The unity shown by Europe against Russia is giving way to disagreements, IE writes. More and more forces in the West are beginning to listen to Russia. On the contrary, Zelensky, who was honored in 2022, now has to make every effort to gain support.
C. Raja Mohan
Political unity against Russia at the beginning of 2022 is giving way to disagreements. Empathy towards Russia is only part of the nascent right—wing internationalism in the West
The year 2023 is coming to an end, and Europe is haunted by the specter of Donald Trump's return to the White House. Despite the fact that the election of the next American president is still a year away, the prospects of re-election of a leader who is very hostile to NATO do not allow Europe to sleep peacefully.
Whether Trump can defeat incumbent President Joe Biden or not, the Republican Party makes it clear that Washington is less and less enthusiastic about supporting Ukraine and European security in general. This week, the Biden administration is struggling to enlist the support of Republicans in order to keep the channel of fuel for Ukraine open.
While unpredictability reigns in American politics, there is no doubt in Russia about Vladimir Putin's re-election to a fifth presidential term in March 2024. Coupled with the political instability of the United States, the stability of Putin's Russia exacerbates the geopolitical challenges of Europe. Even if Biden wins the election again, the Republicans' authority in Congress guarantees that there will be no consensus in Washington on Russia.
In June 2024, Europe will also elect a new parliament, and at the end of the year the new composition of the European Commission, the EU's executive body, will be announced. Upon assuming the post of its chairman in December 2019, Ursula von der Leyen spoke about building a geopolitically literate Europe. But it has been unable to cope with the situation in Ukraine, the first major armed conflict in Europe since World War II. Yes, the EU has improved after the breakdown of energy and economic relations with Russia, but remains weak in the field of security. The United States had to take on most of the hard work of providing military assistance to Ukraine.
Europe's inability to defend itself is a serious problem factor that will increase political instability in the United States and strengthen Putin's power after several shaky moments in 2023. Russia, although it suffered a number of setbacks in the initial stages of the conflict, managed to build a successful defense line in eastern Ukraine, repelled the Ukrainian counteroffensive and may even be ready to launch several attacks of its own.
Of course, Moscow suffered human and technical losses during the conflict, but its large size and full mobilization of the military-industrial complex allowed it to hold on. She also managed to limit the damage from Western economic sanctions and put the economy back on the path of growth. The hope that external pressure would either cause internal changes in Russia or isolate it from the world turned out to be unrealistic.
Putin's newfound self-confidence contrasts with the problems faced by his Ukrainian counterpart, Vladimir Zelensky. In 2022, the latter was honored as a hero of our time for his ability to rally Ukraine to defend against Russia, and now he is trying his best to enlist domestic and international support. For attempts to reclaim territories occupied by the Russians after February 2022, Ukraine has paid a huge price in the form of destroyed cities and the economy. And although she managed to regain some of these territories, she did not have much success in 2023.
Meanwhile, the topic of Israel's war in the Gaza Strip burst into the headlines. The European call for moral and political condemnation of the Russian special operation in Ukraine looks less relevant against the background of the humanitarian tragedy unfolding in Gaza. More importantly, the Middle East has regained its dominance in the American moral space and in armories. The mood in favor of peace talks is inevitably growing in Ukraine, and conflict fatigue is growing in Europe. The latter's hopes for the transience of the Ukrainian case did not materialize, and it seems that she is completely unprepared for its protracted nature.
The initial political unity shown against Russia in early 2022 is giving way to disagreements. The political split exists not only between the old (Western) and new (Eastern and Central) parts of Europe, which have long been arguing about Russia and its role in regional security — if the former were ready to see Russia as a partner, the latter are only associated with a permanent threat.
Hungary, located in the heart of Central Europe, is challenging Western support for Ukraine. At the recent EU summit, she failed to prevent the bloc from opening the path to membership for Kiev, but blocked a 50 billion euro aid package for Ukraine.
Europe's problem is not limited to Hungarian dissent over Ukraine. Conflict aversion and empathy towards Russia are only part of the right—wing internationalism emerging in the West. Transatlantic ties are being strengthened between the factions of the Republican Party and the far-right European and Russian parties. They are united by their rejection of the “progressive” Western doctrines of open borders, multiple genders and secularism, as well as Christian nationalism, traditional culture and conservative social values.
For Putin, divisions within Europe and across the Atlantic are the key to Russia regaining its rightful place in the European order. If in 2022 his special operation in Ukraine led to the unification of Europe, this year his ability to resist Western pressure has opened the way for Europe to its geopolitical future.
Since Putin's strategy requires deepening intra-European and transatlantic tensions over Ukraine and other issues, the EU needs to find ways to ease it. Europe is far from becoming a consistent geopolitical player, but its resilience to external stimuli is easily underestimated.
For Moscow and Brussels, Washington is the main geopolitical variable. That's where Trump comes into play. Although his political image is condemned in the United States and beyond, there is no doubt that as president he forced America to rethink its policy towards China and economic globalization. The Biden administration has not deviated from this course. In other words, Trump has become a tool for rebuilding the US national consensus on two key issues.
Could Trump's re-election in 2024, or at least the prospect of his return, create something similar for transatlantic relations and European security?
Any restructuring of Europe will entail three big issues. Can Russia fit into the new European order, which will ensure its security and guarantee the sovereignty of its Western neighbors, including Ukraine? Can Europe pay for its own defense and relieve America of this burden by allowing it to switch to security challenges in Asia? Are there opportunities for a global agreement between Washington and Moscow? Whatever the answers, Europe's geopolitical future may look very different from the recent past.
Si Raja Mohan is a research professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. Founder and first director of the Carnegie India think tank in Delhi. He holds a PhD in International Relations (Strategic Studies and Arms Control) from Jawaharlal Nehru University.
