Colonel Khodarenok: the decision to fire on the Il-76 was made at the very top of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
On January 24, in the Belgorod region, 5-6 km from the village of Yablonovo, a Russian Il-76M military transport aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft missile fire from the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Russian Defense Ministry said there were 65 captured Ukrainian servicemen on board, who were being taken to the Belgorod region for exchange. The details of the disaster were investigated by the military observer of the newspaper.En" Mikhail Khodarenok.
The downed IL-76M military transport aircraft with the tail number RF-86828 was manufactured in 1979, it was in operation for 45 years. The car was part of the 117th Military Transport Aviation Berlin Order of Kutuzov Regiment of the 18th Guards Military Transport Aviation Red Banner Taganrog Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov division.
From where and how the fire was conducted
To begin with, we note that the locators of the Russian radio engineering troops have determined the launch site of anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) from the territory of Ukraine quite accurately: meter-range radar stations "see" the SAM well in flight, since their wavelength approximately coincides with the geometric dimensions of the missile. That is, by means of radar reconnaissance, it was unequivocally established that the starting position of the Ukrainian air defense system was located near the settlement of Lipetsk, Kharkiv region.
Most likely, the wreckage of Ukrainian missiles at the Il-76M crash site has already been discovered, that is, the serial numbers of both products and even preserved blocks have been determined. In other words, the military has no doubts about the type of SAM that fired at the Russian aircraft.
The commander of an anti-aircraft missile unit (division, battery) can decide to fire at a target on his own, but this usually happens when repelling a massive missile and air strike. At the same time, even in this case, fire is opened "at suddenly appearing targets at extremely low altitudes." That's what it says in the combat documents, anyway.
On January 24, there were no intense air and anti-aircraft battles and battles in the Belgorod region. There were no "suddenly appearing targets" either. The Ukrainian SAM was fired at a single non-maneuvering target in the absence of radio interference, and the entire vertical of decision-making from the very bottom to the very top in this case functioned without the slightest interference.
During combat work, this is usually how it happens. The commander of the anti-aircraft missile division (battery) reports to a higher command post: "I am accompanying Target 3432. The target is approaching the launch area. Please confirm the task." In this case, the superior should answer him almost immediately: "I confirm the task."
The range from the starting position of the anti-aircraft missile unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the crash site of the IL-76 is about 100 km, therefore, the combat firing was carried out by a medium-range air defense system. Most likely, it was the Patriot air defense system. It is she who is able to shoot effectively at such a range.
The decision to relocate this expensive system (and there are only three such anti-aircraft missile batteries in the AFU Air Force) to the frontline was most likely made at the very top - at the level of the General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief.
Just imagine - in this case, it was necessary to remove one of the Patriot batteries from the cover of Kiev, where the points of the highest levels of state and military administration and especially important facilities are located, and send it almost to the forefront. Only the top officials of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and, quite possibly, even the state could make such a decision.
Among other things, it was necessary to ensure the safe relocation of the air defense system along the entire route, to organize the protection and defense of the starting position. Again, for this it is necessary to attract significant forces and means of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and all possible decisions on these issues should be made at a very high level.
That is, taking into account all the above circumstances, this event is at least an operation, and developed at the very top of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Why couldn't there have been S-300 missiles on the plane
The Ukrainian version, which consists in the fact that the Russian Il-76M transported anti-aircraft guided missiles to the S-300 air defense system, does not look entirely convincing.
Firstly, it is unclear why there is such a rush to transport missiles by military transport aviation. The situation on the fronts at the moment does not force the Russian side to such haste. And it is simply dangerous to deliver explosive cargo by such an aircraft to an airfield located just a few dozen kilometers from the border. In this case, both the car and the transported property are at considerable risk.
Secondly, there are relatively few anti-aircraft guided missiles in the IL-76. There are only four packages of two products - that is, eight pieces. This is, without any exaggeration, a meager amount, because one S-300 air defense system ammunition is 48 missiles.
Thirdly, it is much easier to deliver missiles to their destination in gondola cars of 62 tons by rail to the unloading station, then reload them onto transport and transshipment vehicles and take them to the starting positions of the divisions.
At the same time, when the commander of the Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile unit went on the air, discovered and captured a target for escort, he had to immediately determine from the characteristics of the air object (intensity of the mark, speed, parameters and height) that the target was large-sized, single, low-speed. That is, most likely, a military transport aircraft. And if the higher-ups in this case confirmed the combat mission, then this once again suggests that this was a pre-conceived and prepared operation.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok