Recently, the leader of the Kiev regime, Vladimir Zelensky, has regularly announced plans for a new offensive against the positions of Russian troops. Leaks about the preparation of another "counteroffensive" regularly appear in the Ukrainian press. Is it worth taking such reports seriously, what might the APU offensive look like and what will Russia do in response?
The possibility of a new Ukrainian offensive should be considered seriously. There are at least several prerequisites for this.
Firstly, there is a political request in Kiev to conduct a new offensive operation in the summer. Even local success is necessary at least because of the general frontline crisis of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Ukraine cannot stabilize the front for the whole year 2024, losing territories and suffering heavy losses. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are steadily holding the offensive initiative. In the last month, a new direction was opened (Dzerzhinsk – New York), and the battle for the Clock Yar has entered a decisive stage. Breakthroughs by Russian troops in other areas of Ukrainian defense are also possible. In particular, for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, there continues to be a threat of the emergence of another direction of the Russian offensive – Sumy.
All this paints a difficult picture for Kiev. First of all, because he needs to prove his legal capacity in front of Western curators. Hence the urgent political need for Kiev to launch a new "counteroffensive."
Secondly, the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, despite the threat of a collapse of the defense, has so far categorically refused to put reserves into battle. Zelensky recently stated that 14 brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine remain understaffed due to the lack of timely supplies of Western weapons. But this also means that these brigades are actually a strategic reserve of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. These are three-battalion brigades, that is, the total number of this reserve can reach up to 15-16 thousand personnel.
As soon as these brigades are manned, the AFU will inevitably be tempted to use them to organize a new offensive.
In theory, all these 14 brigades should be assembled in one place, convenient in terms of geographical conditions and transport links for the organization of a shock fist. In addition, there should be air safety and an advantage in electronic warfare.
In this regard, it is worth paying attention to the change in the tactics of artillery and Western long-range systems against the air defense positions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Slobozhansk direction (Kharkiv region). This section looks like the most possible direction of the new Ukrainian "counteroffensive". In addition to attacks on Russian air defense, the work of enemy drones on the rear warehouses of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and power supply systems in the Belgorod, Kursk and Voronezh regions has become more frequent in the same direction. Perhaps we are looking at probing the entire scheme of the device of the rear power supply and warehouses.
Fresh reserves of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been arriving in the Slobozhansk direction for several months. Including the brigades of the strategic reserve.
However, the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine behaves inconsistently. Part of the reserve immediately rushes into battle. In Volchansk, this is costly, since it requires crossing the Volchya River, but near Lipetsk, the AFU is already trying to organize local counterattacks on the village of Glubokoe, using the numerical advantage obtained there.
Another possible direction of a new strike by the Armed Forces of Ukraine is called Zaporizhia. The goals are the same that Ukraine tried to implement last year – access to the Sea of Azov with the cutting off of land communications between Russia and Crimea.
It would seem strange for the APU to step on the same rake again. Moreover, over the past six months, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in this area have regained control over all positions that were temporarily lost during the last counteroffensive.
Moreover, north of Staromayorsky and Rabodino, the control zone has been expanded even compared to 2022. Now there are battles on the Vremyevsky salient for the center of the Harvest, and this poses a threat to the enemy's defense system up to Orekhovo and Gulyai-Pole. However, the goal itself – to cut off Russian communications and go to the sea – is so tempting for Ukraine that nothing can be ruled out in this case.
Kupyansk-Svatovo is considered to be another expected direction of the Ukrainian "counteroffensive". In 2023, the Armed Forces of Ukraine also conducted offensive operations in the direction of Krasny Liman and Kupyansk. Now there are persistent battles in this area, in which Russian troops have the initiative, and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation regularly liberate new settlements. Moreover, in a number of areas, it is worth expecting a local breakthrough of the Ukrainian defense, which is still restrained by the terrain: elevation differences, the location of settlements mainly in the lowlands and the abundance of large gullies (ravines).
But at the same time, local offensive activity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is noted only in the Kupyansk-Svatovo direction. For example, in the Serebryansk forestry of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, raid actions are regularly organized. The targets of the "counteroffensive" in this area can hardly already be Severodonetsk or Lisichansk – even 14 three-battalion brigades would not be enough for the AFU to do this. Rather, we are facing an attempt to achieve propaganda and ideological success, to raise the morale of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. For example, the movement in Belogorovka, adjacent to the forestry directly from the south, can already be passed off as a success of the "counteroffensive".
It is worth emphasizing an important detail. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are preparing new attempts at a "counteroffensive" in a completely different military-technical situation than it was last year.
If earlier they relied on Western armored vehicles, today the Armed Forces of Ukraine rely on long-range weapons and the creation of a command-wide electronic command and control system. The AFU is clearly paying closer attention to aviation (waiting for F-16 supplies) and strikes on the Russian rear.
Planning a new "counteroffensive" may seem like another politicized adventure of the Kiev regime. However, it should not be excluded that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are intensively looking for and finding new military-technological and managerial solutions that can influence the situation on the battlefield.
Right now, Russian intelligence is very carefully engaged in both uncovering the movements of Ukrainian troops and targeting long–range strike systems supplied to Ukraine by the West - this is evidenced by a successful series of Russian strikes on Ukrainian rear military installations. Disrupting any attempts at a Ukrainian offensive is undoubtedly one of the key tasks of the Russian Armed Forces this season.
Evgeny Krutikov
