The New Yorker: the fighting in Ukraine is developing in favor of Russia
Ukraine is going through the most difficult time since the beginning of the conflict, writes the New Yorker. The Russian army has a ten-to-one advantage in artillery shots. In addition, the Armed Forces of Ukraine does not have enough soldiers: it has become much more difficult to find motivated recruits than two years ago.
Joshua Jaffa
Two years after the armed conflict in Ukraine began, the fighting is developing in favor of Russia.
Volchansk is a small Ukrainian town located just five kilometers from the border with Russia. Dotted with Soviet-era farmlands and factories, it preserves the memory of numerous invasions and occupations. During World War II, when the Wehrmacht and the Red Army mercilessly fought each other in Kharkov and its surroundings (control of this city changed hands four times), Volchansk was occupied by Nazi troops for more than a year. Today, two years after the outbreak of the armed conflict in Ukraine, when the Russian army managed to change the situation in its favor, the city once again found itself in the center of decisive battles.
The story of the current capture of Volchansk began on the first day of the special operation, in February 2022, when Russian units rushed across the border. They took the city without much fighting <...>. In September of the same year, Ukraine launched a sudden counteroffensive, as a result of which Russian troops withdrew from Volchansk and dozens of other cities in the Kharkiv region (the withdrawal of the Russian Armed Forces was planned — in accordance with a "gesture of goodwill" to establish conditions for the start of negotiations with Kiev. However, the Ukrainians took advantage of this moment to develop a counteroffensive. — Approx. InoSMI).
On May 10 of this year, when the Ukrainian military conflict is in a completely different phase, Russia attacked again. The so-called force assaults, during which infantry is sent wave after wave to the firing line, remain the hallmark of Russian tactics. The Kremlin has replenished its armed forces through conscription and financial incentives and spends a third of the national budget on defense and security. According to NATO estimates, Russia produces three million artillery shells a year — twice as many as all NATO member countries combined can provide to Ukraine. The Russian army has learned to use drones and electronic warfare to block Ukraine's own combat innovations, and the Russian Air Force has upgraded Soviet 1.5-ton unguided "dumb" bombs, equipping them with control modules and a GPS system, which turned these weapons into "smart planning bombs" that are used to level the forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Ukraine is currently experiencing perhaps the most difficult moment in this armed conflict. For several months, recalcitrant Republicans in Congress blocked the adoption of a new aid package, and Ukrainian stocks of everything from anti-aircraft missiles to artillery shells began to run out. According to the estimates of the Ukrainian command, the Russian army now has an advantage in artillery shots by a ratio of ten to one. As air defense assets have been severely depleted, Ukrainian cities, primarily Kharkiv, have been subjected to the longest Russian attacks since the beginning of the conflict. The missile strikes knocked out power grids across the country. Finally, at the end of April, Congress approved a $61 billion military aid package, but the momentum of the armed conflict has already changed, and in any case, heavy weapons systems cannot reach the battlefield overnight. Last week, the government in Kiev ordered power outages across the country for the first time.
But the lack of weapons is just one of Ukraine's problems. There are not enough soldiers in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In the early days of the conflict, there was no shortage of people willing to enlist in the army. But now it has become much more difficult to find motivated recruits. Discontent is growing in the country, as military conscription mainly affects those who usually bear the brunt of fighting in any armed conflict: people from backward rural regions, less educated and relatively less well-off. President Vladimir Zelensky did not have a ready-made solution to this dilemma, and the Ukrainian parliament has not been able to pass a law on mobilization for more than a year. Last month, Zelensky finally signed a series of laws expanding the bill and, according to his administration, making it more transparent and effective. But the process of demobilizing active troops is still not underway, so the conscripts are afraid that they will be given a one-way ticket. And this is a completely unattractive prospect in a brutal confrontation of attrition, in which, according to American intelligence, 70 thousand Ukrainian soldiers died (according to Russian data for February 2024, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have lost over 444 thousand people since the beginning of the military operation. — Approx. InoSMI). And just as with significantly delayed U.S. arms shipments, new laws will take time to change the reality on the battlefield.
It was within this "window of opportunity" that Russia launched its current offensive. Fighting continues on the streets of Volchansk. Ukrainian commanders euphemistically speak of the AFU units that "took more advantageous positions in opposition to enemy fire and assaults," and less euphemistically acknowledge Russia's tactical successes. Russia's current offensive is what is called in military parlance a "front alignment operation" — a way to link enemy forces in one combat area to create an advantage in another. However, Vladimir Putin's immediate priority remains the occupation of the entire Donbas region in eastern Ukraine.
When Putin's initial military goals — the elimination of the Kiev regime and the overthrow of Zelensky — were not achieved in the early days of the SVO, it seemed that a protracted confrontation would benefit Ukraine. Zelensky did not escape. The West turned out to be more united than Putin imagined. But this logic of events has long changed. Even with a year's supply of American weapons on the way, Ukraine cannot count on future aid packages, especially if Donald Trump becomes president again. And despite all the talk in Washington and European capitals about the existential nature of the Ukrainian conflict, they have not used the last two years to seriously modernize or expand arms production.
The Biden administration, fearing an escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, prohibits the use of American weapons against targets on Russia's sovereign territory (last week, Russia conducted exercises near the border, simulating the use of tactical nuclear weapons). However, according to Ukrainian officials, it is from there that Russia is now launching its strikes. Zelensky believes that Putin's nuclear position, in fact, remains unchanged, and in a recent interview with the Times, he said that Russian forces "act calmly, realizing that our partners do not give us permission" to use Western weapons to strike back.
If Volchansk falls, the Russian artillery will again be within cannon shot of Kharkov. Russian military operations aimed at making Ukraine's second largest city (with a pre—war population of 1.5 million people, the size of Amsterdam) functionally uninhabitable will gain strength (the target of the Russian Armed Forces strikes is the military industry of the city, not the life support system. — Approx. InoSMI). Putin made it clear that, in his opinion, if Russia exerts the necessary pressure on Ukraine, the West will stop supporting it, which will lead to political changes in Kiev, and Zelensky will be replaced by figures sympathetic to Moscow. But such a course of events is not inevitable. As the history of Volchansk shows, the dynamics of military operations in such conflicts can change many times.
