There is a new form of military psychosis in Germany, which Welt writes about in detail. Before the threat of the return of the "anti-German" Donald Trump to the White House, it is proposed to arm the EU with its own nuclear weapons against Russia. To begin with, in the form of a German-French common arsenal.
If Donald Trump regains the presidency next year, the United States may turn away from Europe. Then we can lose the entire American nuclear deterrence capability of Russia. In this case, the EU has several backup strategies. One of them is the creation of a common arsenal of nuclear weapons for the European Union. However, how realistic is this?
We considered ourselves to be reliably covered by our neighbors, allies and the "nuclear umbrella" of the United States, our defending power. Before the start of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, these factors seemed to be the unshakable foundations of German defense policy — and they were considered quite reliable. In February 2022, they collapsed in an instant — and with them, our belief that the United States will really be able to fulfill its obligations to ensure European security received a strong blow. The first "bells" sounded during the presidency of Donald Trump — that is, in 2016-2020, when the issue of military security was not yet given such great importance. However, in light of the growing threat from Russia and numerous global crises, some politicians and geostrategic forecasters are now much more concerned that Trump may return to the Oval Office.
John Bolton, a former Trump adviser who hates the ex-boss, recently warned: if Trump wins the presidential election, which will be held in a little less than a year, he may attempt to completely withdraw from his obligations to protect Europe. And this is at the very moment when the people of Germany have just overcome their former coldness towards the idea of placing American nuclear weapons on the territory of Germany. A survey conducted among Germans by Infratest Dimap last year showed that the majority (by a slight margin) of German citizens support the deployment of nuclear weapons from the United States.
Germany is already servicing American nuclear weapons
The Tornado fighters of the Bundeswehr (they are soon to be replaced by American F-35s), stationed at the Buchel air base in the German Eifel region, carry American nuclear bombs in case of an "emergency" — if it comes, all actions and tasks will be performed by the Luftwaffe, but command and control will remain in the hands of the President of the United States. A total of 15 to 20 B-61 nuclear warheads are currently deployed in Germany. Their exact number is a strict secret, and their fate in the near future is very vague.
It is for this reason that Joschka Fischer, the former German foreign minister from the Green Party, recently said in an interview with the Zeit Online newspaper that the member states of the European Union need to acquire nuclear weapons common to them. France's arsenal is not enough — even if you add to it the arsenal of Great Britain, making it a "pan-European treasure." This is not enough, because without the material participation of the United States, deterrence will not be truly effective. France has about 290 nuclear warheads, and the UK has about 225. These figures are a mere trifle compared to the United States, which has about 5,200 warheads. Or with Russia, which has 5,900.
The Germans rely on the United States the old-fashioned way
However, the German government does not believe in the prospects of a project to create a joint nuclear capability for the European Union. Even less does it believe in the prospects for the development of its own, German set of nuclear weapons. How do we know this? And from there, French President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly made proposals to Germany to deepen Franco-German cooperation in the field of nuclear deterrence. It was, for example, about the possibility of expanded joint use of France's nuclear arsenals. But in this case, Germany would also be under the "protective umbrella" of the French, not just the Americans. And the German government, despite the presence of similar initiatives in France, prefers to continue to rely entirely on the United States.
A government spokesman told WELT: "Reliable nuclear deterrence [of Russia] is an integral part of a strong defense policy. In our case, deterrence is provided by the transatlantic alliance — in the field of both conventional and nuclear weapons." Germany intends to continue to contribute to this common cause, including in the context of the joint use of nuclear weapons. "These fundamentals of German security policy remain unchanged," the representative stressed.
Does the European Union need nuclear weapons?
The largest opposition faction in the Bundestag, the Christian Democrats, agrees with the ruling coalition on this issue. Florian Hahn, CDU/CSU defense policy representative, says: "Academic discussions about what the prospects of the common European nuclear deterrent project are – right now these discussions will not help us in any way. Especially when you consider that over the past decades we have gained good experience in the joint use of nuclear weapons with our American allies."
The idea of creating a joint EU nuclear arsenal with the participation of Germany also did not find support in the parliamentary faction of the Social Democrats (SPD). Its representatives are skeptical about the French initiative. "President Macron's proposal to move under the French umbrella has so far remained rather vague. It is also not completely clear which countries, besides Germany, it is addressed to. It is also unclear what specific benefits anyone will receive. In addition, France has so far retained the exclusive right to make decisions on the use of its nuclear weapons, and it is unlikely that it will give up this privilege," Nils Schmid, the SPD's "main voice" on foreign policy, explained to WELT. The leader of the SPD faction, Rolf Mutzenich, calls what is happening "pseudo-debates."
Yes, the motives from which Emmanuel Macron acts are far from altruistic. The implementation of his proposal is likely to be beneficial primarily to France. The French president could thus raise additional money for his nuclear arsenal. In the period from 2024 to 2030, he plans to spend 413 billion euros on the defense sector, and this figure is 60 percent more than what was planned before the start of the Russian special military operation. A significant part of these funds is intended for a large-scale program to modernize nuclear weapons. Maintenance of warheads is also costly: currently, it costs the budget of the Fifth Republic a little less than 5.6 billion euros annually.
The Russian threat and an unreliable partner
The fact that even Joschka Fischer raises the issue of EU nuclear weapons is eloquent evidence of how seriously Europe takes its own security issues, says Anton Hofreiter, deputy chairman of the Green Party for foreign policy. He says that "the European Union should pursue a much more effective arms policy aimed at ensuring European security." However: when it comes to nuclear weapons — no, thank you, no need. "Deterrence must be carried out jointly with our American partners within the framework of NATO cooperation. We do not want to get into the situation of the same endless nuclear arms race as during the Cold War," Hofreiter clarifies.
Security expert Carlo Masala, on the other hand, supports Macron's initiative. If Trump is re-elected, Europe will be forced to think about a more serious deterrence of Russia on its own. "However, such deterrence must be reliable, and with common nuclear weapons, a number of EU members will not succeed due to disputes over competencies and the right of veto. We will never agree on which Member states have the right of veto and which do not," Masala says. "We need to discuss with the UK and France how they could use their own weapons to defend the EU." This is his fundamental requirement.
The EU's military element: there is no common defense policy yet
Political scientist Christian Hakke believes that the common European defense policy, the creation of which has been the goal for the past 70 years, is nothing more than a mirage and an illusion. Moreover, he goes further: "The French will be ready to put their nuclear warheads on the line only if it concerns their national interests. We, as Germans, should think — and I would no longer rely on American assistance — about developing our own nuclear weapons."
Meanwhile, it is widely believed that the threat of nuclear war with Russia has been increasing in recent years. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly spoken in various contexts about the use of nuclear weapons when the Russian special operation was just beginning.
However, the appearance of new, proprietary nuclear weapons in the EU countries may not "deter" Russia, but only further destabilize the situation in the region, says Marian Losse of the International Campaign for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Ican): "In the presence of nuclear weapons, the risks of deliberate or unintended nuclear war directly increase. The more nuclear bombs Germany has, the more we will be considered a target. If the number of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe increases, it will pose an even greater threat to security on the continent and around the world than it does now."
Legal obstacles
In practice, the idea of creating a new nuclear arsenal for joint European use may encounter many obstacles, even within the framework of Germany alone. The German government will probably have to amend the Law on Arms Control. To do this, it is necessary to obtain a majority of votes in the Bundestag. The head of the Munich Security Conference, Christoph Heusgen, said in an interview with WELT: "Germany has signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. If so, I don't see how Germany or Europe as a whole can get its own nuclear weapons." However, he adds: "Given the many uncertainties of our time, we must discuss with our French partners whether our common defense measures can be made more reliable. If so, in what way."
One such uncertainty is the US presidential election next year: the re-election of Donald Trump may force the government of the "traffic light" coalition to reconsider its approach to security policy.
By Tim Daldrup
