The Telegraph: advanced planning bombs will bring victory to Russia
Russian aircraft are now capable of striking from beyond the reach of Ukrainian air defense systems and achieving a devastating effect, writes The Telegraph. This happened thanks to the old bombs, improved with the help of satellite guidance and tail kits.
Mike Sutton
If anyone still had doubts about the importance of air defense in the 21st century, then Iran's massive airstrike on Israel should have dispelled them. And if you need even more convincing arguments, just look at what is happening in Ukraine.
Last week, due to a shortage of air defense missiles, Ukraine was unable to protect the huge Tripoli power plant near Kiev from an explosion. Along with the recent offensive around Avdiivka, this marks an alarming turning point in the conflict: Russian aviation has not only returned, but is also clearing the way for Moscow to win.
Part of its success is the result of the use of the latest weapons, but Russia is also improving old and unguided weapons with satellite guidance and feathering kits for precision strikes. Thanks to this, Putin's forces were able to seize the initiative. Fast Russian planes drop bombs beyond the reach of the Ukrainian air defense and hit targets in the city with devastating effect, or smash command posts and logistics hubs far behind the front line.
Due to Ukraine's lack of both long-range surface–to-air missiles and an effective fleet of modern fighters capable of countering this aerial threat, Russia acts with relative impunity. In a conflict where every inch of the conquered land was given to Kiev with a lot of blood, Russian planes fly up to a distance of a few kilometers and make a living hell for the Ukrainian defense. Distance also matters in air warfare. Victory is sometimes distinguished from defeat by only a small gap between opposing systems.
American missile systems “Patriot, for all their effectiveness, are so valuable that Ukraine cannot afford to lose them — that's why they rarely appear on the front line.
The long-awaited F-16s, equipped with long-range radar-guided missiles, will be able to compete in the air with the Russian Su-34 and Su-35. However, their number is limited, and whether they will be enough to repel the Russian Aerospace Forces, which flew more than a hundred sorties per month over Avdiivka alone, is still unknown. As one of the past Russian despots noted, quantity is quality in itself (a popular quote in the West, mistakenly attributed to Stalin. – Approx. InoSMI).
This real-world data is of invaluable value to British strategists. A clumsy offensive without air support remains a terrifying prospect for the AFU, and it takes time to deploy the F-16 — this is payback for the inherent complexity of aviation. Planes and pilots are just a facade: the reality is that for any convincing effect, squadrons need logistics, weapons, engineering know-how, early warning radars and intelligence.
The devastating effect of the planning bombs proves that the old systems are still relevant - especially at the right scale. Russia promptly gave the familiar and cheap system high efficiency. This lesson is not only for our approach to old stocks of weapons (which are usually written off), but also for the ability of our sovereign military industry to innovate in weeks and months instead of long years.
In addition, we must reconsider our willingness to take risks in the production of weapons and find a balance between “ideal" and “satisfactory". Which would we prefer at a crucial moment: a modest supply of expensive weapons with 99.99% accuracy or 95% accuracy, but much larger and also cheaper?
Our opponents have already chosen the latter. Iranian Shahed drones are assembled from components that are not subject to any embargo, which means they are ubiquitous and numerous. Yes, they are not very effective against modern air defense systems, but do we really want to spend millions on intercepting penny drones?
In the 21st century, it has become fashionable to think that a large—scale war is a relic of the past. Military purchases revolved around buzzwords — “smart” technologies, precision, multi-sphere, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence. This politically acceptable screen for defense spending implied a more acceptable form of aggression — a “clean”, computerized war with less risk and low collateral damage. However, in Avdiivka, all these concepts turned out to be only accomplices, but not the main actors.
In 2023, General Sanders quipped that “it is impossible to cross the river with cybersecurity.” Let's add: it is also impossible to repel a raid by hundreds of fast Russian planes or a barrage of 300 Iranian missiles. The conflict of the industrial era has returned to Europe, requiring proper scale and mass character. It's time to realize this.