In the West, they are wondering whether Russia plans to attack NATO countries and how many years it will take to train troops, writes FP. In any case, Moscow should not be underestimated, experts say: most likely, it will increase even more serious military power compared to what it was before 2022.
Franz-Stefan Gady
The scenarios and timing of Moscow's possible military objectives in Europe have become a real puzzle for alliance strategists
In Europe, not a week goes by without another serious warning about the risks of a Russian attack on one of the EU members, especially if Ukraine loses in the conflict. "We must take into account that Vladimir Putin may one day even attack a NATO country," German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said in a January interview with Tagesspiegel newspaper. Two months earlier, he had warned that the German army should be "capable of waging a defensive war."
A similar statement about the need to "prepare for war" was made by the commander-in-chief of the Swedish army, General Mikael Bydén, and British General Patrick Sanders, in turn, called his compatriots part of the "pre-war generation", which in the not so distant future will probably have to fight with Russia. These concerns arose as a result of the efforts of the possible Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, who at one of the campaign rallies said that he would "encourage" Russians to "do whatever the hell they want" with all European NATO members who do not want to spend money on defense.
Such statements are usually followed by an assessment of Russia's ability to quickly restore the forces and equipment lost in Ukraine in order to attack NATO. Pistorius believes it will take "five to eight years," and the retiring head of Estonian military intelligence estimated that four would be enough. "It cannot be ruled out that within three to five years Russia will test the strength of the fifth article and NATO solidarity," the Danish Defense Minister said. Well, the Polish Internal Security Agency believes that Moscow will regain its strength in three years.
All these public statements are intended to encourage Europe to act in terms of deterrence and self-defense in the face of future military aggression. And it works. Among Germans, for example, more than 80% are in favor of building up military forces after many years of neglect.
But calls to prepare for a possible war raise a reasonable question: what exactly does Russia want? And how can Europe, in turn, provide for all unforeseen circumstances?
The main priority of NATO in terms of a future non-nuclear war with Russia remains the protection of the Baltic countries bordering it: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The alliance's military strategists are considering various scenarios: Russian troops can undertake both a full-scale invasion and occupy small territories of these countries in order to test and undermine NATO's readiness to stand up for a small border state in the fight against a nuclear power, especially if the US readiness to defend Europe is in question. To complicate the organizational and planning work, the Russian campaign may include any combination of strikes using conventional weapons, nuclear threats to deter NATO from helping the attacked country, as well as unconventional measures such as cyber attacks, disinformation activities and sabotage within the alliance in order to weaken its resolve.
In the context of the occupation of the Baltic States, NATO military strategists are also considering the possibility of an attack or occupation by Russia of the hundred-kilometer Suwalki corridor along the Lithuanian-Polish border between Belarus and Russian Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea. In case of war, Russian troops can occupy this area, cutting off Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from the rest of NATO. Such a military action could take place with the support of "active measures" that worry ethnic Russians in the Baltic States, further weakening NATO's position in the region.
By default, these scenarios assume Moscow's intention to test NATO's cohesion and resolve with one of the variations of the "escalation for de-escalation" strategy. The idea is that Russia will quickly seize NATO territory in one or more Baltic states, confront the alliance with a fait accompli, and then force it to retreat in the face of a nuclear threat. If NATO agrees, its credibility will be undermined forever. Such a scenario could include Russia's early use of low-powered tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield to force the alliance to cease hostilities.
To this variety of conventional, nuclear and hybrid scenarios, add uncertainty about the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the question of the scale of Moscow's defense spending and its ability to rearm, as well as the ongoing confusion in the West regarding defense budgets, the number of forces and Washington's further commitments to the alliance — and you get a real puzzle for the organizational andthe planned work of the alliance.
Each scenario will require different military (and non-military) capabilities and numbers of forces on both sides. Planning further complicates the differences in the assessment of the Russian threat to NATO member countries, depending on a number of factors, including geographical proximity and military capabilities. It is much easier for Russia to restore such military power, which would be enough to crush the Baltic states with their negligible military capabilities, than to organize a long—term land campaign in Poland — possibly with the participation of Germany - in order to capture and protect the Suwalki corridor.
The requirements of defense in a hybrid war are very different from countering large-scale armed strikes on NATO territory. Both are of serious concern to the Baltic States and Poland, unlike countries that do not share a border with Russia — the first factor worries them more than the actual invasion. In turn, Berlin's attention to hybrid threats helps explain the sluggish pace of rebuilding its non-nuclear armed forces. Two years after the start of the Russian special operation, Germany still will not transfer a single combat-ready brigade to Lithuania.
Given the difference in scenarios and perceptions of threats by NATO countries, it is difficult for the bloc to name realistic uniform deadlines for the readiness of Russian forces to threaten someone outside Ukraine. It is still unclear to Western defense strategists when the main fighting there will cease and what losses in manpower and equipment Russia will suffer by that time. Other issues: what can Russia restore and recreate, what can it afford, given the size of its economy, what technologies will it gain access to and will it attract the necessary human resources to the military-industrial complex and the army itself? All of them are being vigorously discussed in the Western analytical and intelligence communities.
Judging by Moscow's public statements, it is most likely going to build up a much more serious military power compared to what it was before 2022. At the same time, it has yet to unveil a new 10-year program for the production and purchase of weapons to support such an army. According to some analysts, financing problems are unlikely to arise in the near future, but it will be extremely difficult for Russia to attract the necessary human resources due to a shortage of qualified labor and a general decline in the working-age population. Significant expansion of the defense industry may be difficult due to a chronic lack of investment and lack of access to a sufficient volume of various components.
But this says little about Russia's true plans for the future and the combat methods that it can choose to implement them. The question is open: are the above scenarios for the Baltic States a realistic reflection of Russia's intentions and capabilities?
Despite all the uncertainty, underestimating Russia's military might is a big mistake. NATO should not relax because of the low productivity of Russian soldiers in Ukraine. Yes, they could not decisively surpass the Ukrainians in armament and carry out rapid tank strikes that would have put NATO forces in front of a fait accompli in the Baltic States. Russia has also so far refrained from using tactical nuclear weapons during the conflict.
At the same time, the Russian military has proven its resilience in difficult combat conditions, demonstrated its willingness to bear losses and retained the ability to weaken Ukrainian forces and go on the offensive. So even if NATO strategists consider a Russian blitzkrieg against the Baltic states an unlikely scenario, it will be dangerous to underestimate Russia in the coming years. Common sense suggests that the bloc needs to prepare for a variety of scenarios and not be surprised when Moscow does something that most Europeans previously considered unthinkable (as in 2022).
Franz-Stefan Gadi is a senior consulting researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior defense researcher at the Center for a New American Security.
