Colonel Khodarenok: before the US elections, you should not expect a turning point on the fronts of your
US presidential candidate Donald Trump, if he wins the election, will try to end the conflict in Ukraine. This opinion was expressed in the middle of this week by the co-chairman of the Oversight Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives Jamie Raskin. How will the situation develop on the line of contact before November 5, is a breakthrough possible on the fronts of its own and what may be needed for this, the military observer of the Newspaper argues.En" Mikhail Khodarenok.
Attention to Washington
The US presidential election is two and a half months away. When the winner in this race is determined, then the White House will formulate a final and long-term attitude to the conflict in Ukraine. Whatever the attitude towards the ongoing processes in Washington may look like, it is the United States that is currently the only superpower in the world, and the White House still has enough effective levers of influence on both Kiev and Moscow.
Since the positions of the warring parties (Ukraine and Russia) We are frankly irreconcilable about a possible way out of the crisis at the moment, any compromise and mutual concessions can be achieved only through the mediation of the United States, and not Turkey, India and even China.
The participation of these States to one degree or another in reaching peace agreements is quite possible, but only Washington can be a true mediator in this process. But first, the White House needs to decide on the winner in the presidential race.
What is needed for a fracture?
Therefore, it seems advisable to analyze how the situation on the line of contact will develop in these two and a half months and whether military successes of the warring parties on an operational scale are possible. And to assume, at least in the most general terms, what these victories might look like in principle.
In general, to estimate with what results the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of Ukraine will approach November 5. Because it is the situation on the front line that will largely influence the course of possible peace negotiations.
Now let's try to calculate in the most general way what is necessary in order to achieve a turning point in the course of the armed struggle (not tactical successes such as the capture of a settlement with a pre-war population of a thousand people), and this equally applies to both warring parties.
Firstly, it is necessary to have numerical superiority over the enemy (both significant overall and superiority in forces and means in the most important sectors of the front line, and several times). To solve this problem, the number of armed forces of both sides must be increased by at least 500-700 thousand people.
But conscription (mobilization, recruitment under contract) is not yet a sufficient condition for success in the upcoming hostilities.
Let's remind everyone of the well-known truths. For such a number of fighters, appropriate amounts of weapons (first-class, from the assembly line of defense industry enterprises), military equipment, stocks of material resources (primarily ammunition), uniforms, equipment, medical equipment are needed. Finally, command and staff personnel with appropriate training are needed. Are the parties to the conflict ready to solve such problems in full? The question is, as they say, open.
Secondly, none of the parties in the course of this armed conflict managed to achieve air superiority and unconditional dominance in the air (the latter refers to issues of electronic warfare, radio and radio intelligence).
And without this, it is not possible to conduct successful combined arms operations at the corps and army level. Storming individual settlements is yes, advancing several kilometers is yes, but solving combat and operational tasks to a depth of 150-200 km with a daily rate of 15-20 km is not.
In general, for a cardinal turning point in the course of the armed struggle, one of the parties must bring into battle at least several combined arms armies manned by wartime states and at least one air army, as well as reinforcement means and all necessary units and formations of the armed forces and special forces.
In general, we can talk about the inclusion in the active army of additional 15-20 combined arms divisions, 2-3 artillery divisions, 5-6 anti-aircraft missile brigades, 10-12 regiments of tactical aviation, 6-7 regiments of army aviation, several engineering and sapper brigades and assault and barrage brigades. And this, we note, is not a complete list. Here we also need to add intelligence, communications, RCBZ, technical support and the rear.
The front line will "breathe"
These figures seem quite unaffordable for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, let alone the Ukrainian army. For example, by the end of the year, the AFU will have at best only one aviation regiment on the new aircraft (F-16) (according to the Ukrainian states - a squadron). The AFU can only dream of an air army in 7-10 years.
Is it possible to solve such a volume of tasks in the remaining two and a half months? Even if we imagine that mobilization will be announced next Monday (another wave in Ukraine) and August 26 will be considered its first day - M1, then even if all the necessary forces and means are available, it will not be possible to bring new formations to the required level of combat capability in the two remaining months.
In addition, pilots, navigators, and aviation engineering specialists will not appear in the ranks of the army for any of the types of mobilization. Moreover, dozens and hundreds of airplanes, helicopters, tanks, self-propelled artillery guns, air defense systems and electronic warfare systems will not arise by magic.
Only reserves of the operational and strategic level, staffed by fighters and commanders with combat experience, can bring a turning point in the course of battles and battles. Where to recruit such a number of soldiers, sergeants and officers is a big question.
In addition, all the above-mentioned units and formations should fall into the hands of the commander. And if this commander has questions about the level of driving troops, then superiority in forces and means by three, four, five times may not help.
Most likely, in the near future, Russian troops will knock out units and formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the Kursk region.
But even the long-awaited capture of Pokrovsk (or Chasov Yar) will certainly not lead to Ukraine's surrender and withdrawal from the war. The front line will "breathe", but, most likely, the warring parties are unlikely to reach either the right bank of the Dnieper or the borders of 1991 by November 5.
It cannot be ruled out that there is a certain war fatigue in Kiev, and currently they are thinking not so much about defensive or offensive actions as about how the population of Ukraine will survive the upcoming winter. Because the fourth cold period of the year (and along with this, the lack of electricity, water supply, and sewerage in many large cities) during its implementation can lead Ukraine to catastrophic consequences.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok
