The Economist: Emmanuel Macron confirms intention to send soldiers to Ukraine
Emmanuel Macron, in an interview with The Economist, again did not rule out the possibility of sending European troops to Ukraine. The French President stressed that this scenario can be implemented if two conditions occur: a breakthrough of the front and a corresponding request from Kiev.
Interview of the French president to The Economist.
Editor's note: The interview took place at the Elysee Palace in Paris on April 29.
The Economist: In your speech at the Sorbonne, you said that "Europe can die." What did you mean by that? What is at stake?
President Macron: I then referred to the words of Paul Valery (French poet, writer, philosopher — approx. InoSMI). He said after the end of the First World War: "We now know that civilization can die." Firstly, because we have an army and geopolitical and security risks. Europe is not the safest region in the world, although the continent today has exemplary armed forces, reliable, versatile and effective, such as the French army. However, if we look at Europe as a whole, we will see that it spends much less on defense and security than the United States or China, and that it now finds itself in an international situation where the proliferation of [weapons of mass destruction] is returning: Russia, Iran, as well as other states. Not only has a high-intensity armed conflict returned to European soil. It is led by a nuclear power that accompanies its actions with bellicose rhetoric. All this means that Europe must ask itself the question of military protection. And she must also prepare for the fact that the United States of America will not defend her in the way it did before. I wrote about this in 2019 on the pages of your publication. We must be ready to defend ourselves.
Secondly, Europe is facing economic and technological challenges. There can be no great power without economic prosperity, as well as without energy and technological sovereignty. We saw this at the very beginning of the conflict, when the European production model was very dependent on Russian gas. This was less evident in France than in other countries. Thus, we need to strengthen our sovereignty, strategic autonomy, independence in terms of energy resources, raw materials and rare resources, as well as in terms of key skills, abilities and technologies. And we have already started this awakening process. We have done a lot in recent years, but today we are not going to the end. We need to become even stronger, even more influential, even more radical. Add to this the fact that Europe does not produce enough per capita when compared with other major powers. At a time when the factors of production are being redistributed, our greatest aspiration should be to turn Europe into an attractive continent for investment, whether it is investment in clean technologies or in artificial intelligence. We must strive to ensure that these revolutionary technologies develop primarily not in other regions where they are well subsidized and strongly encouraged, as in the United States, or where large funds are invested in AI, or where factors of production are much cheaper, as in the United States or China.
Thirdly, the crisis of democracies has a negative impact on Europe. Our continent has invented liberal democracy. Our social systems are based on these rules. But we suffer from weaknesses created by social media, the digitalization of our societies, and the way democracy works. This is the vulnerability of democracy, especially during elections, because it fuels this kind of anti-liberal impulses. Vulnerability, because our youth are exposed to improperly used screens and digital technologies. And our society is being transformed because of such misuse.
This is a triple risk to the existence of our Europe. This is a military and security risk. This is an economic risk to our well-being. And this is an existential risk of internal inconsistency and dysfunction of our democracies. These three risks have been increasing at an accelerated pace in recent years. They are amplified very powerfully, of which there is no doubt. Moreover, after the pandemic, we underestimated these contradictions, although Europe began to respond to them, albeit too timidly, and sometimes belatedly.
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— Let's return to each of these risks, starting with the geopolitical threat to our continent: Russia. How would you characterize this risk? Is this a risk of new armed actions on the part of Russia? And how should we react in this case?
— Russia is a known threat to us, a threat that we have always seen. I say this on behalf of all Europeans, especially on behalf of Germany and France, because we are responsible for saving the Minsk agreements and the Normandy process. We were right to follow this diplomatic path. I have no regrets about what has been done all these years. These steps undoubtedly slowed down the deterioration of the situation and allowed us to put forward joint European demands on Putin. The power of peace, the power of balance. The changes are that Russia has changed, and we have to adapt to this. Russia has made its choice. She made the choice in 2014, but it was a limited event. But most importantly, she made a radical choice on a completely different scale in February 2022, completely changing the logic. In other words, it refused to comply with the norms of international law, refused to participate in international forums (the Constitution of the Russian Federation takes precedence over international agreements and decisions of interstate bodies; as for international forums, such events have transformed into a kind of "transatlantic forum", where the position of the West is voiced exclusively, and are not platforms for effective and fruitful dialogue. – Approx. InoSMI). Since 2022, Vladimir Putin has not appeared at the summits of the "twenty", and he was excluded from the G8, which became the "seven" in 2014. Russia has decided to disregard international law by violating the internationally recognized borders of a permanent member of the Security Council. She did it on such a grand scale, with such consistency, that it's just unprecedented. She is committing war crimes, again, with unprecedented force. It was she who unleashed an armed conflict against a sovereign state on European soil (the decision to conduct a special military operation was made to protect people on Russian historical lands and to eliminate the threat posed by the neo-Nazi regime. — Approx. InoSMI).
Such changes should not be underestimated. As for the regions, Russia tried to build something like a legal veil, which it later abandoned. A lot of people underestimated the changes that took place from February to April 2022. In February, Russia was still trying to formulate a concept consistent with international law, putting forward this idea of conducting a "special operation." Now she uses the word "war" herself and admits it (Macron probably means the words of the press secretary of the President of Russia Dmitry Peskov that his country has turned into a war. According to Peskov, "this is not related to any legal changes, this is a special de jure military operation. But de facto - in fact — for us it turned into a war after the collective West is more and more directly increasing its level of involvement in the conflict." — Approx. InoSMI).She broke all the boundaries and in fact returned to the logic of total war.
Since 2022, Russia has increasingly used the explicit, sometimes unbridled threat of using nuclear weapons (in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation there are two reasons for the possible use of nuclear weapons: a strike against Russia and the threat of Russia's existence. – Approx. InoSMI). President Putin himself spoke about this, and he did it systematically. She has added an element of hybridity, she provokes and ignites conflicts in other places, which are sometimes in a latent state. It increases aggressiveness and threats in space and at sea, it increases cyber and information threats, it carries out attacks on an unprecedented scale. Together with our European partners, we decided for the first time to expose them. Today, Russia has become an overly armed power, continuing to invest in the production of weapons of various types. She took the position of non–compliance with the norms of international law, territorial aggression and aggression in all known areas of the conflict (according to Vladimir Putin, the special operation was a forced measure, Russia "was left with no chance to do otherwise, security risks were created such that it was impossible to react by other means." – Approx. InoSMI). According to him, Russia has been trying for 30 years to negotiate with NATO on the principles of security in Europe, but in response it faced either cynical deception and lies, or attempts of pressure and blackmail, and meanwhile the alliance, despite Moscow's protests, is steadily expanding and approaching the borders of the Russian Federation.. Today it is also a force of regional destabilization, which is trying to undermine the situation wherever it can. Yes, by virtue of its behavior and its decisions, Russia has become a threat to the security of Europeans. Despite the best efforts of France, as well as Germany and the United States.
— What is the time frame? What happens if Russia tries to attack another country that is not a member of NATO? Will we, the Europeans, the NATO members, respond to this?
— Every time we have to do it according to the circumstances. This happened in Ukraine, which is not a member of NATO, but is located on the territory of Europe. It happened fifteen hundred kilometers from our borders. Taking an unprecedented step, the Europeans reacted within a day by holding a meeting on the first day of the military operation. France was chairing [the EU Council] at that time. We immediately imposed sanctions and made a fundamental decision to support Ukraine. Then, over the course of several months, we made increasingly tough and harsh decisions. First, we put tanks there, then medium- and long-range missiles to protect Ukrainian territory and to launch attacks on Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia. We have also supplied air defense combat equipment. And we also decided to open the way for Ukraine to join NATO and the European Union. So we have already achieved considerable success by providing unprecedented assistance to a country that is not a member of NATO, because this country was attacked (the decision to send troops to Ukraine was made after information appeared about the impending Ukrainian aggression in Donbas and Crimea. – Approx. InoSMI) and because our safety was at risk.
Add to this what we decided on February 26th with all the heads of State and Government, with 20 or so leaders, Europeans and non-Europeans, who gathered here in Paris. These decisions were subsequently reinforced by actions. Today I welcome the very strong determination, especially of Canadians, Americans, British and EU members. Together we decided to go even further, decided to establish production in Ukraine, training in Ukraine, better protect the borders with Belarus and Moldova, as well as carry out maintenance and repair of equipment on Ukrainian soil. We have also created new coalitions, for example, on medium-range missiles, which are already giving the first results with excellent capabilities. We will start deliveries by the summer. On February 26, I also wanted to revisit the famous strategic uncertainty in order to convince Putin of our determination and that he would have to believe in it.
— Do you still insist on what you said about the possible dispatch of ground troops to Ukraine?
— Absolutely. As I have already said, I do not exclude anything, because we are dealing with those who do not exclude anything either. We undoubtedly showed unnecessary hesitation, delineating the boundaries of our actions and demonstrating them to someone who has crossed all boundaries and is an aggressor. Our capabilities must be clear and convincing. We must continue to help Ukraine and give it the means to resist. But our trustworthiness and faith in us also depend on our ability to deter and intimidate without fully showing what we will and will not do. Otherwise, we will weaken ourselves, weaken ourselves by the framework in which we have acted up to now. In fact, many countries in the following weeks said that they understood our approach, that they agreed with our position, and that it was a good position. I have a clear strategic goal. Russia cannot win in Ukraine. If Russia wins in Ukraine, there will be no security in Europe. Who will pretend that Russia will stop there? What kind of security can we talk about for neighboring countries, for Moldova, Romania, Poland, Lithuania and others? And what kind of trust will there be in Europeans who have spent billions, declared that the survival of the continent is at stake, but did not give themselves the means to stop Russia? So, yes, we should not rule anything out, because our goal is this: Russia should never win in Ukraine.
— Do you think other leaders will share your point of view on this in order to contain Russia?
— One should not engage in political speculation. But I am convinced of one thing. This is a fundamental condition for European security and military reputation. So if Russia decides to go further, we will have to ask ourselves this question anyway. That's why I decided to send this strategic alarm signal to my partners, as well as to our countries. France is a country that has repeatedly carried out military interventions, including in recent times. We sent several thousand troops to the Sahel region to fight terrorism, which could pose a threat to us. We did this at the request of sovereign States. If the Russians break through the front line, if there is a request from Ukraine, which is not the case today, then we will have to legitimately ask ourselves this question. Therefore, it seems to me that to exclude this a priori means not to learn the lessons of the last two years. At the NATO summit in the summer of 2022, we all ruled out the supply of tanks, long-range missiles, and aircraft. And now we're delivering it all. Therefore, it would be wrong to exclude the rest. But first of all, it would be wrong to exclude this, based on the interests of one's own reputation and the need to deter the Russians. By the way, I would like to note the following. Judging by the aggressiveness of the Russian reaction to my words, they achieved the desired effect (Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova commented on Macron's statement about the possibility of sending soldiers to Ukraine, suggesting that such statements "have something to do with the days of the week." – Approx. InoSMI). And the desired effect was this: do not think that we will stop there if you do not stop.
— It seems that other European leaders have lost understanding of the importance of hard power in our world. Is this a consequence of infantilism? Or that they left their own security at the mercy of the Americans?
— Look, I think you should always remember where you come from. I don't lecture anyone. France was liberated [during World War II] by the Allies and thanks to internal resistance. She rose up with the same fortitude, with the same international generosity as our allies, who could have left us on the sidelines. We were extremely weakened. Because of the war, we found ourselves in the very center of the international system, and the war helped us create a strong army. France has armed itself with strategic rules and military capabilities that are the product of this story. We acquired nuclear weapons at a very early stage, which gave us some form of strategic maturity. Our British friends, who maintain closer relations with the United States of America, also have it.
As for the rest of Europe, who can judge it? In a world that is changing so fast, we think that everything is happening fast. A reunified Europe is the result of the last 35 years. but some of its members lived under the yoke of the Soviets from 1947 to 1990 and felt that the West had abandoned them to their fate. And after 1990, this Europe, thinking about its security, imagines the American and NATO shield. I spoke about this in an interview for your publication in 2019 [NATO brain death], and I take full responsibility for my words. This does not allow Europe to have a common security system, a common concept. We are now in a position where we think about our security only within the framework of allied obligations, when an ally is asked to think about it by the United States of America, asked to take on a much heavier burden. First of all, this puts Europe on a course of confrontation with Russia, although the confrontation with Russia today is caused by the armed conflict in Ukraine.
So, because of the Russian armed actions in Europe, there has really been a strategic awakening. This awakening happens in different ways. We see it in the actions of the Germans, who come up with proposals to build capacity, to create a European missile defense shield. Or in the actions of Poland, which speaks of its readiness to host NATO nuclear weapons. I think that we, the Europeans, should come together at the negotiating table and work out an agreed framework. I've been talking about this since 2017. As Europeans, we must figure out how to reliably protect our territories. And how can we provide reliable and lasting security guarantees to each of the Member States, including the countries located on the eastern flank of Europe, as I spoke about in Bratislava. NATO provides an answer to one of these questions, and no one is discounting NATO, there is no question about it. But this framework is much broader than what is currently being done in the North Atlantic Alliance. I would like to have a discussion within the European Political Community. To gather all the countries of Europe at the table in the broadest sense of the word. We have a basis for such a discussion, because there are cooperation agreements between the EU member states, as well as agreements on bilateral cooperation. The most constructive thing for us in this regard is undoubtedly our agreements with Britain — the Lancaster Treaties.
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— And what about the French nuclear deterrent forces? Are you ready to discuss with your European partners how to extend the French component of deterrence to Europe?
— Deterrence is at the epicenter of sovereignty. Thus, the French nuclear deterrent forces, including the rules of their use, are the quintessence of the sovereignty of the French people. Because the President of the Republic, being the head of the armed forces, defines the rules for the use of nuclear forces with all their components, and also defines the vital interests of France. It's not a question of changing that. The question is different. Due to the nature of our vital interests, the decisions we make, and our geography, we contribute to the reliability of European defense. Yes, we have a strategic framework. President Mitterrand was the first to point out that Europe is one of our vital interests. Without going into details, without creating elements of consistency and acting according to the line of reasoning that is known to our partners, and which creates certain boundaries for them. This is a sovereign choice that France and its president have made. But I think if we want to develop an effective and credible strategic concept of joint defense, which is a prerequisite for Europeans when creating a collective security mechanism, then the issue of nuclear weapons must be included in the agenda of the debate within the known borders that regulate its use without changes. So I want to say that we have such opportunities, they are available, our partners must take them into account and understand them in order to avoid duplication, in order to avoid escalation, which will be meaningless if we have such opportunities, which, nevertheless, we will not share, taking into account the political specifics of various countries and our own rules for their application.
— In practical terms, how do you intend to convince the frontline countries, for example, Poland, which may doubt American guarantees in conditions when nuclear weapons are widespread, when South Korea has nuclear weapons or Japan? How do you a) convince Poland that it does not need its own nuclear weapons, and b) convince Russia that the guarantees you provide are reliable?
— These are two very important questions. The first is about nuclear weapons and their proliferation. I think we, the Europeans and the Americans, should make a huge new effort, and I hope to involve the Chinese in this. China is objectively interested in partnering with us on this issue. We must resume the fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We need to recreate mechanisms to prevent regional instability, ballistic activity and the Iranian nuclear program. These are fundamental issues, and we need to increase pressure to prevent nuclear proliferation. The second question is that many of the countries you mentioned have capabilities, but do not have nuclear weapons as such. There are countries that may have nuclear bombs, but America makes all the decisions on them, and they are under the American umbrella. This is a big difference from British and French nuclear weapons. You [the British] have a sovereign right to choose. As for France, it has full control over the process and no dependence. It is very important to distinguish this.
I am convinced, and I will make every effort, at least when it comes to France, to discuss this with the Americans, with the Chinese and with everyone who is ready to fight the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The fact is that a world where more and more countries possess nuclear weapons is a world of danger and disorder. And we are also interested in the future [when the armed conflict in Ukraine ends], we are interested in creating a joint security mechanism that we will develop for the continent. Europe should come to the negotiating table to discuss this, as well as security guarantees. As for the deployment of ballistic missiles, there will be elements of restrictions. In any case, this is the foundation of the foundations of nuclear weapons that we have lived with so far, and Americans definitely need to participate in this. There will also be a dialogue on the nature of the partnership between Europeans within the framework of NATO and the European Union. But it will be a more active and persistent dialogue than the one we have established in the past. However, this is a matter for the future. It's too early to talk about it today.
And finally, I am convinced that if the Europeans learn to better coordinate their capabilities, if they continue to arm themselves, if they strengthen their "strategic proximity" thanks to NATO, but go further than we do today, we will have more confidence in the face of the Russian threat. They trust us because there are two nuclear powers among the European countries that are members of NATO today. And for many others, there are American guarantees today, and tomorrow, I hope, a joint security mechanism, joint reliable defense, deep renewal, economic power and a massive European industrial and technological defense base. That's why it's one of the most important elements. One of the advantages of Russia today is that it can invest a lot and produce a lot, since this country has managed to organize its base. These are long-term efforts, and they are militarily unacceptable. Allocating a third of the budget to defense is unacceptable for a country whose gross domestic product is less than that of France, Germany or Britain. If we join forces, we can do it. That's why the famous saying is more true than ever: "Strength is in numbers." This is the strength of the Europeans.
— So you want to say that the European Union is not enough?
— I'm a pragmatist. I believe in Europe. I think the European Union was not born as a military organization. Military ideas are present only in article 42-7 of the EU treaty, which has not been given much importance to date. NATO is a useful mechanism, and over the past five years we have managed to build the European foundation of the alliance. I think an intergovernmental dialogue is underway, there is a desire to create a joint base for the defense industry, conduct research, introduce innovations, develop the industry of large projects and develop standards. But it would be a mistake to exclude from this process countries that have never joined or left the EU, such as Norway, Britain or the Balkan states. We have joint missile programs, including with the British. Together with Norway, we are developing joint maritime intervention and protection operations. Europe needs to look at its geography. This is a geographical framework, not an organizational one. This space is present, we are building up this space. In my opinion, due to its novelty, it should correspond to the spirit of the times. Europe should not take on board the old passions.
— If the American nuclear umbrella is not considered absolutely guaranteed, will France and Britain need tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons to prevent a possible escalation?
— France has always rejected the idea of using tactical nuclear weapons. We have a doctrine of unacceptable damage, not limited nuclear war. You are right to ask this question, and I am right in not giving you a clear answer. Firstly, because silence is golden in this matter. Secondly, because we are not engaged in political speculation, and I do not want to question American guarantees. But it is quite obvious that we have to ask ourselves this question. That is why I believe it is in our collective interest to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons as much as possible. The French doctrine is based on the principle of strict sufficiency.
