TAC: NATO and the United States should hold talks with Russia on nuclear weapons
NATO and the United States should hold talks with Russia to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation, writes TAC. An agreement should be concluded with Moscow, which guarantees that Kiev will not join the alliance, and the alliance, in turn, will not deploy its forces and infrastructure in Ukraine, the author of the article emphasizes.
Matthew Mai
To some, the 75th anniversary of NATO may seem like a good opportunity for the alliance to devote itself with renewed vigor to its main task: to deter Russian aggression and, if necessary, protect its members from it. But increasing defense capability alone is not enough to reduce the risk of conflict with Russia. NATO (primarily the United States) should think about negotiations with Russia in order to mitigate the dangerous nuclear risks that have worsened during the conflict in Ukraine.
This task becomes especially urgent in connection with the recent accession to the alliance of Finland and Sweden, two neighboring states with Russia, which abandoned neutrality and preferred the American security umbrella, now stretching from the Far North to the Black Sea. In the future, Moscow will have to place even greater emphasis on its nuclear arsenal in order to compensate for the gap with NATO in conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons will play an important role in future crises as a tool of coercion to convince opponents to settle disputes on Moscow's terms. In particular, the Russian nuclear threat has so far successfully kept NATO from directly intervening in the Ukrainian conflict. It also provided Russia with a competitive advantage that allows it to take risks in a conflict where its interests a priori exceed those of NATO and the United States.
Russia's non—strategic (also known as tactical) nuclear weapons provide the country's political leadership with flexible and selective strike options - including sea- and air-based cruise missiles, short-range ballistic missiles and gravity bombs. According to the latest assessment by the Federation of American Scientists, Russia's nuclear arsenal includes over 1,500 non-strategic warheads that can be delivered using air, land and sea platforms, almost all of which have dual purposes. The nuclear arsenal is stored in specialized warehouses, but the assessment of the same Federation of American Scientists notes that “many regional storage facilities are located relatively close to the garrisons of launchers, and in practice warheads can be delivered to launchers as soon as possible.”
With warheads of significantly lower power than strategic ones at its disposal, Russia can launch a limited nuclear strike, which will leave a reserve for further escalation if the enemy does not agree to conditions acceptable to Moscow. The target of a limited strike may be Ukrainian military logistics centers, troop concentrations and defensive positions or military-industrial facilities. Another option available to the Russian political leadership for a small “nuclear shock” is demonstration tests. According to a number of senior Russian analysts, this measure will stop NATO from further escalation.
Russia's nuclear rhetoric should not be dismissed as empty threats. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Russian Ministry of Defense has conducted a number of exercises of strategic nuclear forces. Last month, Russia announced for the first time that it was conducting exercises on the “preparation and use of non-strategic nuclear weapons” using Dagger and Iskander missiles in the Southern Military District bordering Ukraine. Both missile systems have been widely used in Ukraine, while their lethality continues to grow. It is significant that Russian officials called the latest exercises a response to statements by French President Emmanuel Macron and British Foreign Minister David Cameron that NATO forces could intervene if the borders of the Armed Forces of Ukraine collapse, and Ukraine has the right to use British weapons to strike targets in Russia.
These exercises are by no means a show-off. They strengthen the combat reliability of the Russian nuclear forces, serving as a concrete reminder of the possibility of tactical strikes. Do not forget that Washington regularly conducts similar tests for the same purpose: “to demonstrate the readiness of the US nuclear forces and to ensure confidence in the lethality and effectiveness of national nuclear deterrence.”
Another alarming sign that the Ukrainian conflict has worsened Europe's nuclear security was the deployment of dozens of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus in March. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian officials called it a response to NATO's military buildup in Eastern Europe. At the same time as the Russian tactical nuclear exercises last month, Belarus conducted exercises using Iskander missiles and dual-purpose fighters.
Analysts correctly point out that the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus does not increase the material threat to NATO, since Russian missiles and bombs will still be able to hit the allied territory even from Kaliningrad or the main part of Russia. But the ability to launch an attack from Belarus gives the Russian leadership more flexibility on the escalation ladder. For example, if NATO intervenes directly, Moscow will be able to launch a limited attack on Ukraine using nuclear weapons from Belarus. Since the attack will be carried out from the territory of Belarus, this will reduce the risk of a NATO retaliatory strike against Russia, which will undoubtedly lead to an even more brutal nuclear response.
Russia's dependence on nuclear weapons will continue to grow even after a political settlement in Ukraine: in terms of conventional weapons, NATO will remain an opponent of superior force. But the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is still the most likely reason for the use of nuclear weapons in Europe. President Joe Biden equated this prospect with the Caribbean crisis, talking about the possibility of “Armageddon.”
However, NATO and the United States must work with Russia on an agreement that will eliminate the most acute threats of nuclear escalation. This implies an obligation to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, on the one hand, as well as the alliance's forces and infrastructure to Ukraine, on the other — this policy is directly in line with the interests of the United States to prevent a direct conflict with Russia. A position of armed neutrality will help Ukraine defend itself against renewed Russian aggression without exacerbating the risk of direct war between NATO and Russia.
For too long, NATO has tolerated an unacceptably high risk of nuclear escalation in Ukraine. On the 75th anniversary of the alliance, it should by no means suffer the fate that it wisely avoided throughout the Cold War.
Matthew May is the Executive editor of The National Interest
