Archive: In 1994, the West promised Russia not to interfere in the affairs of the CIS
NATO assured Russia that it would not interfere in its internal affairs. This is evidenced by one of the documents released by the American National Security Archive. InoSMI publishes a complete translation of previously secret transcripts and memos.
New evidence of the great hopes of 1992-1995 has emerged.
The list of declassified documents includes transcripts of conversations between the NATO Secretary General and the leaders of the Russian parliament, the US Secretary of Defense with a high—ranking delegation of the State Duma and a report on the visit of the Russian Defense Minister to joint US-Russian exercises.
Washington, DC, April 4, 2024 — According to declassified Russian and American documents published today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University, during the high-level dialogue and practical interaction from 1992 to 1995, senior officials of NATO and the United States, together with senior Russian leaders, including the Minister of Defense of the newly formed Russian Federation, developed cooperation agreements.
The new publication, timed to coincide with the 75th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, highlights the too fleeting period of close cooperation between the United States, NATO and Russia in the field of security in the 1990s, thanks to which it was possible to sharply reduce nuclear weapons and related risks, as well as to consider issues of peacekeeping, to respond to challenges in the Balkans and give Moscow hope for possible integration with Europe and partnership with NATO.
The documents describe the joint US-Russian peacekeeping exercises at Fort Riley, Kansas, the most important agreements in the framework of negotiations on the conclusion of agreements and the exchange of views on the future security of Europe with the leaders of the Supreme Council of Russia and its successor, the State Duma. In the context of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, new facts highlight the tragic consequences of unfulfilled hopes.
Among the documents was a transcript of a lengthy conversation between NATO Secretary General Manfred Werner in Moscow with Chairman of the Supreme Council Ruslan Khasbulatov in February 1992, which was published in Russian for the first time. In it, Werner describes the future of Europe: in the view of the North Atlantic Alliance, "there will be a new security architecture from the Urals to the Atlantic. It will be a single Euro-Atlantic community based on three pillars. The first pillar is the Helsinki process, the second is the European Community, which will create the basis for a lasting political future for our society, and the third pillar is NATO." This point of view was very close to Russia.
Standing on a tank side by side with Boris Yeltsin in August 1991, Khasbulatov defied the coup against democratic reforms in the Soviet Union and worked with Yeltsin to dissolve the USSR in December 1991. There was still about a year or more before the political confrontation between the leader of the Supreme Council and Yeltsin and the struggle for power, which sadly ended with the latter shooting his own parliament. However, they did not believe that they had lost the Cold War — rather, they believed that they had defeated the communist system and saw themselves as the leaders of a superpower that deserved respect from the West and was on the way to European integration.
The documents also include an impressive memo from U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry to President Clinton marked “Top Secret/personal only,” which tells about the three days he spent with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev in October 1995. Perry called the first seven hours at the Pentagon “quite stressful,” but considered the trip to Fort Riley for joint U.S.-Russian peacekeeping exercises a “stunning success” that led to an agreement on joining forces to rebuild Bosnia, after which Grachev and Perry symbolically pressed a double button and blew up a Minuteman missile silo at the base Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri.
Subsequently, there will be other periods of short-term cooperation between NATO and Russia. Special attention should be paid to the period after the September 11 attacks, when Moscow facilitated the transfer and supply of US and North Atlantic Alliance troops who were sent through Russia and Central Asia to Afghanistan to fight Al-Qaeda*. The highlight was in May 2002, when the NATO—Russia Council was convened in Brussels. This period of cooperation and the reasons for its completion have yet to be analyzed. Keep an eye out for future National Security Archive publications on this topic.
A memorandum on the conversation between NATO Secretary General Manfred Werner and Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation R. I. Khasbulatov
February 25, 1992
Source: State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fund 10026, inventory 5, case 453
During his first visit to the Russian Federation, NATO Secretary General Manfred Werner met with the Speaker of the Russian Parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov and had a conversation with him about the future of European security and cooperation between Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance. The meeting was attended by General Konstantin Kobets, who supported Yeltsin during the August putsch in 1991, in September 1991, he was briefly appointed Russian Minister of Defense (on September 10, 1991, he was appointed State Defense Adviser of the RSFSR. – Approx.InoSMI).
Werner spoke about the common interests of Russia and NATO, noted the alliance's deep interest in helping the country to prosper and expressed NATO's readiness to assist in the process of converting the defense industry. He presented his vision of future European security in a way that undoubtedly corresponded to the ideas of his Russian interlocutors: "We want to create a Europe in which there will be a new security architecture from [the Urals] to the Atlantic. It will be a single Euro-Atlantic community based on three pillars. The first pillar is the Helsinki process, the second is the European Community, which will create the basis for a lasting political future for our society, and the third pillar is NATO."
In response, Khasbulatov and Kobets spoke about the problems and difficulties in the transformation of Russia, about the lack of housing for the military, especially for officers returning from Eastern Europe. Khasbulatov noted how the reduction of military spending has helped to implement economic reforms in Russia, and said: "I believe that the contribution of the North Atlantic Alliance is very significant, and we also hope that we will continue to follow the path of reducing nuclear weapons."
Transcript of the conversation between Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation R. I. Khasbulatov and Manfred Werner
Oval Hall, 14:30, February 25, 1992
R. I. Khasbulatov: We are very pleased to note the tone of the current negotiations with the leaders of the NATO countries that are taking place now. The Russian Parliament supports this and welcomes your visit to the Russian Federation.
Mikhail Werner: Mr. Chairman, it is a great honor for me to address the Russian parliament. I myself was a member of the [German] parliament for 33 years. Your parliament is becoming increasingly important for the maintenance of democracy. I have preserved photographs of that important period in your history when men and women defended democracy. Your parliament also has a special emotional significance for me. You said yourself that our countries are getting closer. Today we have left the cold War behind, and it is time for cooperation. In fact, this is exactly the purpose of my visit to Russia: to establish and strengthen ties with the political leadership of your country, with members of parliament, as well as with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. This is the main point of our negotiations with you.
R. I. Khasbulatov: Yes, this is a significant event. Of course, in this regard, this is, of course, the first visit, which can be said to be aimed at strengthening positive changes in the military and political life of Europe and modern civilization. Of course, we have many problems in our relations with our former republics. You probably know about this. But I would not make a tragedy out of these problems, because the creation of the commonwealth is in itself a very serious step. There are many problems, but the important thing is that such a community has been created. And of course, through this partnership, we intend to eliminate possible threats to peace emanating from various countries of the former Soviet Union. Of course, this also has to do with nuclear weapons.
So, as you can see, we inherited a lot of problems, internal problems, problems in the former republics of the Soviet Union. But this does not mean that Russia and its young democracy will not pursue a peaceful foreign policy. Among other things, we are ready to cooperate. The Russian Parliament has already been very actively cooperating with the parliaments of modern democratic states, effectively supporting peace initiatives.
I want to reaffirm the commitments that the Soviet Union has undertaken. We have no disagreements in Parliament on this matter.
Mikhail Werner: Mr. Chairman, we have one very strong, very powerful interest between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or rather, several common interests. I believe that we have a very solid foundation that will allow us to build relations with your country.
We are currently conducting both formal and informal negotiations here. I am speaking with you quite sincerely and I want to repeat: yes, we want to achieve all this [to realize common interests] within the framework of our relationship. Our common interest is to have stability in Russia, because superstability in Russia is very good for Europe. A democratic Russia is very good for Europe and for the whole world, and therefore your success in all areas is also our success. This is the first one.
Secondly, we would like to build new relations in Europe, in Europe, where there will be fewer weapons, fewer soldiers, in Europe, where lasting peace will be established. I think it also corresponds to our common interests. The members of our alliance are interested in achieving this goal.
The third. We are undoubtedly interested in Russia's prosperity. And we strive for this, because in a country where there is no work, there will always be a lack of stability. Therefore, we are interested in Russia's prosperity. It is also a solid foundation for the country's future. We want close cooperation between States in a Europe made up of sovereign democratic countries. How to achieve this: We want to build a Europe with a new security architecture from [the Urals] to the Atlantic. It will be a single Euro-Atlantic community based on three pillars. The first pillar is the Helsinki process, the second is the European Community, which will create the basis for a lasting political future for our society, and the third pillar is NATO.
It is for these purposes that we have established the [North Atlantic] Cooperation Council within NATO in order to conduct close consultations, establish cooperation and create interconnected institutions with our former adversaries and now partners. This is our vision of the future.
We would like Russia and all other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States to join the [North Atlantic] Cooperation Council. From what I hear, and you yourself have said about it, it becomes clear that some people still have doubts about our intentions. I would like to make it very clear here that we need stability or some kind of stabilizing element to ensure peace. We do not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, as well as in the internal affairs of other sovereign CIS member states. We would like to establish the most friendly relations with all former Soviet republics. This will be in line with our common interests, and therefore we will be able to ensure more lasting stability. As a result, everyone will be better off. We hope that all the political and military institutions of your countries will join such cooperation. We would like to establish contacts with parliaments, with members of parliaments. As you know, the [Parliamentary] Assembly of NATO has already established certain ties with the deputies of the Russian parliament, and these ties are now developing. They need to be strengthened, and we only welcome this.
And now I would like to address the general who sits to your right and who has a very good reputation in our countries. We are very interested in establishing closer contacts between soldiers, not just contacts between politicians. We have the highest respect for the soldiers of the former USSR, and now the CIS. We are aware of the difficulties you are going through at the moment. We are just as interested as you are in eliminating these difficulties. Today we see you not as an enemy, not as an opponent, but as a partner. Therefore, we invite you and your soldiers to visit our countries. We will provide them with full information on their questions. As you know, delegations of the United Armed Forces of the CIS have already visited NATO. And we plan to send a delegation to your country to continue these contacts.
With your permission, I must say that General Kobets has already visited us last year. He arrived as part of the Russian parliamentary delegation. I would like to answer some of the questions that have been raised.
We would like to have firm guarantees that you will strictly adhere to the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons. We also want to take measures to prevent the proliferation of such weapons and specialists in them.
And now about the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). We would like this treaty to be ratified and enter into force. We have already started cooperation on this issue with special units within NATO that are engaged in this. We hope that this work will be carried out very successfully. I must say that the prospects in this regard are very, very promising. And here I would like to ask one question.
R. I. Khasbulatov: I beg your pardon, but it seems to me that we should move from the lecture to some form of dialogue, especially since we said very well that we do not need to engage in propaganda.
Mr. Secretary General, I agree with you on how important stability in Russia is for us. But I would like to say the following. You probably need stability in Russia, but for us it's a matter of existence. Therefore, the transformations that we carry out, we carry out in the name of our internal goals in the interests of our people. It is political stability that allows us to implement economic reform very decisively. And, frankly speaking, here we have to rely only on our own resources: intellectual, natural, and those resources that we create ourselves. These are our main resources, relying on which we hope to successfully implement our economic reform.
Of course, the reduction in military spending has had a very significant impact on the implementation of our economic reforms. This is the result of the weakening of military-political rivalry. In this regard, we believe that the contribution of the North Atlantic Alliance is very significant, and we also hope that we will continue to follow the path of reducing nuclear weapons.
I'm sorry, you wanted to ask the general a question.
M. Werner: I can ask the general a question later, but you have already partially answered some questions. But I am still interested in one point: what is the Russian parliament going to do and how it intends to resolve issues related to the economic situation in the country, how will you solve problems, how do you plan to improve economic conditions in the country, what is the reaction of the people to recent price reforms, what will be the next steps of the government, will there be monetary the reform and how will it take place?
R. I. Khasbulatov: Agree, this is too much, it's a whole program. Of course, I will try to answer your questions very briefly.
Parliament, of course, does its usual job, which is the parliament of any democratic country. This is the creation of a legislative framework for reforms implemented by the government and the President. That is, we are preparing laws, by-laws, we are creating opportunities to expand the legal space in which the president works.
But in addition to the projects that the government offers us, we carry out our own legislative work. This concerns the protection of human rights, cultural issues, and there are also political issues. We also raise economic issues very often. Of course, we have our own opinion on each law, we propose amendments, we try to coordinate them with the government.
Of course, I must honestly say that we are very grateful to experts from Western countries, because we submit a very large number of legislative documents to international organizations for review. We also have a lot of foreign experts working with us here. In general, we try to take the best that Western democracies have to offer. But we quite often have serious disagreements with experts from the government. For example, I think that some Western ideas are more suitable for us. We are focusing more on the social sphere in order to somehow prevent conflicts in society.
You asked how our people reacted to the price increase. He reacted the way anyone would react to a price increase: with great caution, with great anxiety. Of course, in such an environment it is necessary to demonstrate a certain sensitivity, because there is no obvious reserve of resilience in society. The fact is that the majority of our population has low incomes, and therefore they cannot count on any significant savings, as happens during economic crises in Western countries. Therefore, we are trying to restrain some deputies in our parliament, who, in our opinion, do not always understand the realities of people's lives. After all, if serious social conflicts arise, it will be impossible to implement reforms.
Mikhail Werner: When I was 14 years old, we started price and tax reforms. I remember how we had to stand in queues for a long time to get 40 stamps, which the government issued to every German. So I know exactly what you're talking about. I am also a proponent of a market economy. After the implementation of price and monetary reform, private property appeared, and this, in turn, led to competition. Most likely, you will go the same way. And you are absolutely right about that. You are also right that in such a situation it is necessary to take into account the interests of the poorest segments of the population.
And now, with your permission, I would like to ask General Kobets a question.
You have the same stars as Marshal Shaposhnikov's shoulder straps.
R. I. Khasbulatov: I think it was invented by Brezhnev when he received the rank of army general. He wanted his uniform to look like a marshal's. It was a little trick of the aging Brezhnev.
M. Werner: Mr. General, yesterday I talked with Marshal Shaposhnikov and with the generals who were present at the conversation. I read your article in English translation, which was published in early February of this year. In this regard, I have two questions for you. How do you intend to overcome the social difficulties that arise in your armed forces? Yesterday, during a conversation, I was told that 292,000 officers do not have housing. That's one question. And the second question: how do you see the future of the United Armed Forces of the CIS? I was told that the three member countries of the commonwealth have decided to create their own armed forces. As far as I understand, Russia does not want to create its own armed forces, at least that's how the Russian president explained it to me. What is your opinion on this issue, Mr. General?
K. I. Kobets: As for the first question. Indeed, the numbers are correct. But these 292 thousand people are in all armed forces, in all republics where there are military. In Russia, this figure ranges from 120 to 125 thousand people.
On the recommendation of the Parliament, the President recently signed a decree "On social guarantees for military personnel." This decree provides for three major packages of measures to address this problem.
The first package relates to the provision of housing. It clearly sets out the time frame in which local authorities are required to provide housing to military personnel based on combined [local and federal] investments.
The second package is the construction of housing directly by military personnel, as well as civilian organizations. For example, now we have the Main Directorate of Special Construction, which under the Soviet Union dealt with the construction of special purpose [military]. Now it has been decided to remove construction troops from special construction sites, combine these forces and throw them into housing construction. The capabilities of such construction troops are about 90 thousand apartments per year.
R. I. Khasbulatov: Actually, this issue will not be so acute in a year. But to do this, we need this industry to have a solid foundation. Unfortunately, the bureaucracy is entrenched in our army even better than among civilians. It's probably no secret to you.
Mikhail Werner: I was the Minister of Defense in my own country for 16 years, so I understand what you are talking about.
R. I. Khasbulatov: It seems to me that the army bureaucracy is very similar to the former party bureaucracy.
K. I. Kobets: I must say that it was not easy to make decisions on the second point. I personally met with Ruslan Imranovich twice to discuss these issues. It was decided to allocate additional financial resources for housing construction. The Supreme Council allocated this money. I don't know where they found them, but the money was allocated.
R. I. Khasbulatov: This is a parliamentary secret.
M. Werner: The most important thing is that there is a result. And where you found the money doesn't matter.
K. I. Kobets: And the third package. 60 percent of the military budget goes to the social sphere. Thanks to this, taxes for military personnel were reduced by 50 percent and financing for rental housing was tripled. So the servicemen received some kind of housing.
R. I. Khasbulatov: That is, almost two thirds of all military expenditures go to provide military personnel, and one third goes to purchase military equipment. You probably know that usually in our country a quarter of all military spending was spent on providing for soldiers. In other words, we have increased allocations for military personnel by almost three and a half times, if we count at fixed prices.
K. I. Kobets: Nevertheless, we are optimistic about the future.
M. Werner: Yes, this is, in fact, the main difference between our military budget and yours. You spent much less on providing military personnel than we did. And now, as far as I understand, the situation is changing a little.
R. I. Khasbulatov: The situation is changing not "a little", but dramatically.
Mikhail Werner: Now we have more than 50 percent going to personnel, about 20 percent for the purchase of military equipment and about 20 percent for its maintenance and repair. That is, you are gradually approaching our ratio.
R. I. Khasbulatov: Not gradually, but very, very quickly.
K. I. Kobets: And on the second question. Currently, we are considering the creation of our own army in Parliament at various levels. We want to work out all the domestic political and economic aspects. And what did Ruslan Imranovich say? We want to prepare laws and create a legal framework to continue solving our military problems. By the end of March, we will be ready to submit our conclusions and proposals to Parliament. But we are not in a hurry to create Russian armed forces yet, because 344 million rubles in 1988 prices will be needed to ensure Russia's security in terms of defense.
M. Werner: Yes, it's a lot.
K. I. Kobets: On the other hand, in order to solve military problems, Parliament will certainly have to consider the creation of a Ministry of Defense. But, of course, we believe that it would be better to ensure collective security within the framework of the commonwealth. There is another side to this issue. We need to quickly ratify the agreements that have already been signed in order to begin their implementation. If we create our own armed forces right now, we will have certain difficulties with the implementation of the signed agreements. That's what's holding us back.
R. I. Khasbulatov: In general, there are problems, problems – problems that we need to solve.
M. Werner: Mr. Chairman, I understand you perfectly and I envy you a little. I believe that your country has great resources and talents. I think this will help you overcome the existing difficulties and cooperate with each other and with us. For our part, we can make this task easier. Today we do not need to spend a lot of money on confrontation, and therefore we can allocate these funds to help you. Unfortunately, we have to finish because I have a press conference right now. We wish you and your people all the best.
R. I. Khasbulatov: I want to say just a few words. The defense budget is a very painful topic. And now that so much has changed in our relations, I think that parliamentarians from Russia and other CIS countries will successfully cooperate with MPs from the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance on issues related to the coordination of the budgetary work of our parliaments. I think this is one of the key points. I thank you for this meeting. It was a great pleasure for me and my colleagues. “thanks. All the best.
(Translated by Sarah Dunn and Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive. Source: State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fund 10026, inventory 5, case 453)
Memorandum of conversation between U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry and Chairman of the State Duma Ivan Rybkin
March 8, 1994
Source: State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fund 10100, inventory 3, case 5
The new chairman of the State Duma, Ivan Rybkin (Agrarian Party of Russia), headed a high-ranking parliamentary delegation that arrived in Washington in March 1994. This Duma was elected in December 1993 by a nationalist majority that rejected radical economic reforms. The Duma delegation met with officials of the Clinton administration and members of the US Congress, including Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, the authors of the key law [on the establishment of the US-Russian program] to reduce the [nuclear] threat and disarm the former Soviet republics and Russia itself.
The transcript of the conversation with Secretary of Defense William Perry demonstrates the willingness of both sides to cooperate on a number of important issues in the field of defense and security. In particular, we are talking about the reduction of nuclear weapons within the framework of the START Treaty, ongoing efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as the current Partnership for Peace military cooperation program and peacekeeping cooperation in Bosnia.
On the Russian side, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense Sergey Yushenkov and Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Vladimir Lukin (former ambassador to Washington) are present. Perry spoke about the benefits of the Partnership for Peace program. Rybkin, in turn, came out in support of this initiative, saying that he “shares its goals and objectives.” Lukin agreed, but made a reservation that the prospects for its promotion in Russia are not ideal. He suggested that both countries “announce this program together and invite everyone to participate in it.” Lukin also stressed the need for additional consultations and coordination on the former Yugoslavia, with which Perry fully agreed.
Transcript of a conversation between U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry and Chairman of the State Duma Ivan Rybkin
March 8, 1994
W. Perry: I am interested in contacts with the leadership of the State Duma, primarily in the field of national security and foreign policy. It is necessary to ensure constructive cooperation between the executive and legislative branches of government in these areas. We are not talking about subordination of one branch to another. It is important that the difficulties inherent in these relationships do not interfere with moving forward in solving certain problems.
I hope it was useful for you to learn about the model of interaction between the branches of government that you observed during meetings in the US Congress. I consider your conversation with the Chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn, who has extensive experience in these matters, to be particularly valuable.
In a week and a half, I'm going to come to Moscow for meetings with the government and the Russian Defense Ministry. I would also like to visit the State Duma. I consider it important to maintain constructive relations and cooperate with both the government and the legislative authorities of Russia. Such cooperation would be useful for the Russian side as well.
I.P. Rybkin: First of all, I would like to confirm the continuity of Russia's defense and foreign policy.
We will be glad to see you as a guest in the Duma during your upcoming visit to Moscow.
The State Duma is an unusual phenomenon in our reality, although before 1917 we had four Dumas. Today we are studying their experience.
For our part, we are ready for the interaction of all three branches of government — legislative, executive and judicial. We are trying to find a middle ground that would define these relationships.
For decades, a representative government has served the leadership. The experience of recent years shows that a tough confrontation is a direct collision. This bitter experience has convinced us that the experience of all authorities is a prerequisite for further reforms. We talk about it openly and translate it into concrete actions. We hope that last October we received a long-term vaccination against the confrontation of the branches of government.
S. N. Yushenkov:As chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense, I am interested in a whole range of issues. These include the US military doctrine, military legislation, the nature of the relationship between the Ministry of Defense and the relevant congressional commissions, the prospects for NATO in connection with the end of the Cold War, issues of our cooperation in peacekeeping operations, specific approaches to the implementation of the Partnership for Peace program – which I consider to be a barely veiled expansion of NATO – the prospects for the ratification of START-2 and START-1 implementation and other issues. Unfortunately, the format of the meeting is such that we will not be able to discuss all these problems now. I hope we can discuss them in detail in the future. We would really appreciate your principled assessments, at least on some issues.
W. Perry: First of all, regarding the Partnership for Peace. We offer this program to all states of Central and Eastern Europe, including Russia. It is aimed at the cooperation of all countries in the interests of preserving peace. Joining the program offers Russia at least two advantages. First, it is strengthening trust between Russia and the United States by increasing openness and strengthening contacts between the armed forces of both countries. Secondly, it is a practical benefit from the exercises, in which Russian, American and European armed forces will take part in order to solve operational tasks. Even if Russia does not join the program, it will be able to benefit from bilateral exercises of the armed forces of both countries. In fact, the program offers an expanded implementation of what is already being done at the bilateral level.
E. Carter: Now, as for the START-2 treaty. We believe that START-2 is necessary both for the implementation of our long-term plans to reduce strategic forces, and from an economic point of view. We support the early resolution of the issue of its ratification, although we understand the organizational difficulties that you are experiencing in connection with the start of the work of the new parliament. We look forward to working together to speed up this process. We hope that the Nunn-Lugar Act will help its implementation (the joint threat reduction program, named after Senators Samuel Nunn and Richard Lugar, was conducted with the participation of the Threat Reduction Agency under the US Department of Defense and was aimed at the destruction of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction. — PrimInoSMI). We believe that this agreement is very good and meets the interests of both countries. We proceed from the fact that the process of its ratification will not create additional obstacles in the form of reservations or amendments.
Like you, we consider it important that the Ukrainian side fulfills the terms of the START-1 agreement as soon as possible. Here we need to further strengthen cooperation between the United States, Russia and Ukraine.
V. P. Lukin: Currently, the Committee on International Affairs of the State Duma is actively working on the issue of priority of ratification of international agreements. There are more than sixty of them in the list provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We tend to agree with the Foreign Ministry's opinion that we should start with the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Open Skies Agreement. Despite the importance of the START-2 treaty, we still have time to ratify it, since work on the implementation of START-1 is still ongoing. However, there is no time to waste. It is very important to combine our efforts and work with the public and parliamentarians of both countries to emphasize justice and mutual benefit within the framework of this treaty. Joint hearings with the participation of your and our experts could play a positive role in this.
E. Carter: I agree that for the successful ratification of START-2, it is necessary to use all available means, including joint meetings of relevant committees of the US Congress and the Russian State Duma with the involvement of experts.
I.P. Rybkin: I would like to emphasize here that the priorities for START-2 could have been different if the issues on Ukraine had been resolved faster.
At. Perry: We are also interested in your assessment of the role of Russia and the United States in resolving the conflict in Bosnia.
I. P. Rybkin: In the end, we spontaneously came to full-fledged cooperation in Bosnia. I would like to achieve such interaction consciously, as a result of mutual consultations and discussions. This is important for the reputation of both countries. There will be many more hot spots that will require our close cooperation. With this approach, it will be easier for us to find the right solutions and convince the State Duma and the Federal Assembly and the whole world of the correctness, accuracy and wisdom of these decisions.
V. P. Lukin: I completely agree with this statement of the question. When I was Russia's ambassador to the United States, I often got into awkward situations. For example, I was invited to the State Department and informed about the decision already taken following consultations between the United States, Britain, France and other countries. Alas, the last time information about the decisions already made was a little late. In principle, it is natural for partners to consult with each other and try to convince each other of the correctness of the proposed solutions and only then proceed to their joint implementation. The result of our uncoordinated actions in Bosnia turned out to be generally good. Although, maybe together we would have achieved more than we deserved. We did not agree with the American decision to bomb, although we must admit that the ultimatum played a role. Our alternative solution also worked. However, it would still be better to consult in advance. We have a common goal — to stop the bloodshed, taking into account the realities as they are. A significant departure from reality in favor of ideological constructions will not lead to the desired positive result. Let's cooperate. Now you have the direct number of the Russian Ministry of Defense. If other phone numbers are not answered, they will definitely answer here.
W. Perry: I believe that the most important goal of both countries in Bosnia is to end the war and establish peace. We must cooperate, even if we do not agree on everything with each other on other issues in the former Yugoslavia.
Russia could make a positive contribution by encouraging the Serbs to participate in the agreement signed between Muslims and Croats with our mediation. Without the participation of the Serbs in this agreement, peace in Bosnia is unthinkable. We will have to discuss together how to make this agreement more attractive to the Serbs.
A few words about our past contacts on the Bosnian problem. I wanted to inform the Russian side about the proposed solution before it was discussed in NATO. To do this, President Bill Clinton tried to contact Boris Yeltsin by phone. However, for reasons unknown to me, there was no communication for two days. I planned to call Pavel Grachev at the Russian Defense Ministry on this issue, but decided not to do so until our presidents had a direct conversation. This loss of two days gave rise to a misunderstanding. After the conversation between the heads of state, we repeatedly called Grachev. If this situation happens again, I will call Grachev myself. This is a lesson for the future. During my trip to Russia next week, I intend to discuss with Pavel Grachev the full range of Bosnian problems.
It is also important that you do not get the impression that the United States implements only narrow national interests in Bosnia. Our goals there are twofold. First, it is to stop military operations in Bosnia, and, more broadly, to prevent them from expanding beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia, and even more so, the Balkans. The second is to reduce the level of violence against civilians. We are determined to reach a peace agreement as soon as possible. We do not plan to use the armed forces of the United States or NATO to resolve any military issues. We intend to use them purely to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population. We don't want people to think that we are against the Serbs. We have influence on Muslims, and we will use it. Just as you, in turn, could use your influence on the Serbs.
I. P. Rybkin: I want to inform you that Karadzic heard the same thing during his visit to Moscow. We stated that both we and, as we understand it, the United States have only one goal – a [peace] agreement in Bosnia. We have made it clear to the Serbs that they must be ready for territorial concessions and to overcome all other obstacles for the sake of lasting peace.
Returning to the idea of the importance of consultations, I would suggest thinking about creating a special mechanism for this purpose. Perhaps a joint military organization within the OSCE could fulfill this role. I am inclined to consider Partnership for Peace as a step in this direction.
S. N. Yushenkov:Currently, the “Weimar syndrome” is very strong in Russia (longing for the lost empire, mixed with revanchist sentiments, by analogy with Weimar Germany after the defeat in the First World War, — Approx.InoSMI), and joining this program alone will be considered by many to belittle the rights of Russia as a great power.
V. P. Lukin: “Partnership for Peace" seems to be an extremely interesting and constructive program. It's all about the way to properly submit it in Russia. It seems that Russia will join this program somewhere in the eighth or tenth in a row. Let's say somewhere between Estonia, Latvia or Ukraine. Given the current problems of the Russian-speaking population in these countries, which are recognized even by OSCE experts, this may be perceived extremely negatively by the destructive-minded part of the State Duma and public opinion. Ideally, we should announce this program together and invite everyone to take part in it. Now the Russian Foreign Ministry faces a serious problem of how to introduce this program into the Russian parliament and introduce it into the public opinion of the country.
S. N. Yushenkov:I share the goals and objectives of this program. I am completely satisfied with the independent position of each participant in this new program. However, a number of provisions raise serious objections. In particular, this concerns the issue of standardization of weapons. We are not against paying for participation in the program, but we are against the restructuring of our military-industrial complex to NATO standards.
W. Perry: For the foreseeable future, we are talking mainly about standardizing communications so that our armed forces can communicate with each other. The standardization of weapons is a long—term prospect. We understand your concern. Let me repeat it. Even if Russia does not want to join the Partnership for Peace yet, joint exercises of the armed forces of our countries, which are already planned, promise no less significant benefits to it.
The meeting was attended by
- On the American side: Secretary of Defense William Perry, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, Deputy Secretary of Defense Graham Ellison.
- From the Russian side: Chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Ivan Rybkin, Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the State Duma Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma Sergey Yushenkov, Military Attache of the Russian Embassy in the United States Anatoly Mazurkevich, Adviser to the Russian Embassy in the United States A.L. Tarasov, First Secretary of the Russian Embassy in the United States Sergey Trepelkov [Source: State Archive Russian Federation (GARF) Fund 10100, inventory 3, case 5]
Memorandum by Secretary of Defense William Perry to President Clinton, subject: Special Defense report
October 27, 1995
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, National Security Archive, FOIA
Secretary Perry informs President Clinton of a "breakthrough" in talks with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who arrived at the joint US-Russian exercises, dubbed "Peacemaker" and held at Fort Riley in Kansas to prepare Russian troops to participate in NATO peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. Perry talked about how Grachev's behavior and position had changed: in three days, he moved away from a "rather tense" seven-hour meeting in Washington, had a long one-on-one conversation with Perry during the flight, watched joint maneuvers in Kansas, met with soldiers, and then went with Perry to Missouri to Symbolically blow up a mine to launch Minuteman missiles.
Perry informed the president that the visit to Fort Riley was a "stunning success." The parties managed to achieve significant results in discussing Russia's participation in NATO peacekeeping activities in Bosnia and the difficult issue of the number of flank troops in the CFE negotiations. In addition, at Whiteman Air Force Base, Perry reports, "Grachev and I symbolically pressed the double button and blew up the Minuteman missile launch shaft." "Grachev was very imbued with the historical symbolism of this moment with the participation of the Russian Defense Minister on American soil. He spoke with fervor that his children and grandchildren understand the significance of this day and will remember it for a long time," Perry summed up.
A memo to US President Bill Clinton from Secretary of Defense William Perry
October 27, 1995
declassified in full on November 30, 2021
Subject: special report
Russia/Bosnia
I managed to achieve a breakthrough with Grachev this week. He agreed to form a "special forces" in Bosnia with the participation of US, Russian and possibly third-party forces; accepted our proposal on how to solve the problem of the number of flank troops in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), took part in the detonation of the Minuteman missile launch mine and visited together The joint American-Russian Peacekeeper-95 exercises are with me.
The first seven hours that Grachev and I spent at the Pentagon plenary session turned out to be quite stressful. His opening remarks about Bosnia turned out to be a step backwards regarding the agreement you reached with Yeltsin. I insisted that the starting point for the discussion, due to the inevitable difficulties associated with NATO operational control, which is implied in Option 1 (IFOR peacekeeping mission), should be Option 2 (participation in reconstruction). However, Grachev dismissed Option 2 as offensive and frivolous and insisted on Option 1 with Russia's participation in the IFOR — but not under the operational control of NATO. He promoted his interpretation of the Hyde Park meeting, which went against Strobe's [Talbott's] version. We discussed the NATO command vertical several times and eventually suggested to him that the Russians transfer their battalions to the command of the US division commander, since their objections concerned mainly the form rather than the content [of this format of cooperation], and they expressed their willingness to cooperate under the leadership of the Americans on a bilateral basis. They considered subordination to the commander of the US division purely within the framework of the American military apparatus. It was rejected. They demanded that the battalions work with General [George] Julvan and the Russian deputy and refused to integrate into the NATO command vertical. We have done everything possible to ensure that the dialogue continues.
The next morning, during the flight to Fort Riley, we had a face-to-face conversation with Grachev. I reformulated Option 2 to include all the elements of Option 1 that he requested, especially in those matters related to interaction with US troops, and informed him that we would launch Option 2 a month after Option 1. I said that I could not agree with his proposals for Option 1 at this stage, but if he agrees to Option 2 in this wording and is ready to reduce Russian participation in Option 1 to 500 people, then I agree not to abandon Option 1 and meet with him in Brussels in a week to finally settle everything. This approach allowed us to reach an agreement, which was subsequently announced at a press conference in Fort Riley. We agreed to create a joint US-Russian "special forces" numbering from 2,000 to 3,000 on each side, with the possibility of including military personnel from other countries in it. They will enter Bosnia at the beginning of, as Grachev put it, "Stage 2", that is, about a month after the introduction of IFOR and the separation of the warring parties. General Julvan will set the tasks, and he will have a Russian deputy with him. The tasks of the division will include engineering work, construction and clearing of roads, construction of bridges and so on. General Julvan and Grachev's representative (General Shevtsov) will provide details later. We agreed on a follow-up meeting between Perry and Grachev based on the report by Julvan and Shevtsov on the work of the joint unit. This allowed the discussion of Option 1 not to be curtailed, which is in the interests of both sides. I think it is very likely that I will be able to find a formulation that will allow the Russians to participate in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia with a contingent of up to 500 people, without recognizing the actual subordination of their troops to NATO, but I will have to clarify these issues with key NATO allies. (For example, there is a possibility of creating a peacekeeping mission in Eastern Slavonia outside the framework of NATO).
Grachev informed me that Yeltsin's health is much worse than reported and that coronary bypass surgery will most likely be required. I have offered excellent open heart surgery opportunities at the Walter Reed Army Research Institute, whether in the form of consultations in Russia or performing surgery directly in the United States. He thanked me for the offer and expressed optimism about this prospect.
He is aware of the successful operation of Dr. Berry from the Walter Reed Institute, who performed triple coronary bypass surgery to the Russian Minister of Economy about six months ago. He will inform President Yeltsin directly of our readiness, but I advise you to call Yeltsin personally with an offer. For Yeltsin, this recognition of the state of Russian medicine, for all its accuracy, will prove politically destructive. However, his consent — and an early one at that— will significantly strengthen the chances of recovery. By agreeing, he will receive reasonable prospects for a full recovery.
The visit to Fort Riley was a stunning success. We made a statement on the creation of a joint unit for the reconstruction of Bosnia and, in addition, visited Russian troops at the recently launched peacekeeping exercises. These are not only the first American-Russian peacekeeping exercises in the United States, but also the first in the continental part of the country in general (previously there were only search and rescue exercises in Alaska and rescue operations after the tsunami in Hawaii). Grachev had a warm conversation with the soldiers, stressed the inadmissibility of a return to the cold war and urged them to exchange addresses and maintain friendly relations. At the evening banquet, many locals made equally fervent statements about the American-Russian partnership.
On Saturday, we flew to Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. There, Grachev and I symbolically pressed the double button and blew up the Minuteman missile launch shaft. By this point, he had become extremely enthusiastic (the English phrase "in rare form" can also serve as a euphemism for "tipsy", — approx. InoSMI) and was very imbued with the historical symbolism of this moment with the participation of the US Secretary of Defense on American soil. He spoke with fervor that his children and grandchildren understand the significance of this day and will remember it for a long time. He promised to defend the ratification of START-2 in the State Duma and [said that] he was confident in the success of his enterprise. Before departure, he got acquainted with the B-2 bomber, inspected the cockpit and bomb bay and exchanged a couple of jokes with the crew.
On the way back, we worked on an agreement on the number of flank troops within the framework of the CFE Treaty — this issue has been bothering us for a long time. We rejected their request for more extensive adjustments in the north in exchange for greater concessions in the south. I said that we would support this alignment at the NATO talks if they presented it.
During the three-day visit, Grachev changed noticeably. [Immediately] after arriving on Thursday, he acted aggressively and quickly turned on. By the time he left, he relaxed, became more complacent and was in the mood to negotiate. I suspect we offered him almost nothing above his minimum requirements—but he was clearly worried that he wouldn't get that either. I concluded that the "tell and show" approach always works. In this sense, a trip to the troops for joint US-Russian exercises and a chance to contribute to nuclear disarmament (and consolidate the appropriate image) after one or two days of formal meetings in the capital helped a lot. He must not be quite sure what the mood in Moscow will be upon his return (although he has a trip to Greece planned immediately), but he did not show it.
William Perry
Vice President Albert Gore, Advisor Leon Furth
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Deputy Strobe Talbott
CIA Director John Deitch
White House: Chief of Staff Leon Panetta
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, Deputy William Owens
* A terrorist organization banned in Russia
