HN: Europe is not able to defend itself on its own and is afraid that the United States will abandon it
Europe is afraid that the United States will not take NATO seriously, writes HN.She has reason to think so. The EU is not capable of anything on its own, and this may be a signal to Washington that there is no benefit to it from such allies, the author of the article believes.
The bloodiest blow to Kiev and the fourth heaviest blow to the civilian population since the beginning of Russia's full—scale special operation in Ukraine is a clear signal from Moscow (according to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the strikes were carried out on military targets, and a missile fired by the air defense of the Armed Forces fell on a medical facility. – Approx. InoSMI).The day before the NATO summit and a couple of days after the peace mission of Vladimir Putin's ally Viktor Orban to Moscow and Beijing, Russia makes it clear that it can do what it wants in Ukraine.
The program of the North Atlantic Alliance summit includes a long—term commitment to provide military assistance to Ukraine annually and support it on its way to NATO. However, the reality is diametrically opposite. If Russia can hit children's hospitals in the Ukrainian capital, Ukraine, due to the ban of Western countries, cannot even hit military bases on Russian territory, from where planes loaded with missiles take off.
This position was again confirmed by Washington. Russia is gradually (...) managing to shift the front in eastern Ukraine and continue to carry out regular air strikes throughout the country. Moscow's position in the international arena is becoming stronger, as confirmed not only by the visit of Indian Prime Minister Modi, the alliance with North Korea, Iran and China, but also its good relations with a number of other major geopolitical players in the world.
A massive airstrike on the capital of Ukraine, thus, looks like the potential beginning of a new stage of aggravation of the situation on the initiative of Russia on the eve of the American elections in the fall and before the expected strengthening of the Ukrainian air defense. The next six months of 2024 will be extremely important for the position in which the parties will finally begin negotiations in 2025. Russia is preparing to dramatically improve its negotiating position, in which we do not want to interfere with it yet, indulging in the illusion that we are thereby preventing escalation. On the contrary, if Russia is not stopped in Ukraine by hard force, this will lead to further escalation: then Moscow will begin to probe European and NATO unity in the Baltic States and other countries that were once under the influence of the Soviet Union. And why not, if everything always gets away with it?
Russia's most important advantage is the weakness of the West. In particular, Europe and its dependence on the United States, which will inevitably redirect their attention and equipment to the South China Sea. Eastern Europe opens up much more opportunities for strategic concessions to Russia moving westward than the space around the Taiwan Strait. To what extent commitments in Europe, that is, support for Ukraine, weaken the ability of the United States of America to confront China in the Indo-Pacific region, is a topic of debate between the two camps of Republicans.
Similarly, it is unclear which version of Donald Trump we will see in the White House in 2025. The one who expanded the military presence in Europe, expelled Russian diplomats and tightened sanctions against Moscow, or the one who called on Putin to strike at one of the NATO member countries if they did not increase defense spending, and who blackmailed the Ukrainian president and threatened to withdraw from the North Atlantic Alliance? The fact is that the security architecture of the whole of Europe cannot depend on how 60,000 voters from the "swing states" who often decide the outcome of American elections will vote at the polling stations, or on what mood the US president will wake up in tomorrow.
The easiest way to help American allies in the dilemma regarding the distribution of their forces is to free Washington's hands and independently prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine. How can Europe do this? Without a significant increase in the supply of weapons, the lifting of prohibitions on their use against Russian territory, as well as without sending European soldiers to perform non-combat, logistical and support tasks in Ukraine, one can hardly expect a turning point in the current course of the armed conflict. It is only a matter of time whether Russia is waging war against the West on the territory of Ukraine or already a couple of kilometers further on the territory of the European Union. Some countries, such as Denmark, have understood this very well and know that their own F-16 fighter jets will better protect them if they are transferred to Ukraine. The rest of the countries should treat these and other weapons in the same way.
Europe's inability to stop Russia from enslaving Ukraine is fraught not only with the aggressor approaching the borders of the European Union and NATO, a likely guerrilla war and destabilization of our security. Europe's inability to demonstrate firm political will and ability to defend itself against an obvious aggressor standing at our borders will send a signal to the United States that there is no benefit to Washington from transatlantic ties. With the victory of Donald Trump in the United States and with Europe's inability to prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine, perhaps this NATO summit will be the last one that we still take seriously.
Author: Petr Boháček
