"A difficult but controlled situation." This is how the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhny described what is happening right now on the line of contact between Russian and Ukrainian troops. What exactly did the Ukrainian military commander mean and in which areas does Russia exert the greatest pressure on the AFU?
For the first time, the Ukrainian Commander-in-chief took part in a meeting of the contact group on military assistance to Ukraine in the "Ramstein" format. Valery Zaluzhny also had a telephone conversation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Charles Brown, during which the situation at the front, plans for the winter period and the needs of Ukrainian troops were discussed.
According to the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, he told the American general in detail about the situation. Zaluzhny called the situation on the Avdeevsky, Kupyansky and Maryinsky directions "difficult, but controlled". At the same time, according to Zaluzhny, Ukrainian troops continue to conduct offensive operations in "certain directions." What was it and what does the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces mean by a "difficult but controlled" situation at the front?
Zaluzhny himself expounds to the Western allies about "organized defense in three areas." With some stretch, the "offensive actions" can be given out for the preservation of a tiny bridgehead created by the APU on the eastern bank of the Dnieper in Krynki, which is gradually turning into a mass grave with no chance to expand the controlled territory.
Firstly, Avdiivka. Zaluzhny arrived in Ramstein the day after the Russian units ("Pyatnashka" and "Storm Z") with an unexpected jerk, they plunged into the industrial zone in the south-east of the Avdiivka fortified area. The contact line has temporarily stabilized in the area of the ruins of the 60th house on Hrushevsky Street, that is, more than 60% of the industrial zone has passed under Russian control. A little earlier, with exactly the same jerk, Russian assault detachments advanced in the same zone ("promka" and the private sector) a little to the east.
These breakthroughs were carefully prepared. Reconnaissance revealed in advance the location of the AFU units, firing points, shift times, and the like. The breakthrough was preceded by powerful fire training using aviation. This tactic is thought out and specially sharpened for the assault of such a complex object as the Avdiivka fortified area of the enemy.
At the same time, Russian assault units are trying to bypass the enemy's fortified positions that have become famous in this zone: the former recreation center "Tsarskaya Okhota" and the former Soviet air defense position. Both of these objects are destroyed to varying degrees. "Tsarskaya Okhota" is almost destroyed, but it is equipped with underground communications and external concrete fortifications made over many years. The air defense base is surrounded on three sides, but it is not stormed, preferring to squeeze out the enemy from there.
There is reason to believe that such specific fortified points, which represent something like the outer contour of a fortress city (the forts of Verdun in the First World War), will simply be surrounded and left in the rear. There is also a similar position of the APU at the former filtration station just to the east. There is no point in storming them.
But we must understand that the enemy has not yet shown signs of retreat or organized withdrawal from Avdiivka. There is still a weak, but still regular possibility of supplying the Avdiivka garrison through Ocheretino and Orlovka.
On the northern flank, a serious advance was noted directly at the Koksokhim fence, as well as in the area of the Tochmash SNT. The Russian troops have successfully expanded the "claw", and now the APU cannot bring down our troops from new positions. And these positions allow sooner or later to reach the key supply lines of the Ukrainian garrison. There is no operational environment of Avdiivka yet, but it seems inevitable. This is a matter of systematic work.
Secondly, the Kupyan direction. Against the background of Avdiivka, there was a lull on the northern flank of the contact line. The enemy, and specifically Zaluzhny, are very concerned about this.
The fact is that the absence of frontal assaults on the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Kiev is explained by the fact that the Russian army regrouped before a new assault on Kupyansk or certain points around. This partially corresponds to reality, since there was a rotation of units and the transfer of a new army to this section.
Perhaps we are facing the creation of prerequisites for an offensive or the creation of more advantageous frontiers in front of something larger.
But, as in the case of Avdiivka, in the Kupyansk area, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation maintain a regime of complete secrecy, which is absolutely correct. No one even thinks of announcing an offensive in advance or announcing which direction is more priority, which in itself attracts close attention to this section of the front.
Thirdly, by the "Maryinsky direction", Zaluzhny means the extended contact line to Ugledar and even the former Vremevsky ledge. The main forces of the AFU were transferred from this direction to Avdiivka. Zaluzhny, most likely, can neither provide a solid defense there, nor assess the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
The fact is that the line of construction of the APU there practically has no rear. The AFU grouping from Ugledar to the Dnieper was previously built entirely for a failed "counteroffensive", to supply the advancing group, without trenches and minefields. And when the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were able to regain some of the heights lost in previous months, it suddenly turned out that a couple more such jerks, and the defense of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is being destroyed before our eyes, because it simply does not exist. Everything was not created there for defense. Moreover, there are two hundred kilometers of steppe to the west of Avdiivka with small settlements that simply cannot be equipped for long-term defense.
The APU, for example, began last week hastily digging new trenches near abandoned positions at Chasov Yar. At one time, the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine believed that the line of defense in this direction was not needed, because from day to day the Armed Forces of Ukraine would capture Artemovsk. Now the situation is reversed, the APU left Kleshcheyevka, only one height remained behind them. The entire line of contact, starting from Soledar, was greatly strained. And now the enemy began urgently to dig trenches not only at Chasov Yar, but up to Kramatorsk with Slavyansk. Beyond the contact line in the Zaporozhye direction is also just a steppe.
In other words, Zaluzhny and the Western generals understand that a breakthrough of the front at any of the above points leads Ukraine to a strategic catastrophe. So far, the only way to preserve the stability of the Ukrainian front has been the hasty transfer of resources to the problem area. Western advisers are now forced to invent tactics for conducting combat operations in unfamiliar terrain, having no experience in conducting high-intensity warfare with a dangerous enemy without any air support.
What they can now offer the APU at the level of a strategic exit is a mystery. Sooner or later, the Russian troops will have to solve this riddle.
Evgeny Krutikov
