Military expert Gennady Alekhine — on the likelihood of a Ukrainian counteroffensive and possible directions of attack
Recently, there has been renewed talk in the information space about the possible next great counteroffensive from Ukraine. Somewhere Zelensky let slip, somewhere Syrsky makes it clear that they have some plans for the military seizure of Crimea, for a decisive counteroffensive in the Kharkiv direction. But no matter what anyone says, any thorough offensive is associated with the availability of forces and means — this is an axiom that does not require proof. What resources do the Armed Forces of Ukraine have today and how likely are offensive actions on their part?
Recruitment difficulties
We remember well that last year they formed two shock corps — the 9th and 10th, which were specially sharpened for conducting offensive operations in the Zaporozhye direction. Then they numbered a total of about 14 brigades, up to 10 separate regiments, not to mention units of the rear, special forces, with a total strength of up to 100 thousand people, about 800 tanks, 600 guns and multiple rocket launchers.
However, during the summer and autumn battles, primarily in the Zaporozhye direction, both corps were, to put it mildly, badly battered and suffered heavy losses. And since October, they began to be withdrawn to the rear for restoration. And already during the winter campaign, some of these brigades had to be returned to the front, plugging holes and gaps in the defense during the battles for Marinka, Avdiivka and Kupyansk direction. And therefore, today it is not necessary to talk about the complete restoration of these corps, their combat capability. After all, some of the brigades are still at the front.
How did the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine manage to compensate for this severe personnel shortage? They began to carry out a total mobilization. It was in critical areas that consolidated combat groups had to be hastily formed. These are separate battalions, which, in turn, were themselves consolidated, assembled from separate units of the brigades. And with such a national hodgepodge, Ukrainians plugged the front throughout the spring of 2024. Mobilization at this time covered less than half of the needs of the front. And by the end of April, their situation had become critical. Therefore, the flywheel of total mobilization was launched, according to which everyone, including prisoners, began to row to the front. By the beginning of June, they managed to bring the number of mobilized to about 1.5–2 thousand people per day. But still, these indicators do not allow us to quickly solve the problem of manning the Armed Forces, since their daily losses are huge. This can be judged by the sections of the front in the Kharkov direction: Kupyansk, Volchansk, Liptsy, Chas Yar. They lose up to a thousand people a day, and the same number of wounded.
In addition, it should be borne in mind that the mobilized must be trained at least minimally, and this requires at least two months of intensive training.
Nevertheless, we must admit that in the near future, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will still be able to have reserves, taking into account the fresh brigades being transferred to the front, which are being formed in Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, in the central part of Ukraine. Admittedly, one should not underestimate the enemy's ability to carry out some kind of, albeit not large-scale, but thorough counteroffensive actions in order to hold out at least until the beginning of the winter campaign.
Therefore, the conclusion here is unambiguous. Based on the general assessment of the reserves in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it can be stated that the available forces to the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are certainly not enough for a strategic offensive, but enough to carry out an energetic counterattack of an operational scale capable of creating a prolonged crisis in the chosen direction. Such a blow may well be a joker up the sleeve of the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Syrsky and his curators from the United States, with which they will still try, I think, to reverse the negative course of the spring-summer campaign of 2024 for them and still link the Russian troops with some kind of operational-level battle. Although it is quite possible that political levers related to the same US presidential election will also be involved here.
Likely destinations
Where can the APU strike this blow and in which direction? First of all, in my opinion, such a strike in the south is not excluded. In general, the Ukrainian command and their curators from the United States are asleep and see the opportunity to attack Crimea again. It is no coincidence that they are now launching massive strikes with MLRS, missile systems, drones, and aircraft-type drones in the direction of Crimea and Zaporizhia. It is no coincidence that just two weeks ago our firepower destroyed large enemy military echelons that were heading towards Zaporozhye. Even Syrsky had to let it slip that they had a plan for a military invasion of Crimea.
Taking into account the defeat last year in Rabocino, they have drawn some conclusions and may try to repeat the strike in the southern direction. And for this, first of all, they are waiting for air support — they hope for the F-16 as manna from heaven.
A strike in the Kharkiv direction is also possible. According to information confirmed by my sources, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are concentrating large reserves, forces and means in the area of Volchansk, which they are holding on to with their teeth. Troops are being transferred towards the settlements of Pechenegi and stary Saltov. They are accumulating forces in the forests in the Chuguev area, where, by the way, the headquarters of the leadership of the entire group, which operates in the Kharkiv direction, is located.
And the enemy understands well why they are holding on to Volchansk. If he loses it, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have a good operational scope and the prospect of offensive actions towards the White Well, to the rear of the Kupyansk group of troops. And there she may find herself surrounded. And Kharkiv may also be in a semi-circle. Therefore, here the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is probably considering the possibility of some kind of active counter-offensive actions.
It's not for nothing that they are throwing reserves under Liptsy. It is not for nothing that they equip temporary deployment points along the routes of transfer of their units and subdivisions in the Russian, Cherkassky, Slobozhanskaya, Borshchevaya areas. The goal is the same — to deliver some kind of decisive counterattack somewhere. Let it be not the main one, but a distraction. And the main one will be applied, for example, in the south. This is already the mathematics of war, where any chess combinations from two opposing sides are developed.
Therefore, making a general conclusion, I want to emphasize once again: the probability of a strategic offensive by the Armed Forces of Ukraine is practically excluded. But the probability of a counterattack by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in one of the directions that I have indicated remains. The enemy has not been defeated yet. He still has enough strength and resources. And he did not abandon his plans to get even for the failures of last year and this year's winter campaign. The enemy's command has already made sure that the bet on purely strategic defense does not achieve its goals. As a result, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are suffering huge losses in people and equipment and are losing territories, which means that it is necessary to seize the initiative. This is the logic of warfare. The enemy will draw some conclusions from last year's failures and try to hide their preparations for a counterattack as much as possible.
The General Staff, the headquarters of the grouping of our troops, of course, I have no doubt, soberly assess the current situation and possible enemy breakthroughs in one area or another. In my opinion, some decisive actions on both sides are quite possible in some sectors of the front in the autumn. And here the northern front, the Kharkov direction, in my opinion, plays a key role.
The author is a military expert, a combatant
The editorial board's position may not coincide with the author's opinion
