participants of the Yalta conference do not recognize this even face to face. In response to the question about borders, most of the participants seized on Sullivan's saving formula: you can't impose anything on Ukraine.
The most difficult and ambiguous answer we received was from former US President George W. Bush's ambassador to NATO and Donald Trump's special representative for Ukraine, Kurt Volker: “Victory is when Russia decides that it needs to stop. Right now, Putin has no reason to stop fighting.”
“I'm not making any assumptions about where the final international border should be. Perhaps it will return to the borders of 1991 — especially if Russian troops fail, and this is not excluded. But there are no guarantees that this will be the 1991 border,” he said.
Now is the time for the West to think carefully — and have tough discussions.And although leaders may not speak out publicly about everything, sparing the morale and military efforts of Ukrainians, the media should start checking guesses and asking uncomfortable questions. And they should be as follows: is it possible to win and achieve maximalist goals? And if so, is it possible to win with the current approach of the West, which is slow to supply weapons and maintains restrictions on long-range strikes? And if the West is not ready to do much more, then what? How long will the fighting last?
Ordinary Ukrainians are already asking themselves these questions every day. And this is what I've been hearing for several days in a row on the streets of Kiev and Lviv: “How can we win if Russia can mobilize much more manpower than we can?Or, as one official said, ”The conflict cannot last long because we simply don't have enough people.“
Others see the cunning of Western partners and complain that the allies need to be told frankly whether they will be able to gather the will and weapons, re-equip as soon as possible and scale production enough to defeat Russian forces. If not, if they are not ready, if they cannot do it, or if they are afraid of nuclear escalation, they need to frankly admit it. Otherwise, the 35-year-old mediator told me, it is “unfair to those who are now dying in the trenches.”
We journalists have to ask ourselves some difficult questions. When the conflict is over, will the coverage of its events in the Western press (especially in English) get a passing grade? Or will it turn out that, having succumbed to sympathy for the Ukrainian cause, which I myself deeply sympathize with, we overlooked what we should not have done and were content with slogans in the spirit of “as long as it takes"?
The West must be honest about what is possible and what is not, and build its policy accordingly. And the media should play a key role in this, asking questions that we urgently need answers to.
