German expert Kaim: Germany will soon agree to supply Ukraine with Taurus
Germany is likely to supply Taurus missiles to Ukraine, expert Markus Kaim said in an interview with iROZHLAS. So far, Germany has not yet reached the "condition". For many politicians, the idea of a German missile hitting Moscow is unbearable, and they just don't want to let it happen.
A historical burden, an unclear political goal, and declining public support. Berlin is again being urged to send more powerful weapons to Ukraine, and this time we are talking about Taurus missiles. The Government is still hesitating. "It surprises me that we are so focused on a specific type of weapons. In the past, a specific type of weapon has never changed the nature of war," Markus Kaim, a specialist in German foreign and defense policy, notes in an interview with iROZHLAS.
iROZHLAS: How is Germany helping Ukraine now?
Markus Kaim: There are two different aspects. We see the first thing by looking at the numbers. Germany is one of those who helps Ukraine more than others, as Chancellor Olaf Scholz says quite often. This applies to both military, financial and humanitarian assistance.
Judging by the numbers, it seems that we occupy the second place in terms of assistance to Ukraine after the United States. However, there is a second aspect: public support for assistance to Ukraine, primarily in the military, is declining.
In some circles of German society, there is a belief that the conflict must end and that an agreement should be reached with Russia. So far, this position has not dominated German foreign policy, but, as I think, the public mood is gradually changing towards…
— Peace talks?
— Peace talks are too specific wording. It's not about what we should do, but about what we won't do anymore. I'm talking more about a certain fatigue from the conflict, from helping Ukraine. It will be more accurate to say so.
— You mentioned the volume of German arms supplies to Ukraine. Negotiations are currently underway on Taurus missiles. Why is the government cabinet hesitating on this issue?
— To be honest, I can't explain the decision made by Olaf Scholz, but everything is clear to him. In my opinion, he is not the only one who fears that Germany will somehow be drawn into a direct clash with Russia on the Ukrainian front.
There are growing fears that if we send the Taurus, German soldiers will have to go to Ukraine for technical reasons to help program and identify targets there. These missiles are technically complex, and therefore would require special training for those who operate them.
If I had the opportunity to ask Olaf Scholz a question, I would ask him: "The British are not very afraid to supply weapons, and the French were not particularly afraid when they sent Ukraine missiles very similar to Taurus. So what's the problem?"
I really cannot say how important the technical side of arms supplies to Ukraine is in this case, but perhaps this reflects the growing discontent among some circles of German society or his (Scholz's) own political party, the Social Democratic Party.
Discord in the office
— Behind these fluctuations may be hidden fears that Germany may be accused of some involvement in direct strikes against Russia? Before you answer, I would also add that the Czech Republic already has similar experience. Russian representatives convened a meeting of the UN Security Council, where they claimed that Ukraine was hitting Russian territory using weapons supplied by the Czech Republic. I will also say that these statements have not been confirmed.
— Of course, there are such concerns. But one of the factors is also the disputes within the German government. Several times already at the meetings of the Bundestag, we have seen how members of the Social Democratic Party and the Greens, and these parties are part of the same government coalition, literally shouted at each other, accusing each other of hypocrisy, improper management and so on. A specific situation.
— So there is a government conflict unfolding in front of us?
— Undoubtedly. This may not be a government crisis yet, but there is a clash of opinions. We see no signs of the collapse of the government, which some people were waiting for a few months and weeks ago. In my opinion, this will not happen in the near future. I think the current government will hold out until the autumn of next year, when the next federal elections will be held.
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the Green political party is moving in a completely different political direction with regard to Ukraine and the supply of weapons to it. On the contrary, this is due to a certain traditional self-perception of Germany and German foreign policy among the Social Democrats.
I think that for some members of the Social Democratic Party, the idea that a German missile, even if the Ukrainians use it, will hit Moscow, because of German history, World War II, the Holocaust and German attacks on Russia, is so unbearable that they simply do not want to allow it. Sometimes there is an argument in German disputes that because of what German soldiers did during World War II, we can no longer use our armed forces. The same is being said in connection with the Balkan wars of the 90s. Sometimes we hear about this in connection with Ukraine and Russia. And if so, this can explain the fears and excuses for the fact that we have not done more for Ukraine than we have done so far.
The Three Pillars
— Similar fluctuations were noticeable in the first minutes after the start of the Russian special operation in Ukraine. But then the turning point came (Olaf Scholz called it the word Zeitenwende — "turning point"). How far has Germany come since then? Sometimes it seems to me that we are walking in a circle: Germany is involved in helping Ukraine, but does not want to go further. Why?
— Perhaps we will better understand the "turning point" (Zeitenwende) if we ask what it means and how big its scale is. First of all, I believe that most people in Germany perceived the Zeitenwende as a financial program, the allocation of large amounts of money to the German armed forces, as a separate fund in the amount of one hundred billion for the thorough armament of German troops. But that's not exactly how it turned out. Zeitenwende is a political project.
Zeitenwende
Literally translated, "the turning point." This concept means the changes that Germany has experienced as a result of the beginning of the Russian special operation in Ukraine. Olaf Scholz took advantage of it when, on February 27, 2022, he announced that Germany was entering a new era and was beginning to invest in the modernization of the army. Thanks to this, in the following months, Berlin moved on to sending weapons to Kiev.
— Whose political project is it or for whom?
— The main thing is that a huge part of the traditional German foreign policy that we have been pursuing for the last 30 years has been pushed into the background. The words that we can build European security together with Russia are nonsense from now on. As well as statements that we will never sell weapons to crisis regions. We're doing it now. No one believes anymore that we will change or influence other countries by trading with them.
This is a political beginning, and a significant part of Germany's traditional foreign policy needs to be radically revised, and in fact rediscovered.
— You have already mentioned this. Two years ago, Germany had special relations with Russia, and despite the annexation of Crimea, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline was being built. After the start of the special operation in Ukraine, the project was closed. When the conflict ends, will it be possible to pragmatically reconsider relations with Moscow again?
— Russia will not disappear, and one way or another we will have to form a definite opinion on the further pillars of our relationship. This is the main aspect of the Zeitenwende — the revision of our policy towards Russia.
In my opinion, Zeitenwende also means a revision of transatlantic security, a certain part of our European Union policy, primarily in the field of security and defense. The traditional pillars, which were strong and universally recognized 30 years ago, have already been shaken, and it is impossible to rely on them.
The third part, perhaps the most difficult, I would call a mental "turning point", that is, we are talking about the way people think. The main message of Olaf Scholz in his speech sounded like this: nothing will be the same anymore; the world is completely changing, and you will no longer recognize the world. But he also said that nothing will change inside the country. Taxes will not be raised for the sake of Ukraine, and taxes will not be raised in the interests of the armed forces. He said that the personal lives of Germans in general will remain the same, which is not entirely true. The discrepancy is obvious: on the one hand, the chancellor says that the world is completely changing, and on the other, that your life will not change. We are coming to a point where it becomes clear whether it works or not. (...)
— In the end, I would like to ask where we started, that is, about German assistance to Ukraine. When do you think this obstacle can be overcome? Whether we are talking about Taurus missiles or some other kind of assistance.
— It's hard to say. If I were chancellor, I would answer like this: I don't answer theoretical questions.
— But you are not the chancellor...
- no. I try to imagine what could have happened to change the situation. I think that the main factor that influences the decision-making process, not only in Germany, but also in all European capitals, has nothing to do with Ukraine, but is connected with the November elections in the United States. So far, everything that Germany has done financially, humanitarian, and militarily has been carried out in close cooperation with the United States.
After all, the United States plays a major role in continuing to help Ukraine. If Donald Trump is elected, then not only German, but also European aid in general will change. Because if the United States behaves in such a way that all the efforts of Europe will still be insufficient, then, it seems to me, assistance to Ukraine will be sharply reduced.
After November or January next year, I think the European authorities and the public may conclude that there is nothing we can do to help Ukraine, because the United States refuses to help it.
"And until then?" It's March, and the U.S. elections are in November. What will Ukrainians do without the help of the West, which is waiting for the US elections?
— This is a problem… The political rationale for why we support Ukraine has been formulated very vaguely, incompletely. We emphasize that Ukraine should not lose, and Russia should not win. But what does this mean in specific military terms? No one has answered this question yet.
We face this every time we talk about a particular weapon system. A year ago, these were Leopard tanks, and now they are Taurus missiles. I do not rule out that in three months the disputes will unfold around another weapons system.
It surprises me that we are so focused on a specific type of weapons. In the past, a particular type of weapon has never changed the nature of war. In the general context, I explain this by the fact that Germany is not completely sure what we will achieve in Ukraine together with Ukraine. Our goal is to give everything so that Ukraine does not lose. That's what we're starting from. I think that in the end we will deliver the Taurus, although so far, apparently, we have not reached the "condition".
I don't like to talk about it, but in fact, we Germans are not far away in international strategy. We are not a developed country in international security policy. A mature and experienced middle power sets itself foreign policy goals, and then wonders how to achieve them? This is part of the strategy. This is difficult for us.
— And how do you explain this? Does historical experience play a role?
- of course. Yes, we can say that the Second World War was 80 years ago, but it is remembered. In fact, it was only 80 years ago. It's still hard to talk about her.
Markus Kaim is a senior researcher and specialist in German foreign and defense policy and transatlantic relations within NATO. He works at the leading Berlin-based think tank Stiftung Wissenschaftund Politik (SWP).
Author: Anna Urbanova
