February 15 marks the 35th anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Colonel-General, Hero of the Soviet Union Boris Gromov, who commanded that operation, shared his memories of the Afghan war in a special interview with TASS, told why it could not be considered lost, and also answered the question of how the war would end.
— Boris Vsevolodovich, you spent five and a half years in Afghanistan. What was the most difficult thing for you during your stay there?
— The most difficult thing for me was the beginning of my stay. I arrived there in January 1980, and in March the fighting began. At that time, I graduated from the academy and, as I thought, was prepared for combat operations. At first I was a colonel, chief of staff of the 108th Division in Kabul. The attacks took place before March, but we could not respond — it was strictly forbidden.
In March, I began acting as the head of the fighting near Kabul. The most difficult period that remains in my memory is just the first fighting. Since then, I have made a number of practical conclusions: do not go into battle without understanding the situation.
— What surprised or shocked you when you found yourself in Afghanistan?
— The first moment that shocked me occurred in February 1980. Then I was the chief of staff of the 108th Division, which was located at that moment on the northern outskirts of Kabul, then we moved it to Bagram. We held meetings of the division leaders, as was customary in peacetime in the USSR.
After one such meeting, the command was given to leave for their points. An hour later, a report was received that on the way from Kabul to Bagram, where the sapper battalion was located, a car was fired at and a lieutenant colonel, the commander of the engineering sapper battalion, was killed. Not only were he and his driver killed, his opponents slashed him with knives, cut off his ears, gouged out his eyes, and mocked the corpses. I was at this place. It was a terrible shock.
— What is your opinion about ordinary Afghans?
— The Afghans, who were not part of any Mujahideen units, were sincere and very good people. They lived very poorly, but they were characterized by wisdom, humanity, and a friendly attitude towards people, including Shuravi (the historical name of the natives of the USSR in Afghanistan — approx. TASS). Maybe they didn't throw themselves at the neck, but they had their own code of honor and behavior. They treated us, the Soviet people, very well, and we treated them too. We helped them a lot, built them, supplied them with food. They appreciated it.
— How did you assess the USSR's chances of success at the beginning and how did your opinion change during the war? How did you understand that there is no military solution to the Afghan problem?
— I have been to Afghanistan three times. At first, I could not judge the correctness of the decision I had made. A year and a half later, when I got to know almost the whole of Afghanistan and visited everywhere, I realized that the idea they wanted to put into practice was not feasible. At that time, both the United States and NATO were doing everything to drag the USSR into Afghanistan.
I also became convinced of this during meetings with the commander-in-chief of NATO's southern forces. They didn't hide it. In my opinion, when deciding on the deployment of troops and international assistance to Afghanistan, the leadership of the USSR apparently did not take everything into account, or there were other points that we do not know about. Now it is obvious to me that the deployment of troops was prepared thoughtlessly.
During the first two years of our troops' presence, it became obvious to many officers and the leadership of the 40th Army - and the Ministry of Defense has always been against the entry of troops — that measures must be taken to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. There was no task as such for the 40th Army. The only task was to maintain a calm situation in Afghanistan in order to avoid the penetration of military conflicts from the outside.
The entry of troops into Afghanistan was ahead of the actions of the Americans, which can be considered the only advantage of the entry of Soviet troops into the DRA. It was possible to solve this issue in another way, for example, not to send a 140,000-strong grouping of Soviet troops, but to limit ourselves at least to the one that was introduced — 30 thousand. These forces would be enough to maintain stability and power in the main areas.
Afghanistan should not have been abandoned, it was necessary to help, but it had to be done differently — politically and economically. In particular, if there were problems and military conflicts with the Pakistani side, special detachments could be sent. Moscow had them — special forces, the GRU. Under the 40th army, there was a GRU intelligence center, whose forces covered the entire territory of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.
— How was the decision to withdraw troops made?
— Since the beginning of 1983, the command of the 40th Army has purposefully insisted on the decision to withdraw troops through the Ministry of Defense, the Soviet Embassy - through all those who made such decisions. We prepared the documents and sent them to the Politburo at the Old Square in Moscow. The decision to withdraw troops was seriously considered in 1985, when it became clear that the issue could not be resolved by force.
Finally, a decision was made in Geneva — the so-called Geneva Agreement signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan. The USSR and the USA acted as guarantors. The agreement set the dates for the withdrawal of troops: the beginning of the withdrawal was scheduled for May 15, 1988, and the end of the withdrawal was on February 15, 1989. The only thing was that the order of withdrawal of troops was not specified, since this was determined by the command of the 40th army.
It was the command of the 40th Army that insisted on the withdrawal of troops, since all those tasks that depended on us in Afghanistan were solved. We showed everyone, including the Americans, that while there was a 40th army in Afghanistan, it was useless to go there and fight the USSR. Americans are still talking about it. However, the United States did everything to detain Soviet troops in Afghanistan as long as possible.
— There is an opinion that the USSR was defeated in this war. What do you think?
— After the withdrawal of troops, those who have no idea what Afghanistan is, who did not fight there, often tell tall tales that the USSR and the 40th army were defeated in Afghanistan. There were no tasks that the 40th Army could not accomplish. It was a very powerful army. There can be no question of any defeat.
The forces that were there were simply incomparable. On the one hand, there were us, and on the other, those who acted at the behest of the United States. The Americans acted covertly. The former CIA chief wrote about this in his memoirs. The United States did everything by the hands of Pakistanis and Afghans who were on the side of Pakistan.
And most importantly, the 40th Army in Afghanistan has never received a task from anyone to win militarily. When they say that our army was defeated there, then these people should be called "storytellers".
— What do you see as the difference between the way Soviet and American troops left? What did the USSR leave behind in this country, and what did the USA leave behind?
— Two big differences, as they say. We came out with our battle flags unfurled and our heads held high. And the Americans fled in disgrace. We have left behind, strange as it may sound, a good memory, a huge number of built facilities, roads and pipelines. When delegations of our Afghan veterans come to Afghanistan, they are greeted as friends. And what did the Americans leave behind? People who were deceived by them, who died falling off the landing gear of planes flying out of Kabul.
— Please tell us in more detail how the preparations for the withdrawal and the withdrawal of troops took place? How difficult was it to carry out the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan from a technical and tactical point of view?
— The Americans did everything to ensure that the withdrawal either did not take place, or if it did, it would be with huge losses for us. We were preparing seriously, we involved everything that was possible: both space and other types of intelligence that existed at that time. We knew everything about every kilometer of Afghanistan's territory.
The withdrawal of troops was carried out in two directions: western — along the Iranian border and central — through the south, southwest to Kabul, through Salang to Termez and to Kushka. We have established and maintained contacts with all the leaders of the Alliance of Seven. We had the most powerful agents among them. We corresponded and met personally with many people. Eventually, completing preparations for the start of withdrawal, letters were sent to everyone with my signature, since officially I was the commander of the 40th army - the representative of the USSR government for Afghanistan, all agreements went through me. Everyone was warned, including in writing. Moreover, we sent letters to those who supported them in Pakistan. The withdrawal was almost lossless, although it was very difficult.
— It is known that an agreement was reached with field commander Masoud that he would let a column of Soviet troops pass through the Salang pass without a fight. How was the agreement reached? What was your relationship with Ahmad Shah? Have you met him? How do you remember him?
— He was a decent man, despite the fact that he was one of our main opponents. Ahmad Shah Masood understood everything perfectly. The people who lived in the Panjshir gorge loved him very much. Masood was a very obliging man. If he made a promise, then you could be 100% sure that he would keep it.
I met with him once before the withdrawal of troops. It was in May 1988. Before that, we wrote letters to each other, passed them through scouts. We discussed everything, sorted out all the problems, and organized interaction so that something unforeseen would not happen. We had passwords, in addition, we encoded the communication so that someone else could not speak on behalf of Ahmad Shah.
The last time we agreed on a place, it was not far from the location of the 177th regiment, in front of the entrance to the foothills, where the mountainous part of the road to Salang begins. The road to Panjshir went to the right, and the main road went straight: Kabul — Salang—Turgundi pass. We met at the junction of two roads without guards. We talked for about five minutes and confirmed the arrangements. After that, we often corresponded.
— What were your first thoughts and words when the withdrawal of troops ended?
— I said something like this to myself: "Thank God that everything is over." I didn't have the strength to speak. There were also words that were better not to say.
— Did you have any desire to go to Afghanistan? Have you been there since the withdrawal?
— There was no such desire, although the Afghans often invited me. I think the five and a half years I have spent in this country is enough.
— Is it possible in principle that Afghanistan will cease to be a hotbed of instability, drug threat and terrorist danger? Will peace ever be established in this territory? How can this be achieved?
— There are so many hot spots in different parts of the world right now that Afghanistan seems to be in their shadow. How will the situation develop in this state? It is difficult to predict. If external forces stop trying to get into Afghanistan with their wishes, then, in my opinion, the Afghans will fix their lives on their own. They are an ancient and wise people, they have the power to make their country quite normal.
— How do you assess the current situation in the world? Are there any fears that a new big war will start in the foreseeable future?
— The situation is extremely alarming and tense. Dozens of countries are involved in the confrontation. Geopolitics is changing before our eyes. As for a global war, its probability exists, of course. But I hope our, let's say, opponents understand that there will be no winners in it.
— How, in your opinion, will the special operation in Ukraine end? How long will it take for this conflict to end?
— I won't guess the time. I would like to emphasize that our military is doing well, acting courageously and confidently. There is no doubt about one thing — it will end with our victory.
— Is there any story that has sunk into your soul the most during the Afghan campaign or in your entire biography that your grandchildren should know?
— Last November I turned 80 years old, so I have not only grandchildren, but also great-grandchildren. For them and for everyone who knows me, I wrote and published a book not so long ago, which I called "Three Lives of One Person." It contains a lot of my memories, reflections and, of course, stories. I hope they don't get bored reading it.