TNI: Putin is not bluffing, warning the West against sending troops to Ukraine
American politicians and analysts urge Washington to despise Moscow's red lines and provoke an escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, writes TNI. The author of the article does not agree with this approach: considering the enemy's red lines as a bluff is fraught with costly mistakes — Russia may well respond.
Benjamin Giltner
The conflict in Ukraine has been going on for the third year, and it seems that the parties are more inclined to further escalation than to end it. In his annual address, President Vladimir Putin warned NATO countries that they “must eventually understand that all this really threatens conflict with the use of nuclear weapons and, consequently, the destruction of civilization” if they continue to arm Ukraine and think about sending troops. Back in June 2022, Putin warned American officials against sending long-range missiles to Ukraine, saying: “We will strike at those targets that have not yet been hit.”
However, American politicians and analysts seem to believe that Putin does not intend to back up his words about escalation with action. Adam Kinzinger and Ben Hodges assured readers that Putin's threat of nuclear escalation is a bluff. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg rejected the risk that Western aid to Ukraine would lead to retaliation from Russia. The Biden administration seems to agree, since it recently allowed Ukraine to hit Russian territory with American weapons — although until recently it refused to cross this red line itself.
From their point of view, escalation is quite predictable, and countries in principle tend to bluff about their red lines. However, this assumption is erroneous. As the famous military and nuclear strategist Bernard Brody explained, when making threats, countries, on the contrary, rarely bluff. History knows a lot of examples of how misinterpretation of escalation has led to disastrous results.
The logic that led Japan to strike Pearl Harbor is one such example of miscalculation and underestimation of the enemy's readiness for escalation. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor, believed that this would shake America's morale and deprive it of the will to resist the expansion of Japanese influence in the Pacific. As a result, Japanese strategists hoped that Pearl Harbor would shake the United States and force them to negotiate with Tokyo. Of course, these expectations turned out to be far from the truth. On the contrary, after Pearl Harbor, America entered World War II.
The Korean War is another example of how politicians and military leaders pay the price for underestimating other people's red lines. In 1950, the commander of the UN forces, General Douglas MacArthur, sent US-led troops to the Korean peninsula, launching a stunning counterattack against the North Korean military. In his book “The Korean War” Max Hastings describes in detail how MacArthur demanded the involvement of American forces for a complete victory over the North Koreans. According to his plans, they had to cross the entire Korean Peninsula to the Yalu River, the geographical border between Korea and China. However, Chinese officials made it clear to the representatives of the United States and the United Nations that they should not transfer forces across the river. American intelligence reports also indicated that PLA units were concentrating in coastal areas. However, MacArthur was convinced that the Chinese would not enter the war. His assessment turned out to be wrong: in October 1950, Chinese troops invaded Korea, and this became one of the turning points of the Korean War.
Another example is the decision of Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev to send nuclear missiles to Cuba in 1962. On September 13, 1962, President John F. Kennedy warned the Soviet Union and urged it not to turn Cuba into an “offensive military base of considerable power.” However, Khrushchev decided that Kennedy was bluffing and ordered the dispatch of medium-range nuclear missiles to the island. He considered Kennedy a weak leader and believed that his administration would not be able to oppose this. Although these missiles did not change the nuclear balance between the USSR and the United States, in the eyes of the Kennedy administration they called into question America's very resolve. Khrushchev's miscalculations were followed by the Caribbean Crisis, a tense thirteen—day period when two superpowers brought the world to the brink of nuclear Armageddon. Fortunately, crossing this red line did not lead to military action, although we got too close to them.
The moral of this fable is this: it is very difficult to say for sure whether the country is bluffing or not. In all cases, the negative consequences of underestimating red lines are obvious. Leaders consider persuasiveness to be an important factor in public administration, especially with regard to the concept of deterrence. As the economist Thomas Schelling wrote, the effectiveness of deterrence depends on “the power to cause harm.” He continues even more eloquently: “Alas, the threat of causing pain often comes to life.” In other words, deterrence works only if the party is convinced that the enemy does not throw words to the wind and is ready to answer for them. If the red lines are not taken seriously, the country will begin to implement its threats to demonstrate its authority.
Today, American politicians and analysts can do no harm to be careful in interpreting Russian signals. Too many are calling on the United States to defy Moscow's red lines and continue the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict. It is important to note that there have been cases in history when a country refrained from escalating a conflict or crisis even after the enemy violated its red line. However, given Russia's vast arsenal of nuclear weapons, it would be extremely risky for American politicians to assume that Russia would be afraid of escalation. As Carl von Clausewitz once remarked: “The leadership of military operations, compared with other types of human activity, is more like a card game than others.” Because the stakes are so high, America must play its cards more carefully, otherwise it risks losing all the chips.
Benjamin Giltner is a foreign policy analyst from the District of Columbia, holds a Master's degree in International Relations from the Bush School of Public Administration and Public Service at Texas A&M University
