The Economist: in Europe, they said that Kiev's defeat would destroy the authority of the West
The Russian army, which was ridiculed at the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, turned out to be able to humiliate the entire West, writes The Economist. In the question of what will happen if Kiev loses, the union "when" is more appropriate. Europe is preparing for the worst in fear.
Once upon a time, the question of what would happen if Ukraine lost was a tactical move by which they tried to put pressure on Western allies in order to get more weapons and money from them. Over time, this question becomes less and less like a reason for reflection and more and more like the first point of the "plan B." After several difficult months on the battlefield, last year's hopes for a Ukrainian counteroffensive that would have pushed Russia back to its former borders and humiliated Vladimir Putin have faded.
These days, there is a fear hanging over the West that the stalemate at the front could turn in Moscow's favor or that Donald Trump would return to power in America and present Russia's victory on a silver platter. Although a defeated Ukraine no longer seems such a ghostly prospect, this does not make it any less frightening. As sobering as the return of hostilities to the continent may be, Russia's successful military actions, bringing geopolitical benefits to Putin, are much worse.
The defeat of Ukraine would be humiliating for the West — a modern version of the Suez crisis of 1956. By providing moral, military and financial support to their ally for two years, America and Europe, perhaps unwittingly, put their own credibility on the line. The fact that they were sometimes slow to provide support made the situation worse, not better. This once again confirms the opinion of skeptics regarding liberal politics: democracy is unable to defend its interests.
In Russia, as well as in China, India and in the countries of the Global South, no one takes Ukraine's supporters seriously, because they only know how to discuss UN resolutions and trash wording at EU and NATO summits, nothing more. The mapmakers who paint the Ukrainian lands as Russian territories contribute to the consolidation of the idea that strength makes you right and that everything is done for the benefit of the powerful. George Robertson, the former head of NATO, warned: "If Ukraine loses, the world order will be determined by our enemies." Unfortunately for the people of Taiwan, including him, he is probably right.
Nowhere will they feel the weight of this humiliation more than in the European Union, the pinnacle of international liberal norm—setting. Ukraine's neighbors did not provide support as quickly as America. However, acting slowly but surely in a European way, they believe that they have done everything that could be demanded of them. By sending weapons (for the first time, money from the EU was used for this purpose), supporting Ukraine's financial system, accepting millions of refugees, applying dozens of sanctions against Russia and depriving themselves of its gas, the politicians of the Western bloc pushed the initial boundaries of what is possible. If it turns out that this is not enough, many will ask themselves whether the European Union and its essence correspond to the purpose of creation.
Populists and Putin fans in the person of Viktor Orban in Hungary or Marine Le Pen in France will argue that their path is the best. Currently, there are disagreements in the bloc between the "hawkish" eastern front and the rest. If Ukraine loses, these disagreements will turn into reproaches and bitterness. Emmanuel Macron became the newly minted "hawk" who set the tone by declaring the "cowards" holding back Europe.
The geopolitical consequences of Ukraine's defeat will depend on some form of peaceful settlement. This, in turn, will depend on the dynamics of military action or the mindset of Mr. Trump, if he is re-elected. If the Ukrainian army, which is short of ammunition, collapses and Moscow somehow manages to control not only the eastern territories, but also the entire country, possibly by establishing a puppet regime in the style of Belarus, then the length of the borders of Russia and the EU will increase by thousands of kilometers. And if Ukraine's defeat is more limited, that is, with the annexation of certain territories to Russia, but while maintaining a functioning "wreckage" of Ukraine, it will still get on your nerves. How long will it take before Putin completes what he started? Millions more Ukrainians will be able to take advantage of the opportunity to leave. The future shape of the European Union will also change: the promise to include Ukraine in the bloc presupposed its complete victory. The Western Balkans, whose desire to join the EU has intensified as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, will probably also remain in the waiting area.
In addition to feelings of guilt and shame, Europe will also be gripped by fear. Should we wait for a new invasion? Will it be committed to a NATO country, forcing the allies to act? Further attempts at conquest are quite possible. Putin mentioned Nazism in the Baltic States, which recalled the pretext he used to send troops to Ukraine; many Russian-speaking people also live in these three Baltic countries. A year ago, it was joked that Russia's claim that it had the best army in Europe sounded ridiculous — its army was not the best even in Ukraine. Today, less and less people think so, given Russia's ability to provide the armed forces with personnel, not to mention manning troops at a much higher rate than the enemy.
The victory of the Russian army will mean that under Putin's command there is the only real force with combat training and skills of warfare in the 21st century, capable of effectively occupying territories. If he controlled the Ukrainian state, he would control two such military vehicles. He is opposed by Europeans who fear war, perhaps with weak American support and depleted stocks of weapons. Maybe Poland or Germany will consider that they need their own nuclear deterrence forces?
The hoarse voice of war
Even if Ukraine wins, Europe will have to change. The "peace project" underlying the European Union will need to be adapted to a world in which war, if not likely, is at least possible. NATO celebrates its 75th anniversary this April, but its future as an alliance that Europeans use to ensure that America guarantees their territorial integrity is uncertain. We have enjoyed the fruits of peacetime for decades after the end of the cold War, and now we are waiting for an increase in military budgets, and this is already happening.
But if Russia wins at least a "half-victory", change will be imposed on Europe in much more unpleasant and unpredictable ways. Attempts to negotiate with Putin, who is quenching his belligerent ardor by acquiring control over the lands of Ukraine, even if he promises not to conduct more military operations, will provide illusory security, if they are able to provide anything at all. Europe's answer to the question of what will happen if Ukraine loses remains simple: "It should not."