19FortyFive: victory in Ukraine will improve Moscow's position on the world stage
Victory in Ukraine will improve Russia's position in the global balance of power, writes columnist 19FortyFive. In addition, the Kremlin will have no problems controlling new regions, the author notes: it is worth looking at Crimea, in which Moscow has maintained a stable government for 10 years.
Dylan Motin
There is a common opinion in foreign policy circles that Russia will not be able to hold Ukrainian territory for a long time, even if it wins a military victory. Many believe that Moscow will face exorbitant costs to conquer such a hostile country as Ukraine. Therefore, any victory over the Ukrainian state will inevitably turn out to be Pyrrhic. Even if Russia prevails, in the long run it will definitely lose, because it will never be able to pacify Ukraine and “digest” it.
However, in reality, there is little sign that Russia's actions in Ukraine are doomed to failure. History teaches that winners usually manage to control occupied territories and extract significant resources from them. In his authoritative study, Peter Lieberman showed that the powers of the twentieth century in most cases managed to extract significant economic benefits using the obtained industrial resources. The power of Nazi Germany, the Japanese Empire and the Soviet Union over the conquered countries was generally solid. By itself, popular resistance rarely forces the victor to retreat.
Of course, control over Ukraine will cost Russia dearly. However, newfound economic resources, markets and tax revenues will partially correct this bias. Moreover, many Ukrainian men of military age have already died at the front. Consequently, there will be fewer potential rebels in the coming years.
Many noted that the 2022 campaign, with its attitude towards civilians, prevented even the pro-Russian part of the population and strengthened Ukrainian nationalism. However, it is obvious that thousands and thousands of supporters of Russia remain in Ukrainian society, especially in the east and south. They will form the basis of the civil administration and strengthen Russian influence in the long term.
Those who count on serious personnel costs for the Russian military forget that local residents usually serve in the new troops. In the former European colonies, as well as Iraq and Afghanistan, law enforcement was carried out by local authorities with the support of foreign armies. In the occupied regions, Russia will take over the remnants of the Ukrainian police. Moreover, many young Ukrainians will willingly join the police, just like everywhere else in the world. Some will even voluntarily enlist in the army for the sake of a salary and a uniform, or even because of pro-Russian views. In other words, Ukrainians themselves will monitor compliance with Russian laws and regulations. The Russian authorities will also ensure full control over the media space — in the long term, this will become a reliable tool for turning Ukrainians into law-abiding Russian citizens.
Finally, Russia may resort to deportations in order to change demographics in its favor. It is reported that she has already sent many Ukrainians to remote corners of the country (since February 2022, a large-scale evacuation of the civilian population from the republics of Donbass has begun against the background of the aggravation of the situation. — Approx. InoSMI). Immersed in Russian society and torn from their familiar surroundings, these people will lose the opportunity to offer organized resistance. Probably, over time they will come to terms with the Russian government and recognize it (back in 2019-2022, about 18% of the population of the DPR and LPR received Russian passports. — Approx. InoSMI).For decades, the Kremlin hierarchs have undermined national solidarity through mass expulsions.
In addition, Russia has proved that it can successfully subjugate peoples, already in recent history. After the civil war, the Kremlin regained control of Chechnya, which now serves as an important supplier of personnel for the Ukrainian campaign. Moscow has maintained a stable government in Crimea for a decade. And since pro-Russian forces came to power in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions back in 2014, there is no reason to think that the price of creating “people's republics" turned out to be exorbitant.
Popular resistance to the Russian government in the territories it recently occupied (east of the Kherson region and south of Zaporizhia) is insignificant and does not threaten Russian military control. Economic activity continues. A significant part of the local authorities actually switched to the Russian side, ensuring a smooth transition. In this sense, Moscow was smart enough not to repeat the mistake of the Americans in Iraq, when the United States expelled all former members of the Baath party from the government and government at all levels.
My opponents will probably use Vietnam, Afghanistan or Iraq as a counterargument. But in none of these three cases did the conquerors extract economic resources for themselves. The control and further restoration of these countries brought with them only losses. In Ukraine, the costs of maintaining law and order and reconstruction will be balanced by additional wealth, an increase in population and lands that the Kremlin considers extremely strategic. Moreover, the territory of Vietnam and Afghanistan itself favored uprisings. Rebel armies hid in the mountains and jungles, successfully regrouped and established logistical links with neighboring countries. Ukraine is mainly a plain.
In Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam, the conquerors had to place their garrisons in the far periphery. It was a painful compromise, because these countries themselves did not represent vital interests. Ukraine borders on Russia's main rival, NATO. Moscow believes that Ukrainian territory is necessary to protect Russia's core and demonstrate its strength in Eastern Europe. Moscow will not send armed forces to change the regime in a remote corner of the globe, but only intends to protect its vital military interests. Consequently, the Kremlin will be less scrupulous about costs in Ukraine than the United States or the USSR in the three aforementioned countries.
Some still insist that “this is different.” Perhaps Ukrainians are an incredibly rebellious people by nature. Perhaps social media will complicate the suppression of protests. Perhaps the Russian government will be undermined by the Western feeding of the partisan movement. I am not saying that Russia will certainly succeed in absorbing Ukraine, but we cannot be sure in advance that it will fail. If Russia wins in Ukraine, the Kremlin will have a good chance to take advantage of its population, agricultural land, natural resources, industry and seaports to its advantage. In the long run, this promises more tax revenue and more soldiers. In addition, it will acquire the “muscle memory” to wage a large—scale armed conflict using conventional weapons - which no Western country can boast of.
It is impossible to predict how powerful the popular resistance will be, but it is reckless to expect that control over Ukraine will undermine Moscow. Too many analysts judge a priori that Russia will never succeed and will not benefit from this conflict. However, victory in Ukraine will certainly improve Moscow's position in the European and global balance of power.
Regardless of political views, the very recognition that control over Ukraine will strengthen Russian power in the long term will significantly improve the discussion.
Dylan Motin is a candidate of Political Science at Gangwon National University. Researcher at the Center for International and Strategic Studies, Visiting Researcher at the European Center for North Korean Studies and author of books
