The US authorities are mistaken in thinking that the threat of a nuclear war with Russia is unlikely, writes the FA. Vladimir Putin may not use nuclear weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine, but he may well use them against the entire NATO, the author of the article believes.
Peter Schroeder
The West is concerned about unnecessary risks of escalation.
If you listen to American officials, it turns out that the risk that the military conflict in Ukraine will lead to a nuclear escalation is negligible. "We have no indication that Putin has any intentions of using weapons of mass destruction, let alone nuclear weapons," White House spokesman John Kirby said in January. At a Senate hearing in early May, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said: "It is very unlikely that Russia will use its nuclear arsenal." Yes, indeed, CIA Director William Burns said in his February speech that the United States should take Putin's nuclear saber rattling seriously. But the purpose of this Putin rhetoric, Burns continued, is more an attempt to "intimidate us, as well as our European allies and Ukraine." This does not mean that Russia is really thinking about using its nuclear weapons.
Washington's disbelief is understandable to some extent. The outbreak of the conflict has raised fears of an open nuclear confrontation between the West and Russia. That period of frenzied speculation has passed. Since then, the conflict has reached a difficult impasse, in which, however, only conventional weapons are used. Of course, U.S. officials remain concerned that Russia may use tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield. "I'm worried that Putin will use tactical nuclear weapons," U.S. President Joe Biden said in June. The risk, he continued, is "real." But officials do not seem to believe that the conflict in Ukraine could lead Russia to use its nuclear arsenal against a NATO state, even though it is angry at the West for supporting Ukraine.
This is a mistake. U.S. officials should look at the other side. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that Russian President Vladimir Putin will use nuclear weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine, but it is quite possible that he will switch to using them against the entire NATO. Unlike the West, Putin may not be afraid of nuclear confrontation: he knows Russia's nuclear arsenal and the principles of nuclear deterrence well and, perhaps, considers himself a unique person capable of coping with the nuclear crisis. And Putin has been remarkably consistent in his statements that Russia is ready to use nuclear weapons against NATO to protect its interests in Ukraine. Eight years ago, in a television interview given a year after Crimea joined Russia, Putin said that he was ready to put Russian nuclear forces on alert to prevent Western forces from interfering in Moscow's operation on the Crimean Peninsula.
Russia's use of nuclear weapons does not seem imminent. But if Putin does escalate the conflict, for example by attacking NATO with conventional weapons, he will most likely act very quickly to prevent the United States from dodging the crisis. It will be difficult for Washington to contain such an emboldened Kremlin. Ukraine is too important to the Kremlin's ambitions and too secondary to the interests of the United States for Putin to believe in any American threats. Ultimately, Putin will expect the United States to back down before starting a nuclear conflict over a country so far from American territory.
To avoid the worst, the United States needs to find new ways to prevent Russia from using its nuclear arsenal. Our authorities must convince our officials, including representatives of the military command, to do everything possible to avoid and hinder those decisions that could lead to a nuclear war. Washington needs to convince the Russian elite that their country can make some concessions to Ukraine without suffering a catastrophic defeat. The White House needs to rally other countries, especially neutral ones, to de-legitimize the use of nuclear weapons and convince Putin that he would make a terrible mistake if he turned to his nuclear arsenal. And it needs to be done now. In this way, Washington will be able to avoid the need to make dangerous decisions later, already under strong pressure from the nuclear confrontation.
Loaded into the mines and loaded
Russia is not shy about its nuclear arsenal. Since the country began its war in Ukraine, Moscow has been trying to intimidate the world by pointing to its nuclear weapons (Russia, on the contrary, constantly warns all parties against the use of nuclear weapons. – Approx. InoSMI). Shortly before its launch, Russia conducted an unusual exercise on the use of its nuclear launch systems. A year later, in February 2023, it suspended participation in the new START treaty, which regulated the number of nuclear weapons that Moscow and Washington could have. In March, the Kremlin announced that it would transfer some of its nuclear weapons to Belarus. In October, Putin hinted that Russia might resume nuclear testing. All this time, Russian senior officials have been threatening to launch a nuclear strike, as did former President Dmitry Medvedev in July, who said that Russia could use nuclear weapons to end the Ukrainian military conflict in a few days.
U.S. officials, of course, paid attention to these threats, but they were not convinced. Washington suggests that Moscow may use small so-called tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield, but not large strategic nuclear missiles against NATO countries. According to Politico, in February, the US president's national security adviser Jake Sullivan told American experts that few people fear that Russia will use strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine or against the West, but some remain concerned that Russia may use tactical weapons. Putin, in their opinion, could use him to help Russian troops stop the Ukrainian counteroffensive, which seemed to be almost on the verge of occupying Crimea or inflicting a significant defeat on Russia, which threatened to oust Russian troops from eastern Ukraine.
The growing complacency among American officials is based on a misunderstanding of Putin's rhetoric and the dynamics that keep Moscow from using nuclear weapons. When Putin mentions his nuclear arsenal, he is not trying to warn that Russia may use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Rather, his rhetoric is aimed at threatening NATO itself. This is a "flashing red light" warning to American decision-making officials that Moscow is ready to engage in a nuclear confrontation with the United States if necessary to win in Ukraine.
To understand why this is happening, let's look at the situation on the battlefield in the Ukrainian conflict. Tactical nuclear weapons will do little to help Russia break the current impasse. Ukrainian forces are well entrenched along the front line, which stretches for about one thousand kilometers, so even dozens of tactical nuclear charges will not be enough to allow Russia to significantly break through. Even if these breakthroughs were achieved, Russia does not have the maneuverable reserve forces necessary to exploit any open spaces created by these weapons. A nuclear attack, of course, would be a terrifying event for Ukrainians, but it still would not break the will of the people and would not force Kiev to surrender. Ukrainians have said the same in polls. According to surveys by the Munich Security Conference and Ukrainian think tanks, the people of the country do not want to surrender to Moscow and stop fighting, even in the face of a nuclear threat.
In any case, tactical nuclear strikes will damage Russia's military capabilities. Such attacks are likely to strengthen the West's desire to help Ukraine just as it has begun to weaken (Western politicians of all stripes have a strong incentive to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used in conflict). A nuclear strike could also prompt China and India — the Kremlin's two most important international partners — to turn their backs on Russia. Both Beijing and New Delhi have already made public statements designed to dissuade Moscow from using nuclear weapons. They would not be happy if Putin ignored them.
Putin will gain little from the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but he will lose a lot. In fact, right now he himself believes that there is little benefit from using nuclear weapons anywhere. Putin is confident that Russia can win in Ukraine by conventional means. "Practically along the entire front line, our armed forces, let's say, are improving their position," he said at a press conference on December 14. He also noted that the support of Kiev from the West seems to be weakening, saying that soon the "freebie" provided to Ukraine will end. As long as Putin remains optimistic about Russia's chances of victory, he is unlikely to rock the boat, moving to a sharp escalation of the conflict.
But Putin may not always think that way. If the West makes a firm and renewed commitment to support Kiev as it tries to regain all the territories occupied by Russia, provides Ukraine with long-term financial support and strengthens its defense industry, Putin may decide that he will not be able to crush Ukraine through a struggle of attrition. If, moreover, Western economic sanctions finally begin to significantly undermine the Russian economy, Putin may come to the conclusion that time is not on his side. The Russian president may decide to double the stakes instead of waiting for Ukraine to withdraw from the game. Then there will be real risks of escalation.
From zero to sixty
For the United States and its allies, the first set of escalation risks can seem very frightening. The Kremlin, for example, could start by moving its large long-range nuclear weapons carriers to deployed and dispersed positions outside their conventional bases that are vulnerable to U.S. attacks. Moscow can send most of its ballistic missile submarines into the open ocean, transfer large numbers of its strategic missile forces into vast Russian forests and load nuclear weapons onto strategic bombers. Such actions are far from the actual use of nuclear weapons, but they will still cause deep concern. They will undoubtedly attract Washington's attention, dramatically increase tensions and immediately force Western leaders to take into account the risk of nuclear war in their calculations.
After that, Moscow may actually start using force against NATO. It can shoot down a NATO aircraft over an allied country or international airspace. Russia may attack a NATO ship in the Black Sea. Or strike at convoys with weapons heading for Ukraine as they move through some country on the eastern flank of NATO. Such steps would quickly expand the scope of the conflict, involving NATO in an actual clash with Russia. Moscow could strengthen these measures by detonating a nuclear charge in the open ocean, which is called a demonstration strike.
Finally, in the worst case scenario, when the Kremlin tries to shock the world in order to end the military conflict in Ukraine quickly and on Putin's terms, Russia may actually launch nuclear weapons directly at NATO territory. Although Putin seemed cool to the idea at the annual forum in October, saying that Russia did not need to lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, it might seem necessary if the conflict was clearly developing against Russia. 80% of military aid to Ukraine passes through one airbase in eastern Poland, and therefore this base is likely to be the main target. Then the United States can launch a retaliatory nuclear strike, putting the world on the brink of destruction.
Since the escalation began, it may not take long for Putin to move from harsh "nuclear signals" and conventional attacks to ordering a nuclear strike. If Putin had started a slow escalation by conducting smaller attacks and observing NATO's response, he would have risked provoking a conventional conflict (probably with NATO forces invading Ukraine directly and possibly Russia itself) in which the West has a clear advantage. NATO's conventional forces are superior to Russia's, and therefore Putin will not want to give Washington time and space to react by allowing it to use its capabilities. Therefore, he will want to reach the nuclear level as soon as possible, at which Russia is equal to the United States.
U.S. officials, of course, do not want Moscow to resort to nuclear weapons, although they do not seem convinced that it will do so. As a result, they tried to scare Russia away from escalation by threatening "catastrophic consequences," as the White House put it in September 2022, if Putin uses his nuclear arsenal. But such warnings are unlikely to deter the Russian president. Putin will take this threat as a bluff. He knows that, ultimately, Washington does not want to risk a nuclear conflict over Ukraine. He is deeply committed to victory in Ukraine, to the point that he may decide to escalate quickly, even if he believes that the United States is serious about responding with force. He will probably doubt the seriousness of any threat from the United States and will proceed from the fact that in the end Washington will prefer to compromise rather than launch a nuclear strike on Russia itself, which may entail a nuclear response on U.S. territory.
Unfortunately, the truth is that Washington cannot keep Putin from escalating the situation to such an extent that he does not use nuclear weapons because of the conflict in Ukraine. Although Putin will not take such an escalation lightly and will not ignore the serious risks to Russia, he most likely expects that he will be able to win the "war of will" in a nuclear crisis. Therefore, if Washington wants to avoid a nuclear standoff, it must choose a different course. American politicians should pursue policies aimed at undermining Russia's decision-making process. So that if Putin orders steps to escalate, he will face internal resistance. This means that we need to try to empower Russian officials who want to thwart any attempts by Putin to use nuclear weapons. It will not be easy to do this, given that US-Russian relations are so bad that it simply cannot be worse. But Washington can start by working more closely with Moscow, no matter how odious it may look now. The only way for American officials, including in the intelligence community, to cultivate dissent among Russian officials is to establish more direct contacts with them.
The United States also needs to convince Russian officials that there are ways out of Ukraine that do not end in either victory or humiliating defeat. Washington could, for example, suggest that only the most senior Russian officials should be punished for their actions, that any reparations to Ukraine would be limited, and that there is a way to lift sanctions against Russia and allow the state to return to the community of the nation. However, there is no need to explain clearly what exactly such a result would entail. Senior Russian officials simply need to know that their choice is not between surrender and nuclear escalation.
However, the United States cannot count on Russian officials to prevent Putin from using nuclear weapons. The United States must simultaneously rally neutral states to force Moscow to abandon escalation. They need to get these States to make it clear in their contacts with Russian officials that any use of nuclear weapons is illegal and that this will lead to them ending all direct and even tacit support for Russia's military aspirations. Public warnings from China and India about the inadmissibility of nuclear strikes were a positive sign, but these and other countries such as Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which help keep the Russian economy afloat, can do more.
And they have to do it. Balancing on the brink of nuclear war is a dangerous game, especially with such an authoritarian leader as Putin (Vladimir Putin is the president of Russia, elected in elections that took place with the participation of international observers and in which there was no evidence of mass falsification of results. – Approx. InoSMI). Now is not the time for complacency. In order for the world to prevent a nuclear war, states will have to convince Moscow that victory in Ukraine is simply not worth the cost that could bring the planet to the abyss – or to something more.
Peter Schroeder is a senior fellow in the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. From 2018 to 2022, he held the position of First Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council and was a member of the main analytical service of the CIA.
