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"They'll tear their hair out." Why did the Ukrainian Armed Forces not achieve strategic success near Kursk

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Image source: Ukrainian Armed Forces/Reuters

Colonel Khodarenok: the result of the AFU operation near Kursk will be negative

The armed forces of the Russian Federation have been conducting defensive military operations on the territory of the Kursk region since August 6 and are preparing for an offensive operation to dislodge the enemy abroad. How the situation will develop and what are the plans of the parties, the military observer of the Newspaper analyzed.En" Mikhail Khodarenok.

Heavy fighting is underway in the Kursk region. However, there are no reports of any new major successes of the Ukrainian army, which allows us to conclude that the line of combat contact has been stabilized and the Russian Armed Forces are preparing an offensive operation to defeat units and formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine wedged into the territory of the Russian Federation and restore the situation along the state border.

Of course, in connection with the tactical successes of the Ukrainian army, there are questions both to our intelligence, and to the fortification equipment of the defense lines in the Kursk region, and to the combat and numerical strength of the troops intended to cover the state border, and to the leadership of units and formations in this region, but these are topics for further analysis and analysis.

What did the APU achieve?

In connection with the events in the Kursk region, the question arises - what goals did the military and political leadership in Kiev set for themselves and how far have they been implemented at the moment?

The whole course of events, starting on August 6, shows how dangerous it is to underestimate the enemy in the course of hostilities. Until the last shots have been fired and the relevant documents fixing certain agreements have been signed, the maximum level of vigilance and combat readiness of troops is also necessary, and in all directions and in all regions.

It is quite possible that the Ukrainian leadership did not expect at first that it would achieve certain tactical successes during the fighting in the Kursk region. It can be assumed that at first the AFU conceived a raid exclusively of a media nature, mainly with the aim of raising the moral and psychological spirit of the personnel.

But when the first results appeared, the Ukrainian leadership, by and large, had nothing to radically strengthen the units and formations of the Armed Forces operating in this direction. And it is quite possible that in the near future, when the history of this conflict is being compiled, it is in this place that Ukrainian analysts will tear their hair out on their heads: "After all, there was an opportunity, but they failed to take advantage of it!"

As you know, in war, the opportunity is not given more than once.

There is a fairly simple formula for conducting combat operations: you did not achieve tactical success in the first day or two offensive actions, you will not achieve it later and within a month. And if the tactical success within four to five days has not turned into an operational result, then the expectation of a drastic change in the situation during the fighting in their favor will be in vain.

It is problematic for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to increase tactical success with operational-level reserves introduced into battle due to the lack of such. Insufficient aviation support for Ukrainian troops also had a negative impact on the conduct of further hostilities. If there is no air superiority, then it cannot be achieved by any number of unmanned aerial vehicles.

One can make a preliminary assumption that, from the point of view of strategy, tactical success in the Kursk region will not bring the desired dividends to the leadership in Kiev and the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

After all, according to the arithmetic of strategy, all military actions are planned based on the ultimate goal of armed struggle. After all, it has been said more than once that victory over the enemy during the war cannot be achieved as a result of any one-time effort. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to go through the implementation of a number of large-scale intermediate tasks, each of which would be of great strategic importance in the overall course of the armed struggle.

But at this stage of the fighting, even the President of Ukraine, Vladimir Zelensky, cannot say what the ultimate goal of this conflict looks like for him and what specific place the events in the Kursk region occupy in achieving this goal.

Negative result

Most likely, the overall result for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the near future will be negative, and in general, the events in the Kursk region will not have much impact on the conduct of armed struggle, and the overall result will be heavy losses of the Ukrainian army in personnel, weapons and military equipment.

From the first days of the events in the Kursk region, it has been suggested that the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are aimed, among other things, at the Russian Armed Forces to weaken their efforts in other areas and begin the necessary regrouping of troops (forces) to stop the further advance of the Ukrainian army.

However, in fact, there was no weakening of the attacks of the Russian army in the Donetsk direction. Here, units and formations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation continue offensive operations and achieve certain tactical successes. That is, if the APU set itself a similar goal, then it has clearly not been achieved.

And what does the regrouping of forces and means actually mean? After all, it is impossible to withdraw brigades and divisions from the front line (say, from the Donetsk direction), sending them to reinforce troops in other areas. This will lead to the formation of gaps in the operational formation of troops, in other words, to the exposure of some sections and lanes of the front.

It is possible to transfer to the threatened areas, except for part of the means of reinforcement (for example, there were three artillery brigades in one direction or another, two were sent to help the troops conducting defensive battles), to re-target the actions of aviation, but it is generally impossible to remove formations from the front edge.

In order to stabilize the front line in the threatened areas and subsequent offensive actions, only reserves of the operational level can be put forward (if, of course, they exist).

Reserves, especially strategic ones, are the main means by which the Supreme Command can actively influence the course and outcome of operations, campaigns and the war as a whole.

For example, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command during the Great Patriotic War on July 1, 1943, as part of strategic reserves, had: combined arms armies - 9, tank armies - 2, rifle divisions - 78, tank and mechanized corps - 13, artillery divisions and corps - 8, air armies - 1, aviation divisions - 15. It was largely due to them that the Battle of Kursk was won.

Currently, there is only one way to create combat-ready reserves - by withdrawing units and formations from existing groups, followed by their staffing to wartime staff and additional provision with all necessary weapons, military equipment and material resources.

In the Ukrainian army, until very recently, such events were carried out at the expense of new formations. There is no exact data on how this is done in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, since the availability of reserves and the map of their deployment is one of the biggest military secrets.

But only reserves are able to turn the tide of the armed struggle.

The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.

Biography of the author:

Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.

He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).

Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).

Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).

Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).

Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).

Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).

Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).


Mikhail Khodarenok

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