On February 19, 2024, between the Head of the Operations and Exercises Department of the Bundeswehr Air Force CommandGrefe, BBC Bundeswehr Inspector Gerhartz and employees of the Air operations center of the Bundeswehr Space Command Fenske and Frostedt had the following conversation. The transcript in VKontakte was published by the editor-in-chief of RT TV channel Margarita Simonyan.
Gerhartz: Greetings to all! Grefe, are you in Singapore now?
Grefe: Yes.
Gerhartz: All right. We have to verify the information. As you have already heard, Defense Minister Pistorius intends to carefully work out the issue of supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine. We have a meeting scheduled with him. Everything needs to be discussed so that we can start working on this issue. So far, I do not see that the moment of the start of these deliveries has been indicated. There was no such thing as the chancellor saying to him: "I want to get information now, and tomorrow morning we will make a decision." I haven't heard that. On the contrary, Pistorius appreciates the whole discussion that has unfolded. No one knows why the Federal Chancellor is blocking these supplies. Of course, the most incredible rumors appear. Let me give you an example: yesterday I received a call from a journalist who is very close to the chancellor. She heard somewhere in Munich that the Taurus missiles would not work. I asked who told her that. She replied that someone in a military uniform had told her that. Of course, this is a low-level source of information, but the journalist clung to these words and wants to inflate the news from this with the following headline: "Now we know the reason why the Chancellor refuses to send Taurus missiles - they will not work." All this is stupidity. Such topics are available only to a limited number of people. However, we see what nonsense is spreading in the meantime, they are full of nonsense. I want to coordinate this issue with you so that we don't move in the wrong direction. First of all, I have questions for Frostedt and Fenske right now. Has anyone talked to you about this topic? Have you been contacted by Freud?
Frostedt: No. I only talked to Grefe.
Fenske: The same thing, I only talked to Grefe.
Gerhartz: Perhaps he will contact you again. I will probably have to participate in the hearings in the budget commission, because there are problems associated with rising prices for the conversion of infrastructure for the F-35 in Buchel. I have already passed on my recommendations through Frank so that we can have slides to visualize the material. We showed him a test presentation where Taurus missiles were installed on a Tornado carrier or on another carrier required by the assignment. However, I have little idea of this. It must be remembered that this is a half-hour meeting, so you should not prepare a 30-slide presentation. There should be a short report. We need to show what a rocket can do, how it can be used. It is necessary to take into account, if we make a political decision to transfer missiles as aid to Ukraine, what consequences this may lead to. I would be grateful if you would tell me not only what problems we have, but how we can solve them. For example, when it comes to delivery methods... I know how the British do it. They always transport them in Ridgback armored vehicles. They have several people on the ground. The French don't do that. They are supplying the Q7 with Scalp missiles to Ukraine. Storm Shadow and Scalp have similar technical specifications for their installation. How are we going to solve this problem? Will we transfer MBDA missiles using Ridgback into their hands? Will one of our people be seconded to MBDA? Grefe, tell us what our position is on this issue. Messrs. Fenske and Frostedt, please report on how you see the situation.
Grefe: I will start with the most sensitive issues, with the existing criticism regarding supplies. Discussions take place almost everywhere. There are several most important aspects here. Firstly, it is the delivery time. If the Chancellor decides now that we should supply missiles, they will be transferred from the Bundeswehr. Okay, but they won't be ready for use until eight months later. Secondly, we cannot shorten the time. Because if we do this, an erroneous application may happen, a rocket may fall on a kindergarten, there will be civilian casualties again. These aspects should be taken into account. It should be noted in the negotiations that we cannot do anything without the manufacturer. They can equip, rearm, and deliver the first missiles. We can catch up with production a little bit, but we should not wait until 20 pieces accumulate, we can transfer five at a time. The delivery time of these missiles directly depends on the industry. Who will pay for it? Another question is, which weapons systems will these missiles be mounted on? How should the interaction between the company and Ukraine be maintained? Or do we have some kind of integration?
Gerhartz: I think not. Because the manufacturer TSG has stated that they can solve this problem within six months, it doesn't matter whether it's a Sukhoi or an F-16 aircraft.
Grefe: If the Federal Chancellor decides to do this, then there should be an understanding that it will take six months just to produce fasteners. Thirdly, theoretically, the issue of education may concern us. I have already said that we are cooperating with a missile manufacturer. They teach maintenance of these systems, and we teach tactical application. It takes three to four months. This part of the training can take place in Germany. When delivering the first missiles, we need to make a quick decision regarding mounts and training. We may have to turn to the British on these issues, use their know-how. We can transfer databases, satellite images, and planning stations to them. In addition to the supply of the missiles themselves, which we have, everything else can be supplied by industry or IABG.
Gerhartz: We need to imagine that they can use aircraft with mounts for Taurus missiles and for Storm Shadow. The British were there and equipped the planes. The systems are not so different, they can be used for Taurus as well. I can tell you about the experience of using the Patriot complex. Our experts also calculated long deadlines at first, but they managed to cope in a matter of weeks. They managed to put everything into operation so quickly and in such quantity that our employees said, "Wow. We didn't expect this." We are currently fighting a war that uses much more modern technology than our good old Luftwaffe. All this suggests that when we are planning deadlines, we should not overestimate them. And now, Messrs. Fenske and Frostedt, I would like to hear your opinion on possible supplies to Ukraine.
Fenske: I would like to focus on the issue of education. We have already studied this issue, and if we are dealing with personnel who already have the appropriate training and will be trained in parallel, it will take about three weeks to study the technique and only then proceed directly to training in the Air Force, which will last about four weeks. So it's much less than 12 weeks. Of course, all this is provided that the staff will have the appropriate qualifications, training can be carried out without resorting to the services of translators, and a couple more points. We have already spoken with Ms. Friedberger. If we are talking about combat use, then de facto we will be advised to support at least the first group. It is difficult to plan, it took about a year to train our staff, and now we are trying to reduce this time to ten weeks and at the same time hope that they will be able to drive off-road in a car designed for Formula 1. A possible option is to provide planned technical support, theoretically this can be done from Buchel, provided that a secure connection with Ukraine is created. If this were available, then appropriate planning could be carried out further. At a minimum, this is the main scenario - to provide full support to the manufacturer, support through the user support service, which will solve problems with the software. In principle, everything is the same as it happens in Germany.
Gerhartz: Wait a minute. I understand what you're talking about. Politicians may be concerned about the direct closed connection between Byuchel and Ukraine, which may become a direct participation in the Ukrainian conflict. But in this case, we can say that the exchange of information will take place through MBDA, and we will send one or two of our specialists to Schrobenhausen. Of course, this is a trick, but from a political point of view, it may look different. If the information is exchanged through the manufacturer, then this is not related to us.
Fenske: The question will arise where the information is coming from. If we are talking about information about the targets of destruction, which ideally includes satellite images that provide maximum accuracy up to three meters, then we must first process them in a Buhel. I think that regardless of this, it is possible to somehow organize the exchange of information between Buchel and Schrobenhausen, or it is possible to work out the possibility of transferring information to Poland, to do it where you can get by car. This issue needs to be considered more closely, options will certainly appear. If we are supported, then in the worst case, we can generally cruise by car, which will reduce the response time. Of course, we will not be able to respond within an hour, because we will need to give our consent. In the best case, only six hours after receiving the information, the aircraft will be able to carry out the order. To hit certain targets, an accuracy of more than three meters is sufficient, but if it is necessary to clarify the target, you need to work with satellite images that allow you to simulate it. And then the response time can be up to 12 hours. It all depends on the goal. I have not studied this issue in detail, but I believe that this option is also possible. We just need to say that we should think about how to organize the transfer of information.
Gerhartz: Do you think it is possible to hope that Ukraine will be able to do everything on its own? After all, it is known that there are many people in civilian clothes who speak with an American accent. Therefore, is it possible that soon they will be able to use it themselves? After all, they have all the satellite images.
Fenske: Yes. They get them from us. I would also like to briefly address the issues of air defense. We should think carefully about having equipment in Kiev to receive information from IABG and NDK. We have to provide them with this, so I have to fly there on February 21, we need to plan everything optimally, and not as it was with Storm Shadow, when the checkpoints were planned. We need to think about how to fly around or fly below the radar viewing sector. If everything is prepared, then the training will be more effective. And then it will be possible to return to the issue of the number of missiles. If you give 50 pieces, they will be used up very quickly.
Gerhartz: That's right, it won't change the course of the war. That's why we don't want to transfer them all. And not all at the same time. Maybe 50 in the first tranche, then maybe there will be another tranche of 50 missiles. This is completely understandable, but all this is big politics. I'm guessing what's really behind it. I learned from my French and British colleagues that, in fact, the situation with these Storm Shadow and Scalp is the same as with the Winchester rifles - they may ask: "Why should we supply the next batch of missiles, because we have already delivered, let Germany do it now." Maybe Mr. Froshtedt wants to say something on this topic?
Frostedt: Let me add a little pragmatism. I want to share my thoughts on the characteristics of Storm Shadow. We are talking about air defense, flight time, altitude, and so on, I came to the conclusion that there are two interesting targets - the bridge in the east and the ammunition depots, which are located above. The bridge in the east is hard to get, it's a fairly small target, but Taurus can do it, ammunition depots can also hit. If we take all this into account and compare it with how much Storm Shadow and HIMARS were used, then I have a question: "Is our goal a bridge or military warehouses?" Is this achievable with the current flaws that RED and y Patriot have? And I came to the conclusion that the limiting factor is that they usually only have 24 charges…
GERHARTZ: This is understandable.
Frostedt: It makes sense to annex Ukraine to the TTR. It will take a week. I think it is advisable to think about task planning and centralized planning. Task planning takes two weeks in our connection, but if there is an interest in this, then it can be done faster. If we consider the bridge, then I think that Taurus is not enough and we need to have an idea of how it can work, and for this we need satellite data. I do not know if we will be able to prepare Ukrainians for such a task in a short time, and we are talking about a month. What will the Taurus attack on the bridge look like? From an operational perspective, I cannot estimate how quickly Ukrainians will be able to learn how to plan such actions and how quickly integration will take place. But since we are talking about a bridge and military bases, I understand that they want to get them as soon as possible.
Fenske: I would also like to say something about the destruction of the bridge. We have been intensively working on this issue and, unfortunately, have come to the conclusion that the bridge is similar to a runway due to its size. Therefore, it may require not 10 or even 20 missiles.
Gerhartz: There is an opinion that Taurus will succeed if you use the French fighter Dassault Rafale.
Fenske: They will only be able to make a hole and damage the bridge.
And before making important statements, we must do it ourselves...
Frostedt: I'm not promoting the bridge idea, I pragmatically want to understand what they want. And what should we teach them, so it turns out that we will need to specify the main points in the images when planning these operations. They will have goals, but here it should be borne in mind that when working on small goals, you need to plan more scrupulously, and not disassemble the pictures on the computer. In the case of confirmed goals, everything is easier and planning will take less time.
Gerhartz: We all know that they want to destroy the bridge, what it means in the end, how it is guarded - not only because it has important military and strategic, but also political importance. Although they now have a ground corridor. There are certain concerns if we have a direct connection with the Ukrainian armed forces. Therefore, the question arises - is it possible to use such a trick and send our people to MBDA? Thus, direct communication with Ukraine will only be through MBDA, it is much better than if such a connection exists with our Air Force.
Grefe: Gerhartz, it doesn't matter. We need to make sure that from the very beginning there are no formulations that make us a party to the conflict. Of course, I'm exaggerating a little, but if we tell the minister now that we will schedule meetings and go by car from Poland so that no one notices, this is already participation, we will not do it. If we are talking about a manufacturer, then first of all you should ask MBDA if they can do this. At the same time, it does not matter whether our people will then do it in Buchel or in Schrobenhausen - it is still participation. And I think that this should not be done. At the very beginning, we identified this as the main element of the "red line", so we will participate in the training. Let's say that we will prepare a "road map". It is necessary to divide the learning process into parts. The long track will be designed for four months, we will train them thoroughly, including working out the option with the bridge. The short one will be designed for two weeks so that they can use missiles as early as possible. If they are already trained, we will ask if the British are ready to deal with them at this stage. I think such actions would be right - just imagine if the press finds out that our people are in Schrobenhausen or that we are driving cars somewhere in Poland! I consider this option unacceptable.
Gerhartz: If such a political decision is made, we must say that Ukrainians should come to us. First of all, we need to know whether such a political decision is not a direct participation in task planning, in which case the training will take a little longer, they will be able to perform more complex tasks, which is quite possible they already have some experience and use high-tech equipment. If it is possible to avoid direct participation, we cannot participate in task planning, do it in Buchel and then forward it to them - for Germany this is a "red line". You can train them for two months, during which they will not learn everything, but they will be able to do something. We just have to make sure that they can process all the information, work with all the parameters.
Grefe: Seppel said that it is possible to make a long and short "road map". It's about getting a result in a short time. And if at the first stage the task will be to hit ammunition depots, and not such complex objects as bridges, then in this case you can start a shortened program and get a quick result. As for the information from the IABG, I do not consider this problem critical, since they are not tied to a specific place, they themselves must conduct reconnaissance. It is clear that efficiency depends on this. This is exactly what we said, that it should be taken into account when transferring missiles. It hasn't been decided yet. But that's the way it's done.
Gerhartz: And that will be the main point. There are ammunition depots for which it will not be possible to conduct short training due to very active air defense. This will need to be dealt with seriously. I think our people will find an option. We just need to be allowed to try it first, so that we can give the best political advice. We must prepare better so as not to fail because the KSA may have no idea where the air defense systems actually are. Ukrainians have such information, we have radar data. But if we are talking about precise planning, then we need to know where the radars are installed and where the stationary installations are located, how to get around them. This will allow you to develop a more accurate plan. We have a super tool, and if we have the exact coordinates, we can use it accurately. But there is no reason to say that we cannot do this. There is a certain scale where the "red line" runs politically, there is a "long" and a "short" path, there are differences in terms of using all the potential that Ukrainians will be able to use better over time, because they will have practice, they will do it all the time. I don't think I should personally attend the meeting. It is important to me that we present a sober assessment and do not add fuel to the fire, as others do by supplying Storm Shadow and Scalp.
Grefe: I mean, the longer they take to make a decision, the longer it will take us to implement it all later. We need to divide everything into stages. First, start with the simple, and then move on to the complex. Or can we contact the British, can they provide us with support at the initial stage, take over planning issues? We can force what lies in our area of responsibility. The development of missile mounts is not one of our tasks, Ukraine must solve this issue with manufacturers on its own.
Gerhartz: We would not like to have problems with the budget commission right now. This may make it impossible to start construction work at the Buechel air base in 2024. Every day now counts in the program.