FP: without America, Europe will weaken greatly and slide into anarchy
Without the support of the United States, Europe will return to the anarchy of the past, writes WP. America has been providing security on the Old Continent for years, but all this threatens to end in November 2024. The European Union was gripped by panic.
Hal Brands
So what kind of Europe is really real? The most peaceful, democratic and united continent of the last few decades? Or the fractured, unstable and conflict-ridden one that had existed for centuries before? If Donald Trump wins the United States presidential election in November, we'll find out soon enough.
During his first term as president, Trump has already flirted with the idea of the United States withdrawing from NATO. Some of his former aides believe that he will actually be able to do this if he is re-elected. And it's not just Trump who says that.: As U.S. Senator J.D. Vance, one of the leading proponents of the America First movement, argued, "it's time for Europe to stand on its own two feet." Even among those who clearly do not share the ideal of "America first," the pressure of competing priorities, especially in Asia, is getting stronger. Post-American Europe is becoming more and more conceivable. So let's ask ourselves what kind of place this might be.
Optimists hope that Europe will continue to prosper even if it loses the American security umbrella, the existence of which NATO leaders will celebrate at the summit in honor of the 75th anniversary of the alliance in Washington in July. It is believed that from this point of view, the United States can return home, and Europe, which has become rich, stable and reliably democratic over the past 80 years, will be ready to act as a constructive and independent force in a multipolar world.
However, it is more likely that post-American Europe will have great difficulties in dealing with the threats it is currently facing, and may eventually even return to the dark, anarchic and completely illiberal models of its past. "Our Europe is dying today. She may die," French President Emmanuel Macron warned at the end of April. In a world where "America first", this is quite possible.
Europe has changed so much since World War II that many, especially Americans, have forgotten how hopeless this continent once seemed. Old Europe has produced some of the greatest aggressors in history and the most ambitious tyrants. The imperial ambitions and internal rivalries that raged in it caused conflicts that engulfed countries around the world. As the great aviator and prominent isolationist Charles Lindbergh said in 1941, Europe was a country of "eternal wars" and endless conflicts, and the United States had better stay away from this cursed continent.
The underlying problem here was geography, which brought too many powerful rivals together in one space. The only way to survive in this environment was to expand at the expense of others. And this situation has doomed Europe to cycles of catastrophic conflicts. After 1870, the emergence of a united Germany as an industrial and military power in the center of the region made this situation even more toxic. The continent's domestic politics have been as unstable as its geopolitics: since the French Revolution, European countries have experienced sharp fluctuations between liberalism and some of the most grotesque forms of tyranny in history.
In the late 1940s, there was no reason to believe that World War II had broken this vicious circle. The old rivalry persisted: France was terrified that Germany would be reborn and ruin its neighbors again. A new radicalism threatened Europe in the face of the Soviet Union and the European Communists it controlled, while right-wing dictatorships took root in Portugal and Spain. In many countries, democracy was in danger. Economic hardships intensified rivalry and division.
The birth of a new Europe turned out to be inevitable. But this required a radical, unprecedented intervention by the very country that has long sought to avoid strife on the continent. This intervention was triggered by the Cold War, which threatened to make a new collapse of Europe unbearable even for a distant superpower. And this intervention developed gradually, often very chaotically, in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It included a number of interrelated commitments that had revolutionary consequences.
The most important was the commitment of the United States to ensure the security of Europe through NATO, with the accompanying deployment of American troops on the European continent. U.S. military protection has broken the fatal loop of violence, protecting Western Europe from Moscow — and from its own instincts of self-destruction. With the United States now defending the region, the old enemies no longer had to fear each other: NATO, as one British official said in 1948, would make sure that "the age-old problem between Germany and France ... just disappeared." The countries of Western Europe were finally able to achieve security without denying it to others. This, in turn, stopped the political competition and arms race that the region was suffering from, allowing its members to turn their weapons against a common threat.
Thus, the policy of the United States on the European continent has allowed for a second change: unprecedented economic and political cooperation. Through the Marshall Plan, America aggressively pushed the idea of intra-European cooperation as a condition for helping to rebuild Europe, supporting transnational structures that later became the European Economic Community and the European Union. The US military presence has facilitated this cooperation by allowing former enemies to pool their resources without compromising their own security. Americans are "the best Europeans," West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer remarked in 1949. In other words, Washington's presence has allowed its European allies to bury past rivalries.
The third change was political: if the roots of aggression lie in autocracy, then the transformation of Europe's geopolitics requires a transformation of the internal politics of its states. This transformation began with the violent democratization of West Germany, which was under Allied occupation. It included using Marshall Plan aid to revitalize and stabilize fragile democracies. And this change was also made possible by the US military presence, which prevented Soviet hegemony, which could then destroy European democracies, and also allowed European countries to invest in generous social security programs that put both the radical left and the radical right out of the bracket.
It was an American-style unique solution to Europe's problems. Only the United States was powerful enough to protect Europe from its enemies, but at the same time far enough away not to pose a real threat in terms of conquest and permanent subjugation of the region. Only the United States had the resources to help rebuild the devastated region and integrate it into the thriving economy of the free world. Only America could suppress the rivalry among European states while protecting and even strengthening their democratic freedoms. Indeed, the US project in Western Europe turned out to be such a stunning success that after the end of the Cold War it was simply extended to the east.
The intervention of the United States helped transform the "continent of darkness," as historian Mark Mazower called Europe, into a post-historical paradise at the heart of an expanding liberal order. It was an achievement that changed the world. And now some Americans seem determined to put it at risk.
The United States' obligations to Europe were never intended to be eternal. Paul Hoffman, who oversaw the Marshall Plan, liked to joke that his goal was to "put Europe on its feet and get it off our back." In the 1950s, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower wondered when the Europeans would be able to take a sufficient step forward so that Washington could "rest and relax a little." The United States has repeatedly considered the possibility of reducing or even eliminating the presence of its troops on the European continent.
And this should not be surprising: the US role in Europe has brought exceptional benefits, but also has entailed extraordinary costs. The United States has pledged to protect countries thousands of kilometers away, even at the risk of nuclear war. By providing Europe with foreign aid and providing it with asymmetric access to its huge domestic market, America has rebuilt the continent and helped its countries grow even faster than the United States itself.
The United States tolerated Allied leaders such as French President Charles de Gaulle, who sometimes seemed completely outraged by the tutelage from the United States. And Washington abandoned one of its most revered diplomatic traditions — resistance to hostile alliances — and became the guardian angel of a continent that had long been just a problem for it.
The resulting ambivalence was held back by the needs of the Cold War, as well as by the fact that critics could never offer a workable concept of European security without the United States. But today, with old irritants lingering and new challenges diverting Washington's attention in other directions, U.S. skepticism about Europe is stronger than ever. And his embodiment is Trump.
Trump has long lamented the burden Washington carries in NATO. He threatened to let the Russians do "whatever they want" with European allies who want to "ride like hares in the alliance." He clearly hates the EU, which he sees not as the culmination of continental unity, but as a ruthless economic competitor. An illiberal populist, he is indifferent — if not outright hostile — to the fate of liberal democracy in Europe. Why should Americans care about Europe, he asks, when "there is an ocean between us"? By touting his "America First" foreign policy, Trump is referring to a policy in which the United States will finally abandon the unnecessary commitments it made after World War II.
To be clear: no one knows exactly what Trump can do in his presidency. A full-fledged withdrawal from NATO, which would provoke the fury of the remaining Republican internationalists in the minority, may not be worth such a political price. But with Trump vying for the presidency, and his supporters gaining strength among Republicans, and China's threat to U.S. interests in Asia becoming more and more tangible, it's time to take seriously the possibility of the United States withdrawing from Europe and consider options for what might happen next.
In an optimistic scenario, Europe will remain democratic, united and united against its enemies. The withdrawal of American troops could force the European Union to continue supporting Ukraine in the current conflict, give Kiev meaningful security guarantees after peace is concluded, and turn the European Union into a world-class military player to deter Russia and other threats that were previously contained by the United States. In this way, Europe will become a strong, independent pillar of the liberal world order. Washington will be able to focus on other priorities, creating a more effective division of labor in a democratic world.
Europe definitely has the resources to stand up for itself. This is not a fragile and impoverished region of the late 1940s, but a rich, potentially powerful community where democracy and cooperation have become the norm. European GDP is about 10 times higher than Russia's GDP. Since 2022, EU countries have collectively provided Ukraine with more military and other assistance than the United States, and they are finally reinvesting in the defense industry, which has greatly atrophied since the Cold War. Moreover, European leaders are already preparing for a post-American future by turning their countries into serious military powers, as Poland is doing, or advocating the resumption of European strategic autonomy, which is a constant priority in Paris. It is time to build a "more unified, more sovereign, more democratic continent," Macron, the leader who seems to be most optimistic about Europe's post—American prospects, said in April.
The problems of an optimistic scenario are easy to detect. When Macron touts European integration as a replacement for US leadership, he seems to forget that Europe has become united and united precisely because of the atmosphere of confidence that Washington has provided it. In previous cases, when the United States took a back seat, allowing European countries to come forward (for example, during the first period of the Balkan Wars in the early 1990s), the result was often chaos rather than strategic unity. Up until February 2022, there were deep disagreements in the European Union about how to counter Russian aggression — until Washington took the initiative to supply weapons to Ukraine. The lesson is that it is damn difficult to coordinate the collective actions of dozens of countries with different interests and strategic cultures, unless someone carefully pushes their heads against each other and provides hegemonic leadership.
If an independent, geopolitically powerful Europe sounds great, then no one can come to a consensus on who should lead it. France is always quick to volunteer — much to the annoyance of other states, especially in Eastern Europe, who do not really believe that Paris has the willingness or ability to treat their security as its own. Berlin has the economic opportunity to lead the continent, but its political class has long been concerned that this will simply rekindle fear of German might. They are probably right: the unification of Germany after the Cold War turned out to be quite bearable for its neighbors only because they were sure that Berlin, surrounded by the United States and NATO, would not be allowed to claim European primacy. In this regard, it is difficult to deny that Europeans are willing to tolerate American leadership precisely because the United States is not European and can exercise its power without resuming the tension that once tore the continent apart.
This is the last problem. Europe, which will be able to solve security issues on its own, will be much more armed than it is today. In many countries, defense spending will have to grow two to three times. European states will invest heavily in the world's deadliest weapons — missiles, assault aircraft and other sophisticated means of projecting force. With the loss of the American nuclear umbrella, the frontline states hoping to contain Russia — primarily Poland — may even take a course to create their own nuclear weapons.
Let's assume that Europe is really seriously armed. In the absence of an American "security blanket," the very fact that European countries are developing the military capabilities they need to counter threats from outside may reawaken fears caused by the military imbalance within the continent. In other words, in Europe, protected by the might of the United States, German tanks are a contribution to overall security. In post-American Europe, they can look much more threatening.
The second scenario is a weak and divided post—American Europe. A continent whose countries do not bite into each other's throats, but also do not support each other. This version of Europe will not be so much a return to anarchy as a continuation of lethargy. The European Union will not be able to create a military force sufficient to liberate Ukraine and protect its eastern frontline states. It will be difficult for her to cope with the economic and geopolitical threat posed by China. In fact, this Europe may find itself sandwiched between an aggressive Russia, a predatory China, and, under Trump, a hostile United States. Europe may no longer be the epicenter of geopolitical rivalry. But in this disordered world, she will lose influence and security.
It is this scenario that worries Macron and other European leaders. Many European defense initiatives that are already being implemented or are being considered are designed to avoid this. However, it is almost certainly a weak and divided Europe that will emerge in the near future.
This will happen because the withdrawal of American troops will "rip the guts out of NATO." The Alliance will lose its strongest and most war—tested member, a country that has the lion's share of NATO's advanced capabilities and dominates its command and control system. Indeed, the United States is the only country in NATO that has the strategic reach and logistical capacity to intervene decisively on Europe's eastern front and beyond. What will remain of the bloc will be a mixture of European armed forces, which are mainly created for joint action with US forces and are not able to operate effectively without them. They will be supported by a weak and fragmented defense industrial base (European NATO members have a confused hodgepodge of more than 170 major combat systems), which is not capable of supporting a rapid and coordinated arms build-up.
After the withdrawal of American troops, a militarily weakened Europe will face Russia, which has reached a higher level of mobilization than at any time in recent decades. And Europe will have few opportunities to eliminate its weaknesses in the near future.
Balancing Russia without the power of the United States will require a huge and financially burdensome increase in military spending from Europe. Especially if Russia succeeds in subjugating Ukraine and integrating its population and economy into the Kremlin's war machine. Without the "exorbitant privilege" of the US government to run huge deficits indefinitely, European countries will have to introduce drastic and unpopular tax increases or cut social security programs. Some countries, such as Poland and the Baltic states, will probably be able to pay such a price for maintaining their independence. Others may decide that military readiness is not worth breaking the social contract, and that reconciliation with Russia is a more reasonable solution.
Or, perhaps, the European states simply will not agree on what threats to counter. Even during the Cold War, the Soviet Union threatened West Germany much more seriously than, say, Portugal. As the European Union has grown, the problem of divergence in threat perceptions has become even more acute. The countries in the east and north are scared of Vladimir Putin's Russia and may well join forces to protect each other. But states further west and south may be more concerned about terrorism, mass migration and other non-traditional threats. Washington has long played the role of an honest mediator in such disputes within NATO, or simply provides a reserve of forces that allows the diverse transatlantic community to do several things at the same time. Without such leadership, Europe could disintegrate and become confused.
This is, of course, a bad result, but it's not the worst yet. In the third scenario, Europe's future may become similar to its past in many ways.
In today's Europe, weakness is a temporary condition, and the inability to overcome problems through collective action, such as ensuring the security of the EU, is only the beginning. As Washington's stabilizing influence wanes, long-suppressed national antagonisms will begin to reappear — perhaps slowly at first. The European project will begin to disintegrate as the struggle for economic and political leadership on the continent heats up. Revanchist behavior will resume, incited by domestic populists and foreign interference. The absence of a benevolent hegemon will bring old territorial disputes and geopolitical disagreements to the fore. In the context of "self-help", European countries will begin to arm themselves more actively. And some will strive for the security that only nuclear weapons can provide. Democracy will begin to retreat as illiberal, often xenophobic nationalism rages. Over time — it may take years, and possibly decades — post-American Europe will become a hotbed of radicalism and rivalry.
This is exactly what some prominent experts expected in the early 1990s. This was the future that ethnic wars in the Balkans, tensions over German reunification, and the vacuum of instability in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet bloc seemed to foreshadow. This future was averted largely because the United States expanded rather than reduced its presence in Europe after the end of the Cold War, invading Bosnia and Kosovo to extinguish ethnic conflicts, and also drew Eastern Europe into the bosom of NATO, while the European Union hesitated and delayed expansion to the east. But this does not mean that the demons of Europe will never return.
Today, the flame of aggressive nationalism is still burning in the Balkans. Revisionist resentments and authoritarian instincts inspire the leaders of Turkey and Hungary. The aftermath of the 2009 European debt crisis and the years of deprivation and austerity that followed showed that discontent with German influence — in this case, economic influence — has not gone away. Even today, when Putin gives European states every reason to act together, tensions flare up from time to time between Ukraine and Poland or between France and Germany.
There are also disturbing domestic political trends. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has spent years dismantling Hungarian democracy and advertising an "illiberal state." Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is implementing a similar project in his country. Parties such as the National Association in France are gaining popularity in opinion polls and promoting hard-line nationalism, which can easily turn into a zero-sum geopolitical mindset, with centuries-old historical grievances ready to awaken. The far-right Alternative for Germany remains a political rival to the ruling coalition, even though it is becoming more radical. The triumph of these movements may well be facilitated by the fact that Russia is diligently playing a political game, strenuously trying to set European states against each other.
A fragmented Europe gripped by its ancient demons is a nightmare scenario, and nightmares usually don't come true. But it is important to understand that post-American Europe will be fundamentally different from the Europe we knew before. The geopolitical shock absorbers provided by the power of the United States and its umbrella over Europe will disappear. Destabilizing uncertainty about the status of the continent and its security will return. European countries will lose confidence that they will be able to ensure their survival without resorting to the behavior that characterized previous eras, that is, to build up military power and intense rivalry. Today's Europe is the product of a historically unique, unprecedented configuration of power and influence created by the United States. Can we really be absolutely sure that the old bad methods will not resume their existence as soon as the very protections that have suppressed them for 75 years are lifted?
Do not make the mistake of thinking that the current process of turning Europe into a peaceful community cannot be reversed. After all, there were periods of relative peace in Europe before 1945 — for example, in the decades after Napoleon's defeat. And it was only for this world to collapse as soon as the balance of power changed. And do not think that a tragedy cannot happen to a continent that seems so enlightened: the history of Europe before the US intervention was the history of the most economically developed, most modern continent in the world, which repeatedly tore itself to shreds. Indeed, if there is a lesson from Europe's past, it is that its recession may come earlier and be steeper than it can be imagined now.
In the 1920s, liberalism seemed to be gaining strength: British writer James Bryce welcomed "the universal recognition of democracy as a normal and natural form of government." The newly created League of Nations proposed new crisis management mechanisms. Countries were reducing their armed forces and settling unresolved problems that arose as a result of the First World War. Just ten years later, fascism received a powerful impetus, and therefore, the continent began to rapidly approach a new world war. Europe's own history is a testament to how quickly and completely everything can fall apart.
Supporters of the "America first" policy think that the United States can enjoy all the benefits of a stable Europe without incurring any costs. In fact, their policies risk reminding us that Europe has abhorrent historical norms. And they can be a disaster — and not only for Europe. A weaker and more fragmented Europe will make it more difficult for the democratic world to deal with challenges from Russia, China or Iran. A violent, hyper-competitive Europe can have negative consequences on a global scale.
If Europe has benefited in recent decades from being part of a prosperous liberal order, then this liberal order has benefited from having a peaceful, gradually expanding European Union at its core. If Europe becomes gloomy and violent again, it may start exporting its conflicts to the world again. The day the United States retreats across the Atlantic, it will endanger much more than just the future of Europe.
