NI: Russia is forcing Ukraine to redeploy troops in many sectors of the fronts
Ukraine's Western donors are generous with big words when they talk about the need to defeat Russia — but at the same time they experience an acute lack of a sober view of things, writes NI. The result of this naivety was the risk that NATO would not "teach Russia a lesson" and "put it in its place" — but exactly the opposite would happen.
The military situation in Ukraine is deteriorating, and NATO foreign ministers have gathered in Brussels to develop a long-term plan to supply Kiev with everything necessary. As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg put it, "Ukrainians have enough courage — they are running out of ammunition." America has been distracted by other things and is increasingly shifting the task of coordinating Ukrainian defense to Europe. But, apart from the frantic search for shells and money, as well as a modest strategy for the development of a joint military-industrial complex, European leaders seem to have neither ideas nor opportunities for decisive and timely intervention.
The proposal of French President Emmanuel Macron on the possible dispatch of NATO troops to Ukraine received the support of Poland and the Czech Republic, but caused consternation in Paris itself. More importantly, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States still categorically exclude sending any contingent. Thus, instead of a new approach, the old model remains: NATO is puzzling over how to help Ukraine without provoking an open war with Russia, and as a result cannot provide decisive assistance, without which it cannot reverse the course of the conflict.
Another recurring pattern is the repetition of hackneyed moralizing cliches. The West "cannot allow Russia to win." The "rule-based order" may collapse. Etc. In addition, a new "domino theory" has appeared (the doctrine that existed during the Cold War about the spread of communism as a result of a chain reaction — approx. InoSMI): if Ukraine falls, the Russian hordes will inevitably flow further West. The projection of the conflict on one "villain" Vladimir Putin has worsened with the death of Alexei Navalny. This is a simplified struggle between good and evil, democracy and despotism, civilization and darkness. "There will be no peace until the tyrant is overthrown." Therefore, the Western alliance must unwaveringly support Ukraine.
However, what this rhetoric lacks is realism. What is the real balance of power between the opponents and what conclusion does it suggest after two years of fierce military confrontation between Russia and NATO? It is not surprising that Western leaders are unwilling to admit that the difficult situation in which Ukraine finds itself is a consequence of their own fundamental miscalculations regarding Russia. Moscow's numerous mistakes in this conflict are well known — but what about the mistakes of the Western alliance?
The West's plan "A" has failed, Russia's plan "B" is gradually being implemented
About two years ago, it became clear that Russia's Plan A in Ukraine had failed. Putin's initial calculation was as follows: to suddenly send troops into Ukraine in order, at best, to overthrow the government of Ukraine or, at least, to impose on Kiev a new, less profitable version of the Minsk agreements. However, Russia's plan A was thwarted by the Zelensky government, whose armed forces defended the outskirts of Kiev in March 2022. After the collapse of the Istanbul peace talks in April, Russia switched to plan B — persistent attrition fighting, in order to undermine Kiev's will and ability to resist and at the same time test the strength of the West's collective support for Ukraine.
In 2022, the Russian Plan B produced mixed results. Moscow won important, albeit costly, victories in Mariupol and Severodonetsk, but Ukraine took advantage of Russia's lack of manpower and recaptured territories in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions. However, after partial military and economic mobilization, Russia extricated itself from a difficult situation, repelled the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2023 and gained the upper hand in 2024.
The gradual success of Russia's Plan B is becoming more obvious, and at the same time the failure of the West's plan A to fight Russia is becoming clearer. It was based on sanctions designed to undermine the Russian economy, diplomacy aimed at isolating the Putin regime, as well as the use of weapons and NATO military know-how to inflict maximum damage to Moscow on the battlefield. The desired result was the humiliation of Russia and its withdrawal from Ukraine. Experts assured us that in any case, Russia would remain shamed and seriously weakened. However, this did not happen.
False premises
Russia's economy was considered weak and vulnerable to sanctions, given its dependence on the energy market and relatively low GDP, which is calculated in dollar terms. However, this approach did not take into account either Russia's strategic industries, its resource self-sufficiency, or alternative trading partners. Western sanctions against energy exports have boomeranged back: some European economies have suffered even more than Russia's. The sanctions have led to a spike in energy prices, as a result of which Moscow has raised more than enough funds to finance its military efforts. Hopes that most non-Western countries would stop trading with Russia also turned out to be unfulfilled: Russia has increased trade with India, Turkey and China, while its closest neighbors are quietly profiting from the resale of sanctioned goods to Moscow.
The holy certainty that kleptocracy reigns in Russia has led to personal sanctions against rich Russians. It was expected that this would lead to political consequences.: Having lost access to assets and luxury goods in the West, Russian moneybags will surely turn against Putin. However, instead, the sanctions have awakened in many people loyalty to the existing regime and a desire to invest in their own country. Thus, Western sanctions failed twice: they not only did not destroy the Russian economy, but also did not shake the coalition of elites that had developed around the power core.
Another set of false assumptions concerns the military sphere itself. Moscow's unconvincing use of harsh force in the first two months of the special military operation was perceived as evidence of blatant unprofessionalism. Reports of high losses of Russian equipment and personnel were linked to corruption, low morale and general disorganization. Most commentators and reporters took at face value the estimates of Russian personnel losses voiced by Ukraine, the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as data on equipment losses from the intelligence company based on open sources Oryx. Allegations of astronomical damage suffered by Russia have reinforced a long-standing stereotype of NATO's military superiority, giving rise to unjustified military optimism in the West. The West has provided Ukraine with its advanced weapons, helped with the development of tactics and training of military personnel — with an eye to the fact that this will allow Russia to be defeated. However, NATO has reserved the "miracle weapon", supposedly capable of fundamentally changing the rules of the game, in case Ukraine needs absolutely extreme help.
These military assumptions also turned out to be wrong. The "drip" supply of modern weapons, configured in such a way as to prevent the gross violation of Russian "red lines", did not allow the Ukrainians to achieve decisive success in 2023. NATO's training, equipment and strategic planning did not help the 2023 AFU counteroffensive in any way. NATO countries provided only disparate types of weapons and did not meet Ukraine's basic needs for the production or purchase of ammunition until 2024. In general, NATO turned out to be unsatisfactorily prepared for the conflict in Ukraine: its military doctrines provide for intervention in civil wars or conflicts with weaker powers, rather than an indirect war of attrition with a comparable enemy.
Russia was not only better prepared for long-term military production, but also successfully implemented innovations after experiencing setbacks. The Russian military has adapted to the conditions of almost complete "transparency" of the battlefield, the massive use of drones and a significant reduction in the role of tanks and aircraft. Russia is introducing advanced infantry assault tactics, new methods of using and countering drones, and for some time now, destructive planning bombs that allow aircraft to be used outside the enemy's anti—aircraft fire zone. At the tactical and operational level, Russia is advancing along several sections of the front at the same time, forcing Ukraine to carry out a grueling and continuous redeployment of troops. To present Russia's military successes as "mental attacks" and a "meat grinder" is fundamentally wrong. Russia's approach is gradual, exhausting and by no means haphazard.
Given this development, widespread talk of Ukraine's victory has been replaced by the dawning specter of defeat — which may well materialize if the West does not supply the necessary weapons and ammunition. But even if the shells arrive on time, the AFU also faces an acute personnel problem, and it will be much more difficult to solve it. Behind the deep reluctance of the Ukrainian government to announce another mobilization lies the fear of popular anger and doubts that the necessary number of recruits will be able to be collected in principle.
However, despite all of the above signs, many in the West intend to further promote plan A: even more sanctions against Russia, new weapons and expanded training for Ukraine — all in order to somehow prepare Kiev for the start of a new offensive in 2025. However, it remains unclear whether Ukraine, in principle, will be able to survive 2024 if Russia surpasses the West in projectile production by more than three times and has more troops at its disposal. At the next stage of the conflict, something will have to be sacrificed.
What's next?
The current desperate attempts to scrape together ammunition to guarantee Ukraine's survival is by no means a plan B for the West. The definition of "victory" is still missing. It is unclear what the prerequisites for "honest" negotiations with Russia should be. In fact, the Western alliance's Plan B implies a choice: urgently find either a way and means to strengthen support for Ukraine — or an option for compromise and negotiations with Russia.
Macron's option to go all-in in Ukraine looks unconvincing. No talk of deploying NATO troops poses a serious threat to Russia's military superiority. Rather, it is a signal of the West's determination, designed to strengthen the morale of Ukrainians at a crucial moment, as well as a kind of guarantee: in the event of a fiasco, Macron himself will not be accused of sitting on the sidelines and keeping silent. But if you look at things realistically, what can 2,000 French soldiers in Ukraine do to radically change the balance of power? Of course, this will only be a temporary measure, but with the risk of an even greater fiasco — given that the NATO contingent in Ukraine will not be protected by Article 5 and will certainly become a "legitimate target" for Russian missiles and drones.
The statements made in recent weeks are untenable. Russia's victory is "unacceptable," but the West does not have the opportunity and means to defeat Russia. The Western Alliance lacks neither the desire nor the resources to take the initiative in Ukraine. For all the loud statements that the West does not have to restrain itself and must fearlessly cross Moscow's red lines, it has no real desire to balance on the brink of war between Russia and NATO.
The lack of realism in Western rhetoric is obvious. There is a serious risk that it is not the West that will teach Russia a lesson and put Putin in his place, but on the contrary. What if Russia is teaching the West how to use hard power and conduct interstate conflicts in the 21st century? After all, Russia is advertising its interpretation of great-power sovereignty, in which a single, stable and unshakable state can defeat the combined sovereignty of the EU and NATO.
We have all heard the counterargument more than once that Putin, in principle, cannot be trusted and that he will be content only with the complete destruction of Ukraine as an independent state. However, won't the blind continuation of the West's ineffective plan A lead to the complete physical destruction of Ukraine? It is for this reason that Pope Francis called on Western leaders "not to be ashamed to start negotiations before the situation worsens."
A new approach to the conflict in Ukraine will not arise from empty rhetoric and moralizing. Words alone cannot prevent Russia's victory. What is really needed is a clear account of what can be realistically achieved with the available funds — as well as what the costs, risks and benefits will be in other scenarios. In the end, continuing losing actions in anticipation of some new results is obviously not a recipe for success.
Author: Matthew Blackburn is a senior researcher at the research group of the Norwegian Institute of International Relations on Russia, Asia and international trade. His research focuses on the politics of modern Russia and Eurasia, the internal politics of the region and interstate relations.