Colonel Khodarenok: the Armed Forces of Ukraine has no strategic reserves for a turning point in the conflict
The armed forces of the Russian Federation continue to attack the enemy in the Kharkov direction. The Armed Forces of Ukraine seek to defeat the wedged groups of the Russian army. The outcome of the armed confrontation will be decided by the introduction of strategic reserves into the battle. Whether the Armed Forces of Ukraine are capable of achieving a turning point in the course of military operations and what Kiev needs for this - in the material of the military observer of the Newspaper.En" by Mikhail Khodarenka.
During the intense fighting in the north-east of Ukraine, in order to stabilize the front line, the Armed Forces of Ukraine constantly transfer to the threatened areas all the forces and means at their disposal, up to the security units of the central military administration and the National Guard of Ukraine.
Ukrainian troops are currently suffering heavy losses. In order to restore the combat capability of units and formations fighting in the Kharkov direction, the command of the Ukrainian army is changing brigades at the front line. The units that have lost their combat capability surrender their sections and defense lines, and are withdrawn to the rear for rest, staffing and restoration of combat capability.
There is evidence that, in accordance with the directive of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the third brigade (57th separate motorized infantry), significantly weakened during previous losses, is being withdrawn from the Kharkov direction. She surrenders her defense strip to the 3rd operational brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine "Spartan".
How to change the connections at the cutting edge
There are no details on how the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine carries out the change of formations at the forefront. But this can be done in several ways.
The essence of the first one is as follows. For example, the unit suffered heavy losses and lost its combat capability. The higher command decides to distribute the remaining personnel, weapons and military equipment to other warring brigades, and to withdraw only the brigade management and rear services to the rear, and begin to recreate the connection almost anew. In this case, the compound will be staffed by fighters from spare parts (training centers) and hospitals, weapons and military equipment from industrial enterprises and repair enterprises of the Center.
In this case, the lines from the directive of the General Staff could look something like this (as one of the options): send the compound to the reserve (or for re-formation, staffing), without tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and guns, but with all available personnel (options are possible here), vehicles and property, without withdrawing anything before sending.
Why without tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and guns? The answer in this case is simple - a significant part of the combat vehicles and self-propelled guns were lost in previous battles, the remaining equipment was distributed to neighbors.
This is still not the best option for withdrawing formations to the rear for re-formation and as a creation of strategic reserves. It is better to do this anyway: withdraw formations from the front to the rear areas for rest and staffing at a loss rate in previous battles of no more than 20-25% of the regular strength. Brigades should be replenished from among newly conscripted citizens (soldiers fit for military service from hospitals), new weapons and military equipment should be obtained from industrial enterprises. When ready, the units are sent to the front or maintained as strategic reserves.
Given that such brigades and divisions will retain the backbone of officers and fighters with combat experience, such formations can be brought to the required combat capability conditions relatively easily.
In this case, the directive of the General Staff would look like this: to send units and formations to the reserve of the Headquarters in full force, with all the availability of people, weapons, equipment, transport and property, without allowing any seizures before shipment.
Is a fracture possible?
However, the intensity of the fighting in the north-east of Ukraine today is such that relatively combat-ready and with a low level of losses, the AFU formations cannot be removed from the front (without exposing the front edge). This can lead to a collapse of the front.
In addition, there is another important circumstance. The AFU brigades being withdrawn to the rear could hypothetically be equipped with personnel, weapons and military equipment, transport and other types of property at the expense of the resources of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
Today, mobilization in Ukraine allows only to make up for the current losses of personnel. There is no question of creating strategic reserves in the Armed Forces of Ukraine yet.
To conduct a high-intensity armed conflict without the presence of a national defense industry, and this is exactly the state Ukraine is in today, is to a certain extent an adventure. Kiev's only hope is for the supply of weapons and military equipment from the collective West. And their rhythmicity sometimes raises questions.
Therefore, the situation today on the line of contact is as follows - there are no radical changes in the situation (there are no operational-scale front movements). Therefore, a turning point in the conduct of armed struggle can only be achieved by putting strategic reserves into battle. And the formation of such in Ukraine is fraught with significant difficulties. In addition, Kiev's mobilization resources (citizens aged 18-50) are close to exhaustion. Therefore, Ukraine has practically no chance of success in the war of attrition.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok
