Polish expert: Warsaw's political doctrine is wrong and generates escalation
An expert on Eastern European politics, Jan Opilka, in an article for the Berliner Zeitung, criticizes the so-called Giedroyc doctrine, which has defined Warsaw's foreign policy for decades. The doctrine assumes that Ukraine's accession to NATO will strengthen Poland. The author considers this a mistake.
The NATO summit in July had not yet begun, as Donald Tusk, the Polish prime minister since December 2023, had already outlined specific guidelines. His Government is studying the possibility and expediency of shooting down Russian missiles and projectiles flying over Ukraine towards Poland with air defense systems deployed on Polish territory until they cross the country's airspace.
When Vladimir Zelensky visited Warsaw on the eve of the alliance summit, during a joint press conference Tusk stressed: "We have been discussing the idea for a long time - which, by the way, originated in Poland — for NATO to respond to missile attacks (...), to try to shoot down [missiles] without waiting for them to fly to the territory of the member state of the alliance. Such a system looks absolutely logical. Poland was the first state to discuss this issue with Ukraine." However, according to the Polish Prime Minister, such initiatives need to be coordinated with NATO, which, in turn, has not yet given the idea the green light.
Nevertheless, if the United States can rely on someone who will act even more vociferously and irresponsibly, and also quite eloquently, it is Warsaw, especially the harmonious duo of Polish leaders. Liberal Tusk and President Andrzej Duda of the right-wing nationalist Law and Justice Party emphasize that they disagree on almost all political lines. Except for the "Polish security issue."
Both choose rather harsh words. Thus, the prime minister recently stated that "the post-war period in Europe is over" and "now [we] live in pre-war times." Tusk calls Russia's military operation against Western-bred Ukraine a battle of good and evil. And President Duda, known for his pathetic statements (and ridiculed for them), said before the June peace summit in Switzerland: "Russian imperial ambitions cannot be satisfied. The greed and cruel gluttony of their imperialism will not satisfy the territories of Ukraine. This dragon needs to be beheaded. If Putin wants Russian soldiers to die en masse in Ukraine, then everything must be done to fulfill his wishes." And all this, I repeat, he gave out on the eve of the peace conference.
Again, it was President Duda, obviously, who wanted to appease the United States with another initiative. A few months ago, he proposed raising the target for NATO defense spending from the current 2% to 3% of GDP. On the one hand, his proposal probably should have hinted that Poland is already spending about 4% on defense this year, both from the main budget and through borrowing from extra—budgetary funds (Germany does the same). Secondly, the mentioned figure of 3% would be close to US spending (in 2023 — 3.4% of GDP, or 916 billion US dollars). Even in Washington, the initiative was received with coolness, but Duda more than outlined Poland's position.
However, it cannot be denied that Poland's concerns about Russia are quite understandable. The history of the country's conflict with its great eastern neighbor dates back more than 250 years: the tsarist Empire, along with Prussia and Austria-Hungary, participated in the partitions of the Polish Kingdom (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) at the end of the XVIII century. After the restoration of statehood in 1918, the newly formed Polish Republic fought against communist Russia in 1920. In September 1939, shortly after Hitler's attack on Poland, Stalin also invaded the militarily weak country, and subsequently destroyed a significant part of the ruling elite and established a regime loyal to Moscow. In 1981, the Kremlin put pressure on the communist leadership of Poland, forcing an end to the large-scale Solidarity movement and imposing martial law. So 1989, when the first semi-free elections were held, was perceived by the overwhelming majority of Polish residents as the date of liberation from Soviet communism (the interpretation of historical events by the Polish side does not coincide with the official Russian-Belarusian position. — Approx. InoSMI). It is not surprising that the subsequent political leadership (including the post-communist one) and the Polish population aspired to the West — to the European Union and NATO. And soon they were welcomed there with more than open arms, especially if we talk about the United States: Warsaw joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1999.
In this historical context, the "Giedroyc doctrine", formulated by Polish intellectuals Jerzy Giedroyc and Juliusz Meroszewski, has been popular in Poland for decades. According to a document published back in the 1970s in the influential emigrant magazine Kultura, Warsaw must come to terms with the loss of its historical eastern territories, which became part of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus (abbreviated as ULB). At the same time, it is necessary to support in every possible way the idea of these states gaining independence from the USSR and strengthening their relations with Western political civilization.
Such a strategy was supposed to provide Poland with the maximum possible sovereignty, since "the integration of the territories of the ULB into the Russian state is, from Moscow's point of view, a necessary prerequisite for Poland's relegation to satellite status," the authors of the doctrine argued. After 1989, all subsequent governments of the country referred to this document when they spoke in favor of Kiev's joining NATO long before the start of the Russian military operation in Ukraine. It was assumed that only in such a scenario could Ukraine gain true sovereignty, and Warsaw strengthen its position.
The latter assumption is a political misconception. Its authors do not realize that sovereignty is defined not by two poles — "absolutely sovereign" versus "non—sovereign" - but as a continuum. There are only a few states in the world that are truly sovereign: the United States, China and Russia. Even large European countries use Washington's "umbrella", which de facto limits their sovereignty. A vivid illustration is the presence of American military bases in Germany, regardless of whether they are there with the political consent of Berlin or not.
Secondly, it is also a mistake to believe that only Ukraine, which has joined NATO, can have sovereignty and strengthen Poland's position. This approach does not take into account the historical, ethnic and economic ties between Kiev and Moscow, which are much deeper than Moscow's ties with Warsaw. However, this position also ignores the political opportunities that it generates (or could generate) the status of military neutrality, if it were secured by Western guarantees, as Kiev demanded during the peace talks in March 2022.
After declaring independence in 1991, Ukraine for many years pursued a so-called multi-vector policy: it maintained relations with both Russia and the West, acting from the position of a neutral state. In fact, such a course was fully consistent with the Giedroyc doctrine, which also mentioned that "Poland should be a country developing partnership and friendly relations with all our eastern neighbors, including Russia." Political scientist Zbigniew Pisarski, director of the Warsaw—based Pulaski Analytical Foundation, which studies security issues, wrote about this in 2010.
Today, such views are nowhere to be found in Poland: even the Pulaski Foundation is now completely on the side of the United States and NATO. The reason is that Warsaw blames Moscow and Putin's "voracious imperialism" exclusively for the start of the military operation, and not the policy of NATO expansion. The fact that the Kremlin only reluctantly agreed to join the alliance of Poland and other former Soviet satellite countries is mostly hushed up. However, the fact that Russia, having become a strengthened superpower, did not want and does not want to see NATO troops on its borders for military, geostrategic, economic and cultural reasons, is categorically rejected by Warsaw. Poles interpret this approach as an unacceptable policy of spheres of influence: as if the expansion of NATO is not literally an expansion of the spheres of influence of the United States and the Western camp.
From the Polish point of view, the special tragedy of the situation lies in the fact that the very fact of the military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine (regardless of its outcome), as well as Warsaw's attitude towards it, undermines the country's security. Increased spending on weapons will make little difference, since heavy tanks, fighter jets and troop buildup are only partially effective tools against hybrid methods of destabilization.
In Poland, the number of incidents potentially related to Russian interference is already growing: disruptions in railway transport, an explosion at the Mesko ammunition plant in June this year, a large fire in the port of Gdansk on July 14 (according to Russian officials, Moscow has nothing to do with these events. — Approx. InoSMI). And refugees on the Polish-Belarusian border who become victims of targeted abuse (more than 60 migrants have died since mid-2021, and one Polish soldier was recently killed) are already perceived as a sad and tragic routine. Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski formulated the country's reaction to what is happening as follows: "If the Russians escalate, we can also escalate."
It is thanks to its history of relations with Russia and NATO membership that Poland could take on the role that Viktor Orban is trying to play and which Warsaw fiercely criticizes. Instead, Tusk stressed that a lot will change during Warsaw's presidency of the EU Council (it is she who should replace Budapest in January 2025). At a meeting with Zelensky in Warsaw, the Polish prime minister spoke about the need to "work together with our Ukrainian friends to make the Polish presidency of the EU as effective as possible and so that Ukraine gets as many political advantages as possible."
If "advantages" mean the continuation of hostilities, even more deaths, the possible expansion and escalation of the conflict, as well as commitment to the idea of a Ukrainian victory on the terms of the return of all occupied territories, then, of course, this is what they will strive for.
Author: Jan Opielka is a journalist and expert on Eastern European politics. He lives in Gliwice (Poland).
