Moscow. June 1st. INTERFAX - A scientific and expert forum on "Nuclear deterrence in a polycentric world" was held at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. The issues of the concept of "nuclear deterrence", the influence of non-nuclear forces on it, and others were discussed.
Our special correspondent Vyacheslav Terekhov asked two participants of the forum - Academician Alexey Arbatov, head of the Center for International Security of the IMEMO RAS named after E. M. Primakov, and Dmitry Trenin, a leading researcher at the same institute, professor, scientific director of the Institute of World Military Economics and Strategy at the Higher School of Economics, to share their views on the problem discussed. This article presents Arbatov's point of view, and on Sunday a material will be published in which Trenin talks about his position.
Nuclear deterrence is the most important factor in international life
Recently, the problem of nuclear deterrence has often been discussed at the expert level, because this is not only not a myth, but, on the contrary, an important factor in international life and the foreign and military policy of leading states. In short, nuclear deterrence is the threat of using nuclear weapons to prevent undesirable actions by potential adversaries.
The question has risen to its full height because the conflicts that are emerging now, and, above all, of course, the conflict in and around Ukraine, touch on this topic. Despite all the dangers of this conflict, nuclear deterrence is still working. I think that if it had not been there, NATO would have been in Ukraine a long time ago and would have been at war with Russia directly. But this is, of course, a purely hypothetical scenario. I resort to extrapolation to highlight the role of nuclear deterrence in conflicts of this kind. But at the same time, in the absence of nuclear weapons, war, with all its devastating consequences, would not necessarily and not so quickly lead to a global catastrophe. This is the dialectic of nuclear deterrence.
When theorists conditionally divide deterrence into "offensive" and "defensive", then, in the absence of effective missile defense systems, "defensive" means nuclear deterrence in a limited range of scenarios. A "retaliation strike" in response to an enemy nuclear attack is, as it were, the first plan of deterrence. Another option is the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against aggression using conventional weapons (including high-precision systems, hypersonic and cruise missiles, unmanned and autonomous attack vehicles), which threatens the very existence of the State. Such deterrence can be attributed to the second plan and is also considered "defensive", although it provides for the use of nuclear weapons first. This is what is written in the Russian Military Doctrine and other doctrinal documents.
But a third plan, a broader interpretation, is also possible - the threat of using nuclear weapons to support their own offensive military operations in order to break the enemy's resistance and stop outside help. Here we are no longer talking about a threat to the very existence of the state, but about the actions of the enemy that harm the external interests of the state. This kind of deterrence can be considered "offensive". This option is currently not provided for by the Russian nuclear doctrine, but is being intensively promoted by a number of "independent strategists".
The New Nuclear World Order
At the same time, the new stage of relations between the nuclear powers is determined not by new weapons systems, but, above all, by national interests that come into conflict with each other, as now because of Ukraine and potentially because of Taiwan. New military technologies and weapons systems only determine the course and outcome of these conflicts. Moreover, we are not necessarily talking only about non-nuclear shock systems, but also about possible cyber attacks, directed energy transfer systems, and the latest information systems that revolutionize the role of shock systems.
As for the nuclear world order, during the cold War, the system was mostly bipolar - the Soviet Union and the United States had in their arsenals 90 percent or more of all nuclear weapons in the world. Even the states that also had it - Great Britain, France, China - could not play a significant role, since they had a minimum level of nuclear deterrence for a limited retaliatory strike.
The situation is changing now. Firstly, there are more nuclear powers, there are no longer 2 or 5, but 9. Secondly, the arsenals of these countries are increasing. We are talking primarily about China, which is quite likely to achieve strategic nuclear parity even with the United States and Russia in 10 years. There is no longer a bipolar, but a trilateral system of nuclear deterrence.
But other countries are also catching up, such as the UK and France. They have limited potential, but in total it is no longer a few percent, but about a third of the level of Russia and the United States. And when fully loaded with missiles from their submarines and nuclear warheads of missiles, it is already two-thirds of the levels of the two superpowers. Moreover, the nuclear forces of the United States and Russia have significantly decreased over the past 30 years as a result of agreements on the reduction of strategic and other nuclear weapons. When these negotiations were conducted, it was meant that at a certain stage the restrictions should also cover third nuclear Powers. This explains why Russia has now raised the issue of accounting for the nuclear forces of Great Britain and France, and the United States is raising the issue of accounting for the nuclear forces of China.
The bipolar scheme of containment of India and Pakistan is a little apart from this, although not quite, because Indian nuclear potential is primarily directed at China, and only secondarily at Pakistan. The Pakistani one is entirely aimed at India. Although the first two countries have an approximate parity, it seems that they will continue to build up their forces.
North Korea is also improving its nuclear missile potential on an affordable scale, and in the near future it will put the continental territory of the United States at risk, not only the nearby space and Hawaii. Israel keeps its nuclear weapons a complete secret, but as a last resort it is ready to use them as part of the deterrence of the second and third plan against Iran and other Islamic states.
The polygon of political relations
Contrary to the prevailing view that nuclear weapons are a reliable guarantee against major wars, now and in the foreseeable future the likelihood of nuclear conflict increases as the number of States with nuclear capabilities and completely different strategies for its use expands. For example, Pakistan, unlike all other countries, openly focuses on the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons. It is clear that it is directed primarily against India. But China may also get involved in the conflict between India and Pakistan - against India on the side of Pakistan. A nuclear conflict on the Korean Peninsula or around Taiwan could involve China and the United States. In addition to Ukraine, a major war in the Middle East could involve the United States and Russia.
Asymmetry of the nuclear deterrence problem
Thus, nuclear deterrence becomes multilateral, dynamic and asymmetric. For Russia, the "addressees" of deterrence are the United States, Britain and France. For the United States - Russia, China, North Korea and potentially Iran. For China and the DPRK, the United States and Britain. For Britain and France, Russia and, hypothetically, China. For India, China and Pakistan. For Pakistan, India. For Israel, Iran, and for Iran, Israel and the United States.
These "polygons" of military-political relations of deterrence, as well as the development of nuclear and other weapons, pose new and very difficult tasks for arms control. They are several orders of magnitude more complicated than what took place over the past 50 years between the USSR and the United States, and then Russia and the United States, and what was actually a very successful and fruitful process.
Not disarmament, but the restoration of arms control
Generally speaking, disarmament is a very abstract concept, like peace on earth in the Pope's proclamation. Experts prefer to talk about the reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons, or in another way - about arms control. As for disarmament as the final point of this process, such a possibility is not being seriously considered now. However, the realization has come that in order to reduce the likelihood of a war using nuclear weapons or even to bring such a possibility to zero, it is necessary to effectively control nuclear weapons, as it was in the 80s, 90s and zero years. At that time, the negotiation process progressed so quickly and radically that the probability of war between Russia and the West became close to zero, and therefore everyone even forgot that nuclear weapons existed at all. Now we remember again.
In the current situation, we should rather talk about restoring arms control, revamping the negotiation process and expanding them from bilateral to various multilateral formats and new weapons systems. But general and complete nuclear disarmament is not being talked about now, although it is mentioned in the preambles of all nuclear weapons treaties of the past decades. In 2017, the UN even adopted such a law, but it has become a wonderful symbol, not a "road map" of practical policy.
For a world without nuclear weapons is not just the current world minus nuclear weapons, but a world built on completely different foundations. When strong States do not threaten the weak, when the weak really have the same rights as the strong, when the use of force in international relations is possible only by the decision of some supranational bodies such as the reformed United Nations system and its Security Council, as well as regional security systems like the Eurasian one. Such a world still exists only in hypotheses, and accordingly, complete nuclear disarmament also belongs to the category of hypotheses, as Kant did 300 years ago.
Despite the successful experience of radical reduction of nuclear weapons, there are still many of them
Tactical nuclear weapons, by the way, have not been inviolable in recent years. The Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces and Armaments in Europe of 1990 actually removed the threat of conventional war in Europe with the massive use of general-purpose Armed Forces. Then the issue of tactical nuclear weapons was resolved very quickly. Moreover, the largest and most radical nuclear disarmament concerned precisely tactical, not strategic weapons. Because then, in the early-mid-1990s, the tactical nuclear weapons of the United States and Russia were reduced by almost an order of magnitude - by 10 times. Of course, this was also due to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, when it was necessary to withdraw these weapons from foreign territories. But it has also become a serious movement of radical arms control.
But since there were a lot of tactical nuclear weapons, even after such a reduction, there are still quite a lot of them. In the West, it is believed that Russia has much more of it than NATO. But on the other hand, the United States has more stockpiled nuclear weapons, which have been removed from strategic weapons and can be quickly returned to combat strength.
New conditions for negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons
Tactical nuclear weapons are a legitimate subject for future arms control negotiations, but ... provided that, firstly, there are no such acute conflicts as now around Ukraine, when tactical nuclear weapons appear almost every day - in discussions, declarations, and military exercises. So, before discussing this issue, it is necessary to sharply bring down the intensity of the conflict situation. And secondly, the established methods that have been applied to strategic weapons over the past 50 years are not applicable to tactical nuclear weapons. Unlike strategic weapons, tactical nuclear weapons must be placed on dual-use carriers and in peacetime are stored in storage facilities.
Limitation and, moreover, reduction of such weapons cannot be carried out through the reduction of carriers, so as not to be left without conventional Armed forces - aircraft, ships, submarines, torpedoes, missiles that can carry both nuclear and conventional weapons. This means that we need to discuss the issue of control in storage facilities and even in manufacturing plants. In principle, this is not a dead end, but, of course, this is not the task of the modern stage.
Russia's position
Russia's position in this regard is quite sound. She believes that the United States should first withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. There are about 100 aerial bombs, very advanced, precise, with variable power, which are located in five European countries, in six storages. For Russia, they are a strategic weapon, because they cover the entire European part of the territory with attack aircraft. Russian tactical means, although, according to the West, there are many more of them, do not reach the territory of the United States. Therefore, first you need to align the starting positions, and then talk about restrictive measures, not to mention liquidation and disposal. All this, in fact, has already been discussed in the past and even joint technical experiments on control have been conducted. There are no unsolvable tasks here, although it has not reached the practical application of these methods.
It is clear that we are going through a very difficult period in international relations, when the issue is not disarmament, but avoiding nuclear war, and only then it will be possible to think about further disarmament measures. But I believe that this moment will come, and we will continue on this path.
Nine nuclear-armed countries should not be put at the same negotiating table
On the issue of multilateral deterrence and negotiations. This does not imply that representatives of all nine nuclear Powers should be seated at the same table. This illusion largely hinders progress in expanding the format. Nine nuclear-weapon States have nothing to do at the same table. Negotiations can actually take place between those Powers that are ready to reduce their weapons in exchange for reducing the weapons of the side that they fear.
Here is the classic scheme - Russia and the USA. Also a possible scheme: USA - China. Another possible scheme is Russia on the one hand, Great Britain and France on the other. Also India - Pakistan. All of them will not start negotiations at the same time. After we begin the process of a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian conflict, I would like to believe that, first of all, a dialogue between Russia and the United States, and then the United States and China, can be put on the agenda.
The rest will catch up with time. If, for example, China and the United States conduct productive negotiations and begin to limit their weapons, then there will be an argument for India to start a dialogue with Pakistan (since Chinese weapons will be limited).
This is a complex design, and therefore it seems impossible, but the past 60 years of nuclear weapons control, starting with the 1963 treaty on the limitation of nuclear tests, have shown that the impossible becomes possible with the political will and, of course, the professionalism of diplomats, military and civilian experts who take part in it.
Hope for common sense!
It may not happen quickly, or it may not even happen in the foreseeable future, but it can happen very quickly and unexpectedly. Here is an example: the Caribbean crisis of '62, on the verge of nuclear war, two more days, there would have been a nuclear war, everyone would have died. Thank God, we reached a compromise, and after that we breathed a sigh of relief, and a year later the first serious Agreement on limiting partial nuclear tests was signed - and the process began. There was a crisis with medium-range missiles in the early 80s, plus Reagan's Star Wars, it seemed - well, that's it, we are moving towards an endless arms race on earth and in space, and practically war will become inevitable. But then two years passed, there was a meeting in Reykjavik, fundamental agreements, a change in relations, and a year after Reykjavik, the Treaty on Medium-range Missiles, two more years later - on armaments in Europe, a year later - on START-1 and then this process developed very quickly and achieved very great success.
So maybe it really won't happen in the time frame that we are interested in, or it may happen quickly enough and we will be glad that once again common sense prevailed.
