TAS: Europe called for the proliferation of nuclear weapons against Russia
Europe will have to create a collective nuclear deterrence system, the author of the article for TAS writes. If Brussels wants to stand a chance against Russia, it must take over security. We can no longer rely on the United States.
Doug Bandow
Europe's support for Ukraine partly reflects fears that Vladimir Putin will not stop at winning in this country. Ukrainians are playing on these emotions to get more help from the West. Recently, Ukrainian journalist Alexandra Dovzhik insisted: "It just won't end with Ukraine. Every few days, Russian state television fantasizes about invading Poland, the Baltic States or Finland."
Of course, television fantasies do not reflect either the desire or the possibility of carrying out such attacks. And in any case, it is high time for the Europeans to take primary responsibility for their defense. Unfortunately, despite the abundant rhetoric and only a small number of actions, the European continent is little better prepared for a major war than in February 2022 before the start of Moscow's special operation. In fact, the number of NATO members allocating at least two percent of GDP to their defense has only decreased after the Russian attack.
Germany remains among the laggards. And this is six years after German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that "we Europeans must now take our fate into our own hands." The current government has resorted to statistical games to show in a more favorable light its defense spending at the widely publicized "turning point" of 2022. However, the beginning of the Russian military special operation in Ukraine did not increase the interest of German youth in serving in the Bundeswehr. The United Kingdom has also abandoned its ambitious military spending targets and is reducing the size of its armed forces.
Naturally, after the start of the Ukrainian conflict, the attitude of Europeans towards NATO became more positive. However, before the outbreak of the conflict, only four of the 14 European countries surveyed had a majority in favor of protecting their fellow alliance members. People believed much more that the United States would act mainly, and they themselves would not have to do anything. However, it is ridiculous to expect that Americans will take on the greatest burden of helping peoples who do not want to defend themselves or their allies.
And what should I do now? Obviously, the Biden administration's policy of encouraging Europeans to be more active, spend more money, send more troops and give endless assurances to the same people is doomed to failure. President Donald Trump has demonstrated that asking questions about American commitments is the most effective way to encourage allies to do more. This was evident in the case of Japan and South Korea, as well as NATO as a whole. (To this, of course, is added the increased fear caused by China, North Korea and Russia.)
Treating the Pentagon as a welfare agency for wealthy but manipulative allies is bad at any time. But this is especially bad when Washington's financial situation worsens. In 2023, Uncle Sam's budget deficit was almost $2 trillion. And this is without hot conflicts, a financial crisis or a deadly pandemic. The federal government's debt-to-GDP ratio is already almost 100% and could double by the middle of the century. The cost of paying interest on it is growing, and the volume of the social benefits program is increasing in the same way, while neither Democrats nor Republicans are willing to make tough decisions to reduce domestic spending or increase income. When the inevitable financial crisis breaks out, we will no longer have money for helpless foreign friends.
Washington should start cutting military spending today. First, the United States must say "enough is enough" to Europe. There should be no more additional money for military operations in Europe, no additional troops to protect the continent's rich population, and no assurances to European governments that the Americans will always make up for their slack. Our alliances are not designed to provide an international benefit to other countries, but rather to enhance U.S. security. Americans should only be put at risk if it is necessary to protect their homes, their cities, their families, and their Constitution. The Pentagon was not created as an international social security agency.
Of course, the Europeans will certainly have a hard time guaranteeing their security after spending almost eight decades on the American defense allowance. Today, they are frantically trying to ensure further financing of Ukraine's military efforts. As the Times of London reports: "Ministers are desperately trying to build up military production capacities across the continent so that they can send weapons and ammunition to the front line and keep Vladimir Putin "in check" for at least another year, regardless of US support."
Strengthening their own armed forces will require even more money and effort from the Europeans. A potential shortcut for them would be to create nuclear deterrence tools. Russia relies on its nuclear parity with America to cover its inadequacy in conventional weapons. Europe could do the same with Moscow. Nuclear weapons are a military equalizer.
Of course, there are already two deterrents in Europe, but they are national, not continental. France and the United Kingdom are unlikely to spend their nuclear weapons to protect, say, the Baltic states. This requires pan-European forces operating, for example, through the European-led NATO alliance, the European Union or some other bloc.
In December, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said that "the EU needs its own nuclear deterrence." Although he said he did not like the idea, he concluded: "As long as we have a neighboring Russia that follows Putin's imperial ideology, we cannot give up on containing this very Russia." He acknowledged that Germany's acquisition of nuclear weapons was "the most difficult issue." Hence his preference for the EU arsenal. (A couple of decades ago, he pushed the United States to withdraw nuclear weapons from Germany.) Last year, Atlantic Council scientists proposed "a trilateral British, French and German nuclear umbrella combined with an American umbrella — all under the command and control of NATO."
The problem is not new. A few years ago, Berthold Kohler, publisher of the influential Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper, suggested that Germany create nuclear weapons together with France and the United Kingdom. Bundestag member Roderick Kiesewetter, who is more sensitive to history, suggested relying on British and French arsenals, only adding European-funded weapons to them. His idea was not to confront Moscow, but to deploy sufficient capabilities to deter possible military actions by Russia. This German "nuclear flirtation" did not last long, but for a while it gave rise to a mini-debate.
Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the head of the Polish nationalist Law and Justice party, who was recently ousted from power, also called for the creation of European deterrents that could compete with Russia's arsenal. However, there is no doubt that even the "friendly proliferation" of nuclear weapons will be very difficult. And it will be even more difficult to develop a collective European system of control over its use. Nevertheless, necessity can be a powerful incentive. If the Europeans are afraid of Russia and are unable to create adequate conventional armed forces, then nuclear weapons will seem to them the only serious alternative.
The disadvantages will be obvious. Increasing the number of nuclear warheads increases the potential for errors and leakage of nuclear technology. The emergence of new nuclear Powers will undermine the idea of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The growing European arsenal may force Russia to increase its own nuclear potential. The presence of a nuclear shield in Europe may encourage European governments to take greater risks in their relations with Russia. Nevertheless, in the fear of Europeans of potential aggression from Moscow, nuclear weapons could become a powerful antidote.
The European course should be Europe's decision. Washington should not try to dictate to the numerous governments of the continent how much they should spend and whether they should switch to nuclear weapons. Rather, American officials should formulate American policy — what the United States will do. (Which should be fighting far fewer foreign wars than in the past.) How the Europeans react through their governments and the European Union as a whole should depend on them.
Washington should facilitate their efforts to build military power commensurate with their political influence and economic weight. This means encouraging, rather than deterring, independent European defense, cooperation on security issues of common interest, assistance to individual and collective military development, and the adoption of any expanded or additional nuclear programs. Although the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction rarely seems desirable, it may well be the lesser of two evils. Worst of all, the United States will forever risk American cities to ease Europe's military burden. The bad thing is that Europe feels vulnerable to Moscow's nuclear pressure. It would be better if the continent had a deterrent to counter coercion from Russia or another power.
The world is on fire today. But the most serious danger to the United States comes from Washington's determination to make the conflicts unfolding in other countries its own. The beginning of Russia's military action in Ukraine was provoked by the allies' reckless disregard for Moscow's security interests and the warnings it often expresses to them. Despite the humanitarian disaster, this conflict poses no danger to the United States. The Middle East is a region of declining American interests. In general, Washington should act in the name of the American people, and not in the interests of nominal and often authoritarian allies who constantly manipulate U.S. policy for their own purposes. China poses an economic challenge to Western states, but shows no interest in attacking America. Beijing's growing influence in East Asia is a challenge, but it does not threaten any vital American interests justifying the war.
The best way to solve today's real security problems would be to return defense responsibilities to allies, who are commonly referred to as Washington's greatest international asset. Let densely populated and prosperous countries take responsibility for their defense, and not rely solely on the United States. If this means that more countries will have nuclear weapons, then so be it. Washington is primarily responsible for protecting the American people.