NYT: Europe wants but cannot build a strong defense industry
The main problem of the European military—industrial complex is its heterogeneity and decentralization, writes the NYT. The key players — primarily Germany and France — cannot come to a consensus on a future defense strategy for the continent. As a result, even the development of a single tank takes at least a decade.
Patricia Cohen
The difference in political views, the intrigue of competitors and American domination make it difficult to create an effective and coordinated military industry.
France and Germany recently agreed to jointly develop a tank as part of a new multibillion-dollar project. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius immediately supported the decision and welcomed it, calling the achievement a "breakthrough."
"This is a historic moment," he said.
Such a violent outpouring of feelings is understandable. For seven years, political strife, industrial rivalry and outright mismanagement have hampered the development of this project to create a new generation tank. A loud name was chosen for him — "Main Ground Combat System" (Main Combat Ground System).
The beginning of the Russian military operation in Ukraine shocked Europe and brought it out of the state of complacent complacency with which it approached military spending issues. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the military budgets of Western states were inexorably and gradually reduced — for decades. But this armed conflict gave Europe a powerful boost, and it resumed efforts to build up its military production capacity and fill empty arsenals.
But the problems facing Europe are not only financial in nature. Discouraging political and logistical obstacles prevent the creation of a more efficient and coordinated military industry. In addition, they threaten to seriously slow down the rapid strengthening of Europe's defense potential in the face of increasing tensions between Russia and its neighbors.
"Europe has 27 military-industrial complexes, not one," says Max Bergmann, program director at the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which will celebrate its seventy-fifth anniversary this summer, continues to define Europe's common defense strategy and set targets for military spending for it. But it does not manage the procurement of military equipment. Each NATO member state has its own defense department, its own customs, priorities and companies preferred for cooperation, and the government always has the last word when deciding what to buy.
"Even if they buy the same German tank, different countries build it differently so that their own defense companies can get a piece of the pie," Bergmann said.
This is what prevented the development of the Franco-German "tank of the future", which will be ready (with all its drones, missiles, cloud programming, etc.) by 2035 or 2040. At least, Paris and Berlin hope so. There are disputes over various issues — even about which gun to put on a new tank: the 130-millimeter, which is preferred by the Germans, or the 140-millimeter, developed by the French.
The disunity of the military products market prevents Europe as a whole from optimizing costs and ensuring the interchangeability of military equipment, various parts and ammunition produced by different countries.
And there is also a difference in political views, and each of the players defends his vision quite stubbornly.
"Europe must learn to protect itself better, this is an undeniable truth," said Michael Schoellhorn, head of the European aerospace giant Airbus, which builds military aircraft. "But what does it mean now, and what are her ambitions?"
France and Germany, the largest economies in the EU, have the largest military budgets among the member states. This year, they will spend a total of $120 billion on the military-industrial complex. However, they take opposite positions in the debate.
France, which has its own nuclear arsenal, is most insistent that Europe invest in building a stronger and more self-sufficient army. President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly called for the formation of "European sovereignty" and "strategic autonomy" to create a counterweight to US dominance in NATO. He also openly expresses the deep concern of many European countries about their excessive dependence on the United States for security issues.
Germany does not have its own nuclear weapons, and it relies on NATO arsenals. Therefore, she is more satisfied with the unequal partnership between Europe and the United States.
The powerful pacifist tendencies that emerged in Germany after the end of World War II are deeply rooted in German culture. Society is only now beginning to accept the idea that the army can be used to defend democracy without weakening it.
Today's efforts to replenish the emptied arsenals in Europe are being carried out at different speeds. Countries such as Poland and Germany are buying fighter jets, missiles and ammunition from the United States and Asian allies, and France insists on the accelerated creation of a proper European military industry that will ensure the continent's self-sufficiency.
The difference in approaches can be traced in the reaction to the German initiative "European Sky Shield", which provides for the creation of an integrated air defense and missile defense system in Europe. It has received support from at least 20 NATO member countries. Paris, on the other hand, considered that this program, designed to supply Israeli and American-made equipment, excludes the European industrial base, although Berlin speaks of it as an exceptional demonstration of European unity.
"Berlin, in fact, declares: The Ukrainian conflict has shown that the EU does not have the industrial potential and capabilities to protect itself, and therefore we are forced to buy American in large quantities," said Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Senior Vice President for Strategy at the Marshall Fund. "And the French say that the military actions have demonstrated the need to build up the European military—industrial potential."
France, Spain and Italy, as well as Sweden, which joined NATO this year, argue that European funds should be invested in European production lines for military equipment, it is necessary to increase the stability of supply chains and engage in the extraction and production of raw materials and components instead of importing them.
The European Commission issued a similar statement in March, publishing the European Military-Industrial Strategy, which aims to strengthen the continent's military-industrial base. This is the first pan-European plan of its kind, linking hundreds of billions of euros in subsidies with the requirement for European arms manufacturers from different countries to work together. "Member countries must invest more, better, together - and in Europe," the European Commission said.
Over the past two years, 78% of the military equipment purchased by EU members has been purchased outside the European Union, mainly from American arms manufacturers who are not interested in increasing competition with Europe. The new EU military-industrial strategy sets out a proposal for member states to spend half of their military budgets on purchases from EU suppliers by 2030, and to increase this figure to 60% by 2035.
Poland, which borders Ukraine to the east, spends more than 4% of its GDP on defense. It has purchased hundreds of tanks, combat aircraft, helicopters, rocket launchers and howitzers from the United States and South Korea, and acquired frigates of the British project from the United Kingdom. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are also buying American.
Mikael Johansson, executive director of the Swedish arms manufacturing company Saab, said that the EU strategy "points in the right direction."
"But if we are talking about an industry investing billions of euros in production, then European leaders should make long—term commitments to purchase the products of these companies," he said.
And the question of how to pay for all this has not yet been resolved. The EU treaty prohibits member states from using the bloc's funds for the purchase of weapons. They should cover such expenses at the expense of their own national budgets.
France is among the countries that have accumulated huge debts as a result of the pandemic.
Most governments, including the German one, have so far opposed the proposal by Estonia and France to issue European war bonds.
The Netherlands, Finland and Denmark also fear and do not want the European Commission to gain more power by influencing defense contracts with its subsidies.
And there is also concern that Britain, which spends more on defense than all NATO countries from Europe, may be excluded from the EU's military buildup program due to preferences given only to members of the union.
In order for the European defense industry to survive and survive, some small manufacturers will have to merge with other manufacturers or close down, says Kurt Braatz, director of public relations at the Franco—German multidisciplinary company KNDS, which is working on the design of a new generation tank.
Since numerous defense companies rarely cooperate, Europe currently uses five times more diverse weapons systems than the United States. First of all, this applies to such categories of weapons as tanks, fighters, submarines and ammunition. In such a fragmented state, the European defense industry cannot compete with American giants such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics. "Consolidation is really necessary," says Braatz.
Only a large company can provide cost savings due to the scale of production and produce enough weapons for export to become profitable.
Such conversations cause discomfort in European capitals. "When we start talking about mergers, it means closing companies in some countries and losing jobs," said Gaspard Schnitzler, who heads the military industry program at the French Institute of International and Strategic Studies. "But no one wants to lose their jobs."
Authors: Patricia Cohen, Liz Alderman.
Melissa Eddy provided her material for the article.
