FP: The United States has turned from a leader to a catch-up in the Arctic
The United States was once a leader in the Arctic, but today the situation has changed, writes FP. Washington is trying to make up for lost time, but ambitions do not coincide with real opportunities. America doesn't even really have icebreakers to send them to the region.
Kenneth R. Rosen, author of a book about the new Cold War in the Arctic
Kodiak, Alaska — At the Coast Guard's Kodiak Air Base, the 127-meter Stratton ship was trapped in the port by a thin layer of ice that had grown overnight in January frosts. The ship, which bears the name of the first female Coast Guard officer Dorothy Stratton, is not designed to work in ice: its home port is Alameda, California. After serving in the Indo-Pacific region, he was transferred to Alaska forcibly, due to accessibility.
“The sun will rise soon, and the ice will surely melt,” suggested the junior officers sitting on the open deck. Nevertheless, the commander ordered a local tugboat to break the ice in the port into plate fragments, after which the Stratton rolled off and headed for the Bering Sea.
Over the past decade, when melting ice has opened up new opportunities for fishing and mining, the Arctic has turned from a zone of cooperation into a zone of geopolitical upheaval: Russia, China, India and even Turkey are expanding their presence, nurturing global ambitions. And now the United States is acting as a catch-up in a region where it once had significant influence.
One of the Coast Guard's unofficial mottos is "We'll do more for less.” As a result, as expected, the United States faced a serious shortage of icebreakers needed for work in the Arctic. As a result, ships like the Stratton, which are not suitable for the role of an icebreaker, have to perform tasks in the struggle for northern latitudes. In the 16 days I spent aboard the Stratton this year, she was the only one of the Coast Guard ships to sail into the Bering Sea. Apart from him, no one conducted inspections on board fishing trawlers, or exercises with search and rescue helicopter crews - and did not guard the maritime border with Russia.
Although the Stratton crew coped with the task, the equipment failed. Even a brief tour of the ship shed light on the operational limitations and lack of resources of the Coast Guard. If Washington does not change its approach in the most decisive way, Stratton risks remaining the only microcosm of the American presence in the Arctic: The once dominant force is no longer able to successfully defend its interests in a rapidly changing region.
During the Cold War, the United States actively invested in Alaska, seeing it as an important part of the country's future. Among these investments, a significant milestone was the construction of the Dalton Highway in 1974, which opened the way to the controversial Trans-Alaska pipeline and allowed the United States to become a major player in the global oil trade. Recognizing Alaska's role as the backbone of national defense, the leaders have also invested heavily in its security. In 1957, the United States began operating the northern frontier of long-range radar detection called the Dew Line, and in 1958 the North American Aerospace Defense Command was founded.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these measures seemed excessive. The North has once again become a territory of partnership between the countries of the region: some called this period “Arctic exclusivity”, and the Norwegians came up with the motto “High latitudes, low tension”.
But at the turn of the millennium, already under President Vladimir Putin, Russia began to behave more aggressively in the Arctic: extensive modernization of military facilities during the Cold War unfolded, and tests of hypersonic munitions became more frequent. In 2007, Russian divers installed a national flag on the seabed under the North Pole. Russia was not the only one who showed keen interest, and soon even countries far from outside the region wanted to participate in it. China expanded its icebreaking fleet and even began to finance infrastructure projects of the Polar Silk Road (PSHP) in Scandinavia and Greenland (although the West soon put a barrier to these attempts). Even India has recently developed its first Arctic strategy, and Turkey has ratified a treaty under which its citizens have received commercial and tourist access to Svalbard, the Norwegian archipelago in the Arctic Ocean.
However, over the past decade, the United States has consistently lagged behind, instead focusing on problems in the Middle East, the South China Sea and Ukraine. The American early warning system in the Arctic is outdated. The necessary coastal infrastructure in Alaska, with which climatologists predict typhoons, has not been installed — the state and federal governments considered it an unacceptable luxury. In 2020, a fire in the engine compartment of the Coast Guard's only Arctic icebreaker almost disrupted scientific plans in the Arctic Ocean. Two years later, a report by the Inspector General of the Ministry of Defense revealed significant problems with the structural integrity of runways and barracks at American bases in the Arctic and subarctic zone.
Until recently, American politicians were not at all interested in restoring lost know-how in the Arctic. Legislators and military commanders began to develop a holistic Arctic strategy only three years ago — after Washington noticed the successes of China and Russia. And this inattention did not go unnoticed.
During the recent patrol on the Stratton, the consequences of the delay were fully manifested. The crew had just returned from the hot climate of the Indo-Pacific region and could not get used to it. Persistent sailors have learned how to handle patrol boats and helicopter pads with a special anti-icing mixture, invented by trial and error. The cabin was decorated with a “cheerful” backlight to increase serotonin levels and help the crew survive short light days. But the crew rarely turned it on: natural light in these latitudes is only a few hours a day, there are few portholes on the ship, and additional lighting still does not play a big role.
The Coast Guard is perhaps the most neglected branch of the US armed forces. It is woefully short of resources, especially in the Arctic and surrounding regions, where systemic gaps undermine the great-power aspirations of the United States.
First of all, its icebreaking fleet itself is limited. The United States has only two active icebreakers. Of these, only one is used in the Arctic, “Healy". The other, Polar Star, operates mainly in Antarctica. For comparison, Russia, whose Arctic Ocean coast is much longer, has more than 50 icebreakers at its disposal. Even China has two ships capable of carrying out missions in the Arctic, and at least one more will be ready by next year.
Representatives of the Coast Guard and the US Department of Defense have repeatedly stated to Congress that at least six icebreakers are required for normal operation, three of which must have at least the same capabilities as the Healy, which has been in service for 27 years. Due to poor management and lack of funds, the program is out of schedule for almost ten years. As one former diplomat told me, “A strategy without a budget is a hallucination.” It was assumed that the first light vessel under the Polar Security Cutter program would be commissioned this year. However, as officials informed me, the deadlines have shifted at least until 2030.
“Once we receive the appropriate design, it will take several years — at least three years plus — to begin and complete work on the ship," Admiral Linda Fagan, Commandant of the Coast Guard, told Congress last April. ”I would tell you the date if I could."
The government's General Control Directorate has long warned that the U.S. government and military, including the Coast Guard, have made serious miscalculations regarding work in the Arctic. Firstly, the process of purchasing new ships for the Coast Guard is hampered by constant design changes and the inability to conclude a contract with competent shipbuilders. Moreover, the Accounting Chamber found in a report for 2023 that discrepancies in the Arctic within the State Department and the failure of the Coast Guard to fill gaps in capabilities “hinder the implementation of the US Arctic priorities set out in the 2022 strategy.”
At the same time, there is much more at stake than just national security. The Arctic is also of great economic importance to the United States. The Bering Sea alone provides the United States with 60% of its fish catch, not to mention significant revenues from oil and natural gas. Presence in the Arctic is also important for achieving the set climate goals. Reducing or eliminating carbon dioxide, methane, and soot emissions in the Arctic protects carbon-trapping areas such as tundra, forests, and coastal swamps.
Captain Brian Krautler, commander of the Stratton, is well aware of these problems. He, who had previously served on Arctic ships, turned out to be almost the ideal person for a new, unfamiliar assignment. After the inspection team had to be recalled due to heavy seas and icing on the deck, Krautler complained about work restrictions. “We are an Arctic country that does not know how to become one,” he said.
The Stratton made its first call at Unalaska, a sleepy fishing town where the port of Dutch Harbor is located. Signs in Unalaska read: “Welcome to the No. 1 commercial fishing port in the USA.” The port has been virtually forgotten by Washington and the federal authorities, but evidence of its former importance to US national security is everywhere visible: concrete pillboxes from World War II stand along the roads, and the hills around the harbor are dotted with trenches.
Washington turned its back on the Arctic, and Alaska and its indigenous communities were alienated. Unalaska Mayor Vincent Tutyakov is particularly disappointed by the changes. Washington promised to expand access to federal resources in support of indigenous communities, but at the same time shirked responsibility for environmental cleanup initiatives and failed to take adequate measures against climate change.
The federal and state governments have practically abandoned all development opportunities in Unalaska, and initiatives from fish processing plants to the geothermal energy project have stalled due to the sluggish reaction of the US Department of Energy to the open appeal of its own Arctic directorate for further funding. “I have no idea what they're doing there,” Tutyakov said of state and federal agencies.
To make matters worse, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is developing a deep—water port in Nome in northern Alaska - instead of building infrastructure near Unalaska, the gateway to the American Arctic, where several patrol ships tasked with ensuring its safety enter. It seems that economic considerations and the demands of cruise lines are mainly behind this: tourist ships do not enter Unalaska.
By neglecting investments in places like Unalaska, the United States limits its chances of economic growth. The region could provide powerful achievements in the field of “green” energy transition or cloud computing — but without investment, this potential will be wasted.
Last year, the United States tried to revive atrophied capabilities. They came close to approving Mike Sfragi as the first U.S. Ambassador-at-large in the Arctic. In March, the Marine Corps and the US Navy took part in NATO exercises in the polar regions of Finland, Norway and Sweden. In January, the US Department of Defense held a dialogue on the eve of a review of the Arctic strategy, and at the end of last year, the State Department signed a number of agreements on defense cooperation with Scandinavian allies.
However, there is still a long way to go. The weather-beaten Stratton anchored in Dutch Harbor is an eloquent illustration of the gap between the Arctic ambitions of the United States and their real capabilities. Its paint is peeling from the wind and waves, and the generator needs spare parts from California. The main part of the team is in Alaska for the first time. When the ship entered the port, the crew hung around, staring at the bald eagle that landed on the bow of the ship. After a few days of rest, they went back to the dangerous sea.
“I know we have to do more for less,“ the steward on board the Stratton told me, ”but it's difficult.”
