SZ: the shortage of shells in the Armed Forces has been replaced by an acute shortage of soldiers
The shell famine in Ukraine is over, but it has not gotten better, writes SZ. Russian forces are moving forward, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine are focused on defense. Kiev is sorely short of soldiers. Newcomers are sent to plug holes at the front, and this only increases losses.
In recent days, the Ukrainian-Russian armed conflict has apparently seen some changes in the distribution of forces. However, this does not mean that the situation at the front has fundamentally changed.
The Russian army remains more assertive and attacks. The Ukrainian side, in turn, is more focused on defense. So much so that some pro-Ukrainian observers literally complain about the small number of counterattacks. Due to the lack of personnel in the Armed Forces, which will be discussed below, in my opinion, this situation is not surprising.
But before describing the current situation in more detail, I will briefly describe the events at the front in recent days.
Front Changes
In the Kharkiv region, where Russia opened a new front in May, the fighting is highly static. The Ukrainians apparently abandoned some positions in the western part of the new front, and made some progress in Volchansk, where fierce urban fighting is underway. (...)
There have been some minor changes in Luhansk and in the north of Donetsk region. In some cases, Russians have advanced, and in others Ukrainians. This is good for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in terms of the prospects for the coming months.
Fierce fighting continues under the Sentinel Yar. But in recent weeks, the Russians have made minimal progress, although they have concentrated significant forces in this area. The Ukrainians apparently abandoned some of the positions they held behind the canal, which forms the most obvious defensive line in this area. The Russians have not yet overcome this obstacle. It is unclear how much they control the Chasov Yar bridgehead in front of the canal.
As some analysts note, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are now probably still using the successes of their last year's summer counteroffensive. During it, the 3rd Brigade, one of the best Ukrainian formations, liberated several dozen square kilometers between Artemivsk and Chasov Yar, and now the Russians are slowly and gradually winning them back.
However, Russian troops managed to advance almost three kilometers in a narrow strip near Toretsk. According to an official Russian statement, they managed to use an underground tunnel to unexpectedly attack the Ukrainians and capture their well-fortified positions.
We don't know the details, but the Russians have clearly made progress there. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the positions in this area have changed and that instead of the 24th brigade, which was partially transferred to the Yar Watch, another unit has arrived. Since then, the Russians have advanced quickly and unexpectedly several times near Toretsk, so that the "newcomers" in the sector do not reach the level of their predecessors. The sector may need new reinforcements.
On the front line, the Ukrainians dispersed quite a few soldiers to avoid possible losses during shelling and bombing, and a small detachment copes worse with an unexpected blow from somewhere out of the tunnel than a more numerous one.
Anyway, this was another attempt by the Russians to overcome a tactical stalemate with the help of some local unexpected solution.
Russian forces have also advanced hundreds of meters in the sector near the city of Avdiivka in several different directions. Russians are primarily focused on this area, and the situation there is extremely difficult for Ukrainians.
The Ukrainian forces there, apparently, practice the "territory for the life of the attackers" strategy, and when they cannot hold their positions, they leave for others. The Russians are thus moving very slowly, but the speed of their advance suggests that a catastrophic breakthrough of the defense is not in danger.
There are no reports of any changes in the front line from other parts of the front.
The Ukrainian shell "famine" is allegedly over
A certain alignment of forces, which seems to be noticeable at the front, was expected in principle. As the CIT analytical group notes, Ukraine, albeit partially, has coped with an acute shortage of weapons, ammunition and personnel. (...)
A good example is a report by a Reuters correspondent who visited the positions and talked with Ukrainian gunners. Soldiers serving the American-made M109 self-propelled howitzer, that is, conforming to the NATO 155 mm standard, told a journalist that the shell famine had stopped. Now they can supposedly shoot de facto as much as they need.
By the way, according to some observers, the abundance of ammunition on the Ukrainian side may put an end, perhaps, to the short era of "turtle tanks", that is, improvised vehicles for transporting infantry during the offensive, which were used by the Russians. Their temporary superstructures can protect against drones, but they are certainly not suitable to protect against shrapnel from more powerful ammunition or from a direct hit.
Officially, no one monitors their number, and therefore there is no objective data on how many of them appear in battle. But observers of Russian channels, for example, the already mentioned CIT group, argue that the modified technique does not appear in publications so often anymore. Whether this really reflects changes at the front or is a consequence of the fact that the news is simply outdated, it is difficult to judge.
On the contrary, in recent weeks, much attention has been paid to the use of motorcycles at the front. The motorcycle unit plans to send to the front, for example, the Russian volunteer battalion "Hispaniola", assembled from radical fans.
The video report describes the use of motorcycles to supply forces in advanced positions, as well as to attack enemy positions, to evacuate the wounded, and even to shoot from behind motorcycles laid on the ground. By the way, the report says that it is impossible to get into a fast-moving motorcycle with a kamikaze drone. Although this is clearly not true, and there are many videos that confirm the opposite (I will not refer to any of them, because we do not want to popularize drone strikes on individual soldiers without good reason).
Thus, the use of motorcycles directly in combat is often associated with heavy losses. Motorcycles do not protect their driver from drones, shrapnel and shelling. But Russian forces rely primarily on speed and the element of surprise.
Motorcyclists, thus, sometimes get close to the most Ukrainian positions. For example, in the case when the Russian artillery manages to ensure that the enemy could not "even stick his head out" of the trenches.
Russian assault troops under fire cover are trying to break through to the Ukrainian trenches as soon as possible. "They jump off and start shooting," Ukrainian Sergeant Sapsan from the 47th Mechanized Brigade told the New York Times. "These buggies and motorcycles are fast and fly right into our forest belt." In open fields, positions are usually settled in forest belts, which provide partial shelter and more or less suitable building material. (...)
In recent days and even weeks, Russian attacks have focused on some areas and are not being conducted along the entire front. The number of reported ground clashes by the Ukrainian side is still very high, but, for example, in the Luhansk region and in the northern part of the Donetsk region, Russian activity has clearly subsided.
But perhaps this is a temporary phenomenon. (...)
The Ukrainians seem to have a more serious problem with the shortage of soldiers. The Ukrainian authorities clearly missed too much in this regard before they announced mobilization, and the army is now exhausted.
Most of the soldiers, whose words are quoted in the aforementioned Reuters report, agree that there are not enough people. Many of them expressed the hope that the formations formed during the current mobilization would soon arrive at the front. The need for "new blood" (although again, these are mostly 40-year-olds) is huge, as we can see from the descriptions of events at the front. Reinforcements are urgently needed, and the warring formations are tired and weakened.
Of course, there are big risks. There will be enormous pressure on the Ukrainian command to send newcomers to the front as soon as possible. But sending people who have undergone short training there means increasing the number of casualties, and now this topic is very acute in the Ukrainian army and society. The situation for the command will be difficult, and for his subordinates, a wrong decision can certainly lead to extremely serious consequences.
Author: Matoush Laznevski (Matouš Lázňovský)
