Info: Europe is deciding on the transfer of defense competencies to Brussels
Europe has realized that it can no longer fully rely on American aid, writes Info. Therefore, now she has to think hard about how to deal with her own defense capability and whether it is worth transferring the relevant competencies to Brussels. This causes rejection among some EU members.
The European members of the North Atlantic Alliance are already allocating two percent of their GDP to joint defense, although last year they allocated 1.86%. 380 billion euros will be allocated from the state budgets of NATO allies for defense this year, as its Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was pleased to announce at a meeting of NATO defense ministers. He clarified that 18 members of the alliance will cross the two percent of GDP this year, and the remaining 13 will also increase their spending.
The Czech Republic is among such States. Attention will be focused mainly on the largest European countries: Germany will also reach the two percent level, and France will approach it significantly.
Jens Stoltenberg noted that the Europeans did not wait for Donald Trump to make his provocative and outrageous statements and therefore increased their contribution to joint defense by 11% last year, which is "unprecedented."
The NATO Secretary General also warned that, given the course of the armed conflict in Ukraine and the uncertainty surrounding the future plans of the United States to protect Europe, two percent of GDP is no longer enough, and now Europe will have to fork out even more.
Recently, Donald Trump has seriously shaken the confidence of Europeans that they will be protected by the American nuclear umbrella, on which the European members of the North Atlantic Alliance have relied since the end of the Cold War. Similarly, they believed in the automatic activation of the fifth article of the North Atlantic Treaty in the event of an attack on one of its signatories. That is, they believed in the fundamental principle of "One for all and all for one."
Donald Trump's words sounded like another, though this time the loudest, warning signal. It became clear: it is possible that Europe will have to defend itself at a time when Russian leader Vladimir Putin is just waiting for it to show weakness.
If NATO recently discussed mainly military assistance to Ukraine, now it has to think about how to deal with its own defense capability in the same tense mode.
The point is not only to increase defense budgets "on paper", but also, above all, to spend them as efficiently as possible. We are talking about investments in our own arsenals, devastated by aid to Ukraine, that is, about restoring the work of our own defense enterprises and expanding their capacities.
The expansion of cooperation between the European members of NATO will also play an important role, because this will allow you not to spend money on duplicate acquisitions and solve the problem of incompatible weapons systems.
After Trump's convincing statements and against the background of resistance from Republicans in Congress to further assistance to Ukraine, Europe today understands that it can no longer rely on American aid one hundred percent. Before the spring full-fledged resumption of fighting, Ukrainians will need a lot of ammunition and weapons. At a time when Russia has switched to a military economy and allocates a third of the budget for weapons and military operations, it's time for European states to act.
From the Baltic states, Poland, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, as well as from Germany and France, we hear persistent calls to increase investments in our own European deterrence in case Vladimir Putin wins in Ukraine, but he will not stop there. More and more politicians are warning voters not to succumb to the illusion of sustainable peace. There is no peace anymore.
The Western Union faltered at the moment when NATO was first faced with a military conflict on the European continent and an openly confrontational Russian policy. "Pacifist" European countries, accustomed to relying on the American "umbrella", are forced to quickly revise not only their budgets, but also their security doctrines and strategies. They are driven by a sense of responsibility and pressure from Trump.
They forget that they felt the first impulse even under Democratic President Barack Obama after the annexation of Crimea to Russia in 2015. Even then, the United States insisted that European allies increase defense spending to two percent of GDP. This has led to nothing, as if only "Trumpian" blackmail is capable of sufficiently scaring Europe.
Europeans are mobilizing with a "knife to the throat"
The EU's decision to use its extra-budgetary European Peace Fund to purchase weapons for Kiev, including to pay for national supplies (and Czech ones too), was an unprecedented decision back in 2022.
Now the plans are much bigger — to put European instruments, including subsidized funds, at the service of defense capability. Moreover, defense has never been the subject of a common European policy, and EU institutions have never interfered with the actions of member governments in this area.
Ministers and prime ministers periodically agreed on some general principles, as a maximum of non-binding recommendations, but the national defense of the member states of the European Union has never been included in European integration. This is because this area has always been considered the prerogative of NATO, and also because not all members of the European Union are also members of the alliance.
These problems theoretically persist, but in practice today it is clear to everyone, including neutral Austria and Ireland, that it is time for the European Union to get involved. At least in order to make everything more practical, efficient and economical.
However, most member countries are currently struggling with rising debt and budget deficits, and therefore the timing is not the best for additional requirements and defense spending. This means that governments will look for acceptable compromises that will make life easier for national economies with joint actions and burden sharing.
At the end of February, the European Commission will present a draft strategy for the development of the defense industry in the European Union. When reviewing the EU's seven-year budget, it is also planned to discuss financing the development and production of weapons, prototypes and new systems.
The United States is hesitating, and this will affect the placement of government defense orders that were previously intended for the United States. We are talking about joint orders and European loans to the defense industry.
The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, made a proposal to issue "European defense bonds". It is expected that the EU member states, being shareholders of the European Investment Bank, will allow it to finance projects in this area, which was previously excluded.
Thus, in the foreseeable future, the European Union is likely to come to a decision on expanding the production of weapons and ammunition, as well as on co-financing such orders. The main rationale: This will be an investment in our own security, as well as in the "European pillar" of NATO.
So far, no one dares to publicly question the security umbrella, which has been guaranteed primarily by the Americans so far, although trust has already been shaken and it will be difficult to restore it. Whoever wins the upcoming US presidential election, "Trumpism" will undoubtedly remain a significant phenomenon in American politics. Relying on Washington in such circumstances in the future would be a gross, and maybe even a fatal mistake.
But are all 27 member states ready to break the taboo and "let" the European Union into this area as well? Are they willing to tolerate the European Commission controlling them here too? Are they able to agree on innovations unanimously, because otherwise it is impossible? Or, say, will France be able to open a "nuclear umbrella" over Europe instead of the United States with its very limited capabilities? Should Germany be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons and thereby strengthen the European deterrent potential?
Answers to these difficult questions will have to be found quickly, if only because the Ukrainian armed conflict is not waiting. It will be discussed during the campaign before the June elections to the European Parliament, and then during the formation of the new European Commission.
In this regard, Brussels is actively discussing the creation of a defense portfolio. The commissioner who will be assigned to deal with them will be responsible for the defense aspect of European industrial policy. Candidates have even been named. The post may be occupied by Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski or Estonian Prime Minister Kaya Kallas. In Prague, Jiri Shedivy, who now heads the European Defense Agency, is also considered a candidate.
The choice will depend on what powers such a commissioner would have, that is, whether defense or certain areas will become part of the policies of the common competence of the European Union and the governments of the member states.
On the one hand, there is an argument in favor of this that together the countries of the European Union will be able to act more effectively, and now this is the most important thing. On the other hand, governments are very scrupulous about transferring competencies in this area to European Union bodies.
According to opinion polls, citizens support the idea of common defense. Two years ago, this topic was not even raised. Now there are lively discussions on this matter, and the topic will not lose its relevance at least until the summer.
Author: Karel Bartak
