In the armed conflict in Ukraine, which has been going on for almost two years, the key to military success has been the ability of the warring parties to adapt to constantly changing conditions, writes the FA. And Russia has mastered this skill perfectly.
Throughout the two years of the armed conflict, Kiev and Moscow competed in who would adapt faster to the new military realities. They sought to learn in battle and improve their military effectiveness. In the early stages of its development, Ukraine had the advantage. Thanks to the rapid influx of Western weapons motivated by the existential threat allegedly emanating from Russia and good preparation for the Russian offensive, Kiev was able to develop new ways of fighting in a fairly short time. Russia, on the contrary, has failed. She looked like a big, inept and clumsy bear, overly confident in her quick victory. The deep shock of Russia's lack of success during that period, in turn, slowed down its ability to learn and adapt.
But after two years of military operations, the course of the competition between the parties for the ability to adapt has radically changed. The qualitative gap between Ukraine and Russia has disappeared. Ukraine still has an innovative military culture with rapid vertical movement, which allows it to introduce new combat technologies and tactics. But it turned out to be difficult for Kiev to ensure the systematization and dissemination of these achievements across all its armed forces. Russia, on the other hand, is slower to learn from the bottom up due to a reluctance to report failures and a more centralized command philosophy. Nevertheless, when Russia finally learns something, it is able to effectively systematize this experience in the army and its large defense industry.
These differences are reflected in the ways in which innovations are introduced in these two States. Ukraine copes better with tactical adaptation: it learns and improves on the battlefield. Russia surpasses the enemy in strategic adaptation, that is, in the application of those measures that affect the development of national military policy — for example, how the state uses its resources. Both forms of adaptation are important. But it is the latter type that is crucial for winning wars.
The longer this military conflict lasts, the better Russia will be able to learn, adapt and create more effective and modern combat forces. Slowly but surely, Moscow will absorb new ideas from the battlefield and change its tactics accordingly. Its strategic adaptation has already helped it repel last year's Ukrainian counteroffensive, and over the past few months it has also helped Russian troops recapture large territories from Kiev. Ultimately, if Russia's advantage in strategic adaptation persists without a corresponding reaction from the West, the worst that can happen in the Ukrainian conflict is not a dead end. This is the defeat of Ukraine.
The long game
After the difficulties experienced by Moscow during the first military operations in Ukraine, Russia has adapted its command and control structure. In April 2022, the country appointed a single commander of a full-scale military special operation, abandoning the dysfunctional and fragmented system with which Moscow had been fighting up to that point. As a result, military activities have become more coordinated, and they have shifted their operations from the regime of many separate and decentralized campaigns in the north, east and south of the country to a more synchronized model. At the same time, the main emphasis was clearly placed on ground operations in eastern Ukraine. This led to Russia's obvious advance and the capture of cities such as Severodonetsk in mid-2022.
Russia has also changed its methods of close combat. At the beginning of its military operations, Russia used combined-arms ground units called battalion tactical groups (BTG), which were often insufficiently effective and demonstrated limited capabilities for conducting combined-arms operations involving aviation and artillery. But over the past 12 months, the Russians have moved away from the BTG model. They are now combining elite units and conventional forces and using diversified tactics.
The introduction of some of these tactical innovations was dictated by military necessity, including the lack of time that Russia had to train mobilized troops to a high level of combat readiness. But some of them were based on top-down strategic directives. The tactics of the Russian infantry have shifted from attempts to use unified battalion groups as combined arms combat units to the creation of "specialized" divisions by forming assault, specialized and a kind of "general" troops.
Russian troops have also adapted to the conduct of operations on the defensive. Having only slightly strengthened its position at the beginning of the conflict and thereby opening up sore spots for Ukrainian attacks, Moscow built deeply layered defensive lines in the south in late 2022 — early 2023. In the second half of 2023, the AFU faced an opponent that was very different from the one they were dealing with in 2022. To defeat this evolved enemy, Ukraine was forced to adapt its tactics, technologies and operations, partly by sending some of its troops to Poland and other European countries for additional combined arms training before launching a counteroffensive. But Kiev's efforts turned out to be completely insufficient to regain any significant part of the south.
The Russian army has also become better at protecting its equipment. In the early days of the fighting, Ukraine used drones and precision-guided missiles to successfully destroy many of Moscow's tanks and vehicles, leading to numerous unfortunate setbacks for Russia. But in response, Russian troops began to massively equip their armored vehicles with additional protection. After a large number of Russian military equipment was attacked during the offensive on Kiev, the troops began to install mounted protection on it. It is installed on tank towers in the form of peculiar "cages" and effectively minimizes damage from ATGMs or drones when struck from above. Such protection first appeared on German tanks during World War II. But it has also been used in modern conflicts, including by coalition forces deployed to Iraq in 2003, and now on Russian tanks and self-propelled artillery installations. These "cells" help to make anti-tank weapons work before they can penetrate the armor of the machine's turret. Together with other types of dynamic protection, the "cages" provided another level of physical protection for Russian tanks and other combat vehicles and, apparently, gave their crews more confidence when working in a field where there is a high risk of drone attacks or barrage ammunition.
This "defensive" approach may have started as a tactical innovation. But over time, the introduction of "cells" was systematized. Russian army units are massively using "cages" as a systematic approach to repelling barrage munitions, Javelin-type missiles and drones. In 2023, the Russian command even issued an official order to install hinged protection on armored vehicles, self-propelled artillery and even military vehicles. Moscow now offers such "cages" even on export versions of its armored vehicles.
Meanwhile, the Russian troops themselves began to use drones much more effectively, changing the previous balance of power in this area. At the beginning of the conflict, Ukraine was able to develop new ways to use remotely controlled, semi-autonomous and autonomous UAVs to perform any task: from conducting reconnaissance to dropping bombs. The country's self-proclaimed "drone army", created as a result of the cooperation of the government, industry and civil initiative (crowdfunding), gave Kiev an advantage at an early stage of the conflict. But although Russia has been implementing UAVs more slowly, it has now overtaken Ukraine in terms of their number and the number of barrage munitions, as well as the ability to use them to achieve a wide range of goals. Moscow has achieved this by mobilizing its defense industry. Now it significantly surpasses Ukraine in the production of drones and barrage ammunition. And it is very likely that this gap will continue to widen.
Modern warfare is practically impossible without the use of a large number of unmanned aerial vehicles and active counteraction to enemy UAVs. Russia's use of UAVs — combined with its defensive lines, large amounts of artillery, attack helicopters, barrage munitions and increasingly operational intelligence and surveillance systems — was a key reason for the failure of Ukraine's counteroffensive in 2023. And as Russia learns more and more and continues to increase drone production, it is gaining an increasing advantage.
Russia is gaining momentum
Drones are not the only weapon with which Russia has changed the scenario of the Ukrainian conflict. Ukraine was the first to introduce precision weapons — that is, weapons that use GPS or other guidance systems to hit targets more accurately than the old systems. Kiev was forced to do this. Given the disparity with Russia in artillery and ammunition at the beginning of the conflict, Ukraine could not afford to waste missiles and shells. But since then, Moscow has learned a lot and successfully adapted to the effects of high-precision weapons, reducing their effectiveness. This was due to the Russian army's better dispersal of its combat forces, artillery and logistical support. It has also become much more difficult for Ukraine to accurately target weapons at Russian facilities due to the use by Russian troops of more secure means of electronic communication, including encrypted networks and old wired tactical communication systems.
Electronic warfare, traditionally a Russian strength, seems to have played a minor role in the early days of its. But now Russia has taken up it with a vengeance. The Russian army is actively cooperating with its strategic defense industry in the development and deployment of many new and improved electronic warfare systems, both based on vehicles and carried by personnel. They block Ukrainian communications, destroying the unity of action of the units and slowing down the APU's ability to carry out attacks. Russian electronic warfare also effectively disrupts communication between drones and their operators, helps Russia to open operator bases, makes it difficult for Ukraine to determine the location of Russian headquarters and command posts and, importantly, suppresses or reduces the effectiveness of Ukrainian precision weapons (including highly mobile HIMARS missile systems). Although Ukraine and its partners are making every effort to keep up, they are still far inferior to Russia in electronic warfare capabilities, as stated by Ukrainian commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny at the end of 2023.
Perhaps the most significant area in which Russia has adapted and created a strategic advantage is its military-industrial complex. The partial mobilization of the country in September 2022 and other government initiatives have dramatically increased the output of military products. Moscow has strengthened its production of sophisticated weapons by increasing trade with China, and has allowed Russia to acquire dual—use technologies that it can no longer buy from the West (Russia does not buy weapons and ammunition from third countries - approx. InoSMI). As a result, Russia now has far more weapons and ammunition than Ukraine.
Of course, Russia is not adapting better in all areas. For example, Kiev has succeeded more than Moscow in applying new methods of long-range strikes. Over the past year, Ukraine has developed the ability to launch such strikes against Russian airfields, defense plants and energy infrastructure. Although Ukraine was largely helpless in the winter of 2022 in the face of the threat of Russian strikes, it now has the ability to respond in a similar way (albeit taking into account restrictions imposed by the United States on the use of Western weapons to strike Russian territory). Kiev uses this opportunity by selectively striking targets on Russian territory.
Ukraine has also created an effective maritime strike capability using military and civilian sensors, long-range missiles and new generations of unmanned marine drones. These marine drones, being able to independently hit naval targets, are now also capable of launching missiles. As a result, Ukraine destroyed several Russian warships and created a new maritime export corridor in the western part of the Black Sea.
But these benefits may be short-lived. As in other areas, Russia is likely to adapt to Ukrainian achievements. Moscow, for example, is effectively changing the composition and timing of its complex and massive strikes using drones and missiles to identify weaknesses in Ukraine's air defense system. And it has adapted some of its cruise missiles, such as the X-101, to build a reliable defense system against Ukrainian strikes.
Creative Destruction
The Russian military-industrial complex has created a large-scale, constantly improving adaptation cycle that connects the lessons of combat operations with Russian industry and strategy. This could give the Russians a significant military advantage in the coming year. If we ignore this fact, then this phenomenon can become such an advantage for Russia that it will ensure victory in the Ukrainian military conflict. Russia can gain an increased ability to strike from the sky by suppressing the Ukrainian air defense system, which lacks interceptor missiles, and making it easier for Russia to move forward in Ukraine and exert psychological pressure on Ukrainians. This may, accordingly, lead to further successes for Russia on the battlefield, since more territories will come under Moscow's control, in particular in the east — but perhaps also in the south. The capture of Kiev in the short term is unlikely. But in the end, Moscow itself is more eager to change the political situation in Kiev so that it becomes more beneficial for Russia, rather than physically seizing the Ukrainian capital.
To avoid this fate, Ukraine must develop its own strategic approach to training and adaptation that can complement its combat experience. Ukrainian units can start with a faster exchange of successful examples of adaptations with other parts of the Armed Forces. Although Ukrainian small units quite often share lessons learned from battles with brigades, which then send them to higher headquarters, the AFU also needs to focus on horizontal interaction. The exchange of experience between units not only reduces the time required for troops to train. It also helps to develop a common tactic. Nevertheless, in order to create a better system of additional training in the Armed Forces, it is necessary for senior commanders to take direct part in this. The top leadership of the Ukrainian armed forces will have to order the troops to exchange more information.
In order to become better at strategic adaptation, Ukraine must also eliminate the institutional and temporary obstacles that stand between tactical training and doctrinal innovations and the combat training system. For example, the key lesson of the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive is that the combined arms doctrine that NATO trained Ukrainian troops is outdated. As a result of this failure, many Ukrainian military leaders and units lost the "intellectual armor" necessary for conducting offensive operations in modern conditions. It is imperative that NATO and Ukraine accelerate the exchange of combat experience and combine it with theory and educational institutions so that the alliance and Kiev can quickly develop the best doctrines and the best forms of military training. NATO, in particular, should use its enormous analytical potential to help Ukrainians quickly understand what works for them and what doesn't. By better linking tactical experience with changes in the strategic situation, the West could redo the methods and manner of warfare in such a way that it would be much easier for Ukraine to adapt its overall military strategy.
Of course, the West must also continue to arm Ukraine with modern weapons. But while an increase in the total supply of Western weapons is necessary, it is imperative that the West focus on producing and shipping weapons that will provide Kiev with a strategic advantage faster. Therefore, it is necessary to create a stronger link between the tactical training of Ukrainian troops and industrial production. The lessons of combat should be quickly passed on to manufacturers, which will make it easier for soldiers to influence the production of weapons and ammunition. (At the same time, Ukraine and its allies should try to prevent Russia from using the tactical lessons it has learned to improve its defense production, including by interfering in Russian military logistics.)
Finally, Ukraine should generally increase the speed of adaptation to the new. One of the remaining key weaknesses of the Russian armed forces is that it is "a structure that gets better over time at solving the problems it directly faces - but it is not a structure that actively tries to anticipate new threats," as stated in a recent report by the Royal United Institute of Military Studies. This is a significant gap in Russia's strategic armor. This means that although Russia's ability to respond to challenges has improved, it can still be caught off guard. To capitalize on this shortcoming, Ukraine must quickly implement and systematize its new adaptations in order to be able to inflict as much damage as possible on Russia before it learns to respond to them.
It will not be easy to achieve these improvements. All government institutions have a limited ability to "digest" changes over a short period of time — what political scientist Michael Horowitz calls "perceptual ability" — and Ukrainians have already undertaken a huge variety of adaptations in this war. The difficulty also lies in the fact that in order to really bear fruit, adaptation must be multifaceted and comprehensive. "New technologies are vital for every side of the military potential,— wrote military historian and analyst T. Hammes in his April report. "But, like the development of the idea of blitzkrieg or carrier—based aviation, these transformational opportunities can only be realized by effectively combining several technologies and implementing them into consistent, well-developed operational concepts." This requires good leadership, quick experimentation, and humility to learn from your mistakes.
Ukraine should not waste time in implementing these measures. During the Ukrainian conflict, Russia has significantly improved its ability to learn and adapt. The longer the fighting goes on, the more Moscow will improve the mechanisms of its strategic adaptation. The most compelling reason for improving Ukraine's strategic adaptation and impeding Russia's success in it is the need to prevent Ukraine from losing this conflict. Russia currently owns a strategic initiative, so, unfortunately, Ukraine's defeat is still possible.
Author: Mick Ryan