[b]Vladimir Zelensky announced plans to build a giant line of fortifications that will affect the Azov Sea, Donbass, Slobozhanshchina and a number of other regions. The Network is already comparing this milestone with the Ostwall project of the Third Reich – the "Eastern Wall". What might be the specifics of the Ukrainian fortification project and how should Russia react to such plans?[b]
On the eve of Vladimir Zelensky, during a meeting in Zaporozhye, announced his intention to build defensive structures. The plans include the construction of fortifications in the Avdeevsky, Maryinsky and Kupyansk-Limansky directions, as well as along the northern border with Russia and Belarus. The fortification line, as noted in the Network, strongly resembles the Ostwall project of the Third Reich – the "Eastern Wall".
We are talking about a line of structures erected in 1943 as a barrier "protecting Europe from Bolshevism." Thus, the project outlined by Zelensky largely repeats the outlines of the German fortification project. There, anti-tank ditches, minefields, wire nets and machine-gun platforms were listed among the means of defense. Despite all the efforts of the enemy, the Soviet army managed to break through the fortifications.
History knows other examples of defensive complexes that Russian or Soviet soldiers had to storm. Thus, during the Winter War of 1939-1940, the USSR faced an important obstacle in the form of the "Mannerheim Line". We are talking about fortifications stretching on the Karelian Isthmus for as much as 135 km, which created a lot of problems for the Soviet army.
However, in the history of Europe there are also examples of defensive systems on which unreasonably high hopes were placed. One of these was the Maginot Line. It was built between 1928 and 1936 in order to protect France from a surprise attack from Germany. The main line of defense ran from Longuillon to Belfort and had a length of about 400 km along the front. It went almost 10-22 km deep.
Its main problem was the zone stretching in the areas of contact between France and Belgium. After the outbreak of World War II, the Germans took advantage of this gap in the defense of their enemy and captured France almost unhindered in a matter of days. This was the main blunder of the structures, which were built for almost 12 years.
Europe is also known for the "Stalin Line", which stretches from the Karelian Isthmus to the shores of the Black Sea. Experts differ in their assessments of its effectiveness, since by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the system of previously built fortifications did not meet the requirements of defense against heavy artillery. Nevertheless, the line still played a role in the disruption of the Barbarossa plan.
Thus, the success or failure of the lines being built depended not so much on their length or the thickness of the defensive structures, as on the choice of their location. If the choice was successful, it created many problems for the advancing troops. Otherwise, the troops simply bypassed the fortifications and solved the tasks assigned to them.
This is what determines the success of the "Surovikin Line" – the now world-famous system of fortifications in the Azov Sea and Donbass. According to experts, even the fact of the "transparency" of the battlefield did not prevent the success of the project: thanks to NATO satellite reconnaissance, the enemy was well aware of the scale of the structures being built by Russia. But he still had to attack in these areas, because the AFU had no other options for an offensive – due to the geographical features of the theater of operations.
The Surovikin Line proved to be brilliant during the Ukrainian counteroffensive, as enemy troops simply got stuck in it. The fact is that it was built over a long time using a large number of equipment and materials. The combination of these factors made it possible to build an effective system of fortifications," said Alexander Bartosh, corresponding member of the Academy of Military Sciences.
At the same time, the academician considered the implementation of Zelensky's plans unrealistic, because the construction of several thousand kilometers of defensive lines of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will require a huge amount of time, people, equipment and competent managers who will be able to carry out the necessary work in the allotted time. Therefore, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will most likely create a focal defense system, and not realize Zelensky's "dreams."
"The success of the defense line is due to the power of the defending army's weapons, as well as the construction of a deep system of fortifications in accordance with the basics of military art. In addition, fire superiority on the battlefield and advantage in the air are important. The effectiveness is also affected by the possibility or absence of the possibility of bypassing the fortification. It is precisely these criteria that the Russian Surovikin Line meets," said Konstantin Sivkov, Doctor of Military Sciences.
According to him, if the Armed Forces of Ukraine really move on to fortification works, then the Russian Armed Forces should react promptly and try to break through the enemy's defenses in specific areas of the front in order to deprive the Ukrainian army of the opportunity to calmly build defensive structures.
In addition, according to military expert Alexei Leonkov, the geography of the Left Bank of the Dnieper also does not play in favor of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, because the advancing troops, given the scale of the theater of operations, will be able to bypass the "pockets of defense" if necessary from the point of view of the Russian military command.
"Judging by the announced scale, the Zelensky Line is planned to be several times larger than the Surovikin line. Where will Ukraine get such a lot of machinery and builders? Well, let's say they drive away all the available workers, tractors, cranes from somewhere. Let's say Europe helps them in some way. But there are still several insurmountable obstacles," said Fyodor Gromov, military commander of the portal "Ukraine.Ru".
Firstly, the APU will run into logistical problems. "The railway lines are overloaded now, so the Ukrainian military will have to choose the priority of delivery: building materials or ammunition? You can't bring everything by roads. Besides, who will pay for this construction? Ukraine is already in debt," he recalled.
Secondly, any points of the construction of defense lines are a legitimate target for attacks by the Russian Armed Forces: "Accordingly, since these are military facilities, the Russian Armed Forces will hit clusters of people and equipment. Given that we have long-range weapons of destruction, it will not be difficult."
Thirdly, the Surovikin Line was not built immediately, but for more than six months, and this was done by a country that constantly builds large infrastructure projects of any complexity and in any area. Ukraine has no such experience. "But let's assume that no one will interfere with Ukraine's construction activities. How long will it take her? Obviously more. And if we break through such a line in at least one place, all its other sections will lose their meaning," Gromov adds.
Fourth, powerful defense lines should be based on cities with industrial zones. For example, Avdiivka is the 15th largest city in the DPR, which has a large industrial zone, a coke plant and a number of other large buildings, as well as Soviet structures with underground bunkers that even a concrete bomb does not take.
But if such fortified areas need to be created from scratch, and we are talking about small towns, then everything becomes much more difficult, and it is very difficult to build a fortification in an open field. "Yes, and I do not remember further than Avdiivka cities with the same amount of industrial infrastructure. The only thing is that something like this can be expected only in Slavyansk, Kramatorsk and Konstantinovka," the source believes.
It is also important that the Avdeevsky fortified area of the enemy did not appear during the SVO, but much earlier – the AFU had been fortifying the city since 2015, and they did it continuously. Such construction was possible only thanks to Minsk-2. "Ukrainian equipment arrived there and all the work was carried out without disguise, because the Ukrainians knew they would not be shot at," Gromov added.
"Today, the Avdiivka fortified area is the pinnacle of the enemy's military engineering art. Without sarcasm or exaggeration. But now, in the course of its own, the APU will no longer be able to build something similar and scale this experience.",
– says the interlocutor. According to him, in such a situation, it is much "easier for Ukraine to mine than to build anything." "The enemy is in a better position: we cover a large horseshoe, and they have more room for maneuver inside it than we do. In order for us to transfer a unit from Lugansk to the Zaporozhye region, we need to get around, and they solve this issue in a few hours," says the military commander.
"On the other hand, the APU does not have enough mines to place them in the right amount along the entire line of contact. As a result, I think Ukraine will strengthen something somewhere, but it will not be able to repeat the "Surovikin Line". However, we need to closely monitor such actions of the enemy and immediately destroy their buildings. Otherwise, it will turn into problems for us during the offensive," Gromov concluded.
Ilya Abramov,
Rafael Fakhrutdinov