Colonel Khodarenok: it makes no sense for the Ukrainian military to copy the "Surovikin line"
The Armed Forces of Ukraine have begun to build their own "Surovikin line" against the background of possible offensive operations by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, The Telegraph newspaper wrote. What is the line of defensive structures, with which Russia thwarted the counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and whether the Ukrainian military will be able to copy it, the military observer of the Gazeta figured out.En" Mikhail Khodarenok.
After the failure of its summer offensive, the military and political leadership of Ukraine decided to switch to strategic defense for the period of the 2024 winter campaign (and this looks minimal in terms of timing). The decision was made far from yesterday, but much earlier, in the late autumn of 2023 (at the end of November, to be more precise). So The Telegraph newspaper turned to this topic with great delay.
The transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to strategic defense is due to the fact that the Ukrainian army no longer has the forces and means to continue offensive operations on an operational and operational-strategic scale, and the West will be able to provide possible assistance in terms of significant supplies of weapons, military equipment, and materiel at best not earlier than the spring of 2024 (most likely, this the assumption is too optimistic).
In such circumstances, the transition to strategic defense seems to be the only right decision for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. That is, the military-political leadership in Kiev has finally decided on the operational directions and areas on which the main efforts of the Ukrainian army will focus. It also gave instructions to the troops on the construction of strategic defense in the theater of operations, including a system of prepared defensive lines and groups of troops being created.
What is the "Surovikin line"?
According to The Telegraph, the Ukrainian military is now copying the Russian system of defensive structures, called the Surovikin Line. Such statements are not entirely true.
The "Surovikin Line" is a network of trenches, minefields, barbed wire and firing positions that were erected by Russian troops to repel the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, when Army General Sergei Surovikin was the commander of the Combined Group of Troops.
Since many things in such messages frankly resemble either "soft-boiled boots" or "forty barrels of prisoners", it is advisable to start with the established terminology.
From the point of view of the engineering troops, it is more correct to say that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have begun to fortify the defense lines and create a system of engineering barriers.
The fortification equipment of the defense lines includes the equipment of the support lines, the first and second defensive lines, corps defensive lines, cut-off lines, areas of concentration of second-echelon formations and combined arms reserves.
In this case, first of all, platoon and company strongpoints are equipped with the creation of trench systems and communication passages in them, artillery firing positions are being prepared.
Secondly, a system of trenches and communication passages for battalion defense areas is being equipped, cut-off lines and positions are being created.
In the future, the fortification equipment of the defensive lines is being improved, and a trench system is being created at the regimental defense sites.
The above-mentioned "minefields and barbed wire" refer to a system of engineering barriers. According to the nature of the impact on the enemy, engineering barriers are divided into mine-explosive, non-explosive, electrified, water and combined. However, the basis of the engineering barrier system is made up of mine-explosive barriers (they are erected using mines for various purposes and explosive charges).
Non-explosive barriers include not only barbed wire. In practice, NWZS are ditches, escarpments, gouges, hedgehogs, barriers, forest blockages, wire barriers (so correctly called "barbed wire"), electrified, water, combined barriers in combination with the mechanical destruction of bridges, dam gates, culverts on roads. And there is no doubt that the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is concentrating its efforts in this direction.
What do they want to build APU
According to The Telegraph, Ukraine will not create exactly the same defensive line as the Russian Armed Forces, since the Ukrainian army intends to conduct "active defense", that is, combine the protection of fortifications and offensive operations.
The phrase "active defense" refers more to the field of political science than to the statutory provisions. In this case, we should talk about "maneuverable defense". How much maneuverable defense is relevant for the Armed Forces of Ukraine today is a big question. It is a combination of organized waste and counter-attacks. This requires exceptionally disciplined parts and connections and flawlessly organized interaction. Therefore, in this case, it is much more expedient for the Ukrainian army to conduct defense in particularly important areas on the principle of "not a step back."
And in the event of an enemy's intrusion, the formations of the first echelon of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with fire of all kinds should stop the advance of the advancing troops into the depth and prevent the expansion of the breakthrough towards the flanks. Under favorable conditions, the second echelons can carry out decisive counterattacks to the flank of the advancing enemy and restore defense in certain directions. This is the only way "active defense" can look like for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in modern realities.
Now a few words about the "three-layer system of trenches, tank traps and strong points" (as The Telegraph writes about it). Here, frankly, "horses, people and volleys of a thousand guns were mixed up in a pile." From similar expressions (such as a "three-layer trench system") experts are frankly boiling their brains.
In this case, the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will simply take up the Manual on military engineering and will be strictly guided by it in their practical activities, strictly in accordance with the situation and the terrain.
Strategic defense and fortification equipment of the area is the only right solution for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this situation. However, the expectation by the Ukrainian army of large-scale supplies of weapons and materiel from the collective West may be delayed, and for a very long time. And it is not at all a fact that the Russian Armed Forces will passively observe the restoration of the offensive capabilities of the Ukrainian army in this situation.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok