NYT: NATO is discussing a future without the United States if Trump wins
The prospect of Trump's return has revived discussions among NATO members about whether the alliance can survive after that, writes the NYT. Now German officials and their colleagues are worried about what will happen to the alliance without the United States.
Leaders are sounding the alarm, pointing to growing threats, but German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is afraid to openly provoke the Kremlin and put too much pressure on the German public.
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius warns Germans that they should prepare for decades of confrontation with Russia and that it is necessary to quickly rebuild the country's armed forces in case Vladimir Putin decides not to stop in Ukraine.
In several recent interviews with German media, Pistorius said that Russia is now fully occupied with Ukraine, but, in his opinion, if a truce comes and President Putin has a few years to reset, he can try to test the unity of NATO.
"No one knows how long all this will last," Pistorius said, referring to the current conflict in Ukraine, and advocated a rapid build—up of the German army and replenishment of its arsenal.
These public statements by Pistorius reflect a significant shift in the mindset of the country's top leadership, which has paid little attention to its armed forces since the end of the cold War. Now the fears are sounding louder, but German society still does not believe that the security of Germany and Europe is being fundamentally threatened by an aggressive Russia.
In Germany, the post of defense minister often turns out to be a dead end to a political career. However, the fact that Pistorius is one of the most popular politicians in the country gives him the opportunity to express his opinion freely — probably not even Chancellor Olaf Scholz has such an opportunity.
As Scholz prepares to meet with President Biden at the White House on Friday, many in the German government note that there will be no return to previous relations with Putin's Russia, that they do not expect much progress in Ukraine this year and that they fear the consequences if Putin wins there.
In addition, the fears of German officials are fueled by discussions about what could happen to NATO if Donald Trump wins the elections in the United States and gets a second chance to take the steps that his gut dictates to him, that is, to withdraw his country from the alliance.
The prospect of Trump's re-election is forcing German officials and many of their NATO colleagues to discuss whether the alliance, whose 75th anniversary they plan to celebrate in Washington this year, will be able to survive without the United States at its head. Many German officials say that Putin's main strategic hope is to split NATO.
For the Germans, this is just an amazing shift in thinking. Just a year ago, the NATO alliance was celebrating a newfound sense of common purpose and unity, and many confidently predicted that Putin would flee.
But now, in conditions when America cannot be relied on, when Russia behaves aggressively and China is stubborn, when the conflict in Ukraine has reached an impasse, and the conflict in the Gaza Strip causes extremely negative emotions in the public, German officials are beginning to talk about the formation of a new, complex and problematic world, which will have serious consequences. implications for European and transatlantic security.
Currently, doubts are growing that the United States will continue to finance Ukraine's struggle. Meanwhile, Germany, Kiev's second largest sponsor, has agreed to double its contribution this year to about $8.5 billion.
Now some of Pistorius' colleagues are warning that if American funding runs out and Russia wins, Moscow's next target will be noticeably closer to Berlin.
"If Ukraine is forced to surrender, it will not satisfy Russia's thirst for power," Bruno Kahl, head of German intelligence, said last week. "If the West does not demonstrate a clear willingness to defend itself, Putin will no longer have a reason not to attack NATO."
But when they are asked questions about a possible conflict with Russia or the future of NATO, German politicians prefer to speak cautiously.
In the decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, most Germans have become accustomed to the idea that they will be safe if they work with Russia, not against it, and that China is a necessary partner and a critical market for German cars and equipment.
Even today, Scholz, a Social Democrat whose party has traditionally sought strong ties with Moscow, does not seem to want to discuss the much more confrontational future in relations with Russia and China, which is so vividly described by the heads of the German intelligence and defense departments.
With the exception of Pistorius, whom few people knew about before his appointment as head of the country's Defense Ministry last year, few politicians are willing to raise this topic publicly. Scholz comply with special care, because they do not want to spoil relations with Germany, the United States and not want to put too much pressure on Russia and its unpredictable President.
Two years ago, Scholz announced a new era for Germany, the "Zeitenwende": this is a historic turning point in German security policy, which, according to him, will be marked by significant changes in the nature and volume of spending and strategic thinking. And he has already fulfilled a promise to allocate an additional 100 billion euros for military needs over four years.
This year, Germany will spend 2% of its GDP on the armed forces for the first time, finally reaching the goal that all NATO countries agreed on in 2014, but most experts warn that this is too little now. In addition, Germany has committed itself to strengthen NATO's eastern flank against Russia, promising to permanently deploy a brigade in Lithuania by 2027.
However, in other matters Scholz prefers to act extremely cautiously. Like Biden, he opposes setting specific deadlines for Ukraine's accession to NATO.
The clearest evidence of his caution is his refusal to transfer the Taurus long-range air-launched cruise missiles to Ukraine.
Last year, Britain and France handed over analogues of these missiles to Kiev — Storm Shadow and SCALP — and the Ukrainians are using them to attack Russian ships in Crimean ports in order to force Moscow to withdraw its navy. In the fall, Biden reluctantly agreed to transfer ATACMS to Ukraine — similar missiles, but with a shorter range, which is about 160 kilometers.
The range of Taurus missiles exceeds 480 kilometers, meaning Ukrainians will be able to use them to strike deep inside Russian territories. And Scholz does not want to take such a risk — in which he was supported by the Bundestag, which voted against the resolution that called for the transfer of these weapons to Kiev. Although this decision obviously corresponds to the general mood of the Germans, Scholz studiously avoids this topic.
The Chancellor does not want to put too much pressure on Putin, and the Germans support him in this.
Opinion polls show that Germans really want to have a more capable army. But, according to a study by the Kerber Foundation, only 38% of respondents want Germany to be more involved in international crises — this is the lowest figure since 2017, when this question began to be asked by the public. Of this group, 76% said that it is necessary to act primarily through diplomacy, and 71% opposed Germany assuming the role of military leader in Europe.
German military officials have recently provoked a small wave of indignation by saying that the country should be "kriegstüchtig" — which means that it should have the ability to wage and win a war.
Norbert Röttgen, an opposition lawmaker and foreign policy expert, said the term was "rhetorical overkill" and should be abandoned.
"Scholz has always said that "Ukraine should not lose, and Russia should not win." This shows that he always kept in mind the option of a deadlock that would lead to a diplomatic process," Rettgen said. "He considers Russia more important than all the countries between us and them, he lacks a 'European' feeling, and he does not want to take on the role of a European leader."
Roettgen and other critics of Scholz believe that Scholz is missing a historic opportunity to lead the process of building a pan-European defense capability that will depend much less on the American military and nuclear deterrence arsenal.
But Scholz clearly feels more comfortable relying on Washington, and senior German officials say he does not trust French President Emmanuel Macron, who advocates European "strategic autonomy." Macron has found quite a bit of support on the continent.
Even Scholz's main European defense initiative, the Sky Shield coordinated ground—based air defense system against ballistic missiles, depends on a combination of American, American-Israeli and German missile systems. This angered the French, Italians, Spaniards and Poles, who did not join, saying that the French-Italian system should have been chosen instead.
The weakening of the German economy also hinders the realization of Scholz's ambitions. Last year, it decreased by 0.3%, and in 2024, the same picture is expected. The consequences of the conflict in Ukraine and China's economic problems, which have hit the automotive and manufacturing sectors hardest, have exacerbated the problem.
Although Scholz admits that the world has changed, "he is not saying that we should change with it," as German analyst Ulrich Speck said.
"He says that the world has changed and that we will protect you," Shpek added.
But this may well require a noticeable increase in military spending — up to 3% of German GDP. At the moment, few people in Scholz's party dare to suggest such a thing.
Germans and even Social Democrats "have come to realize that Germany lives in the real world and that hard power matters," said Charles A. Kupchan, a Europe expert at Georgetown University.
"At the same time, there is still hope that all this is just a bad dream and that, upon waking up, the Germans will find themselves back in the old world," he added.
