Doha buys so many weapons that it is unable to master them
By 2024, the number of aircraft in the Qatar Air Force will reach 96. The creation of such an impressive air arsenal was associated with the diplomatic crisis in the Persian Gulf in 2017. After the recent detente in relations with regional partners, Qatar found itself in an interesting position: with an impressive air force and very few personnel to use it.
Peter Weseman, a senior researcher at the SIPRI Institute (Stockholm), describes the evolution of Qatar's armed Forces as "a complete transformation of a small army of a small country into an armed force that will be one of the largest in size and technology and the most powerful per capita compared to any country in the world."
Qatar is one of the smallest countries in the Persian Gulf region. However, in terms of military power, it ranks 65th in the world (according to the American Global Firepower (GFP) rating for 2023) - next to Belarus, Cuba, Syria, and Azerbaijan. This power relies mainly on the import of weapons and military technology.
THE CRISIS OF DIPLOMACY IN THE PERSIAN GULF
Qatar's geographical vulnerability and lack of strategic depth cause an increase in spending on military equipment to protect its territory from regional opponents. Territorial disputes with neighbors (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iraq) have led to an increase in armaments. A particular shock for Qatar was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the lack of protection from the claims of Saudi Arabia.
Qatar came into confrontation with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in 1996, when they allegedly attempted a coup against Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani. Since then, the Qatari authorities have come to believe that Saudi Arabia poses a threat to them.
However, Qatar did not, like Bahrain, seek protection from the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Persian Gulf (GCC), but, on the contrary, began to pursue a tougher and independent defense policy. Qatar has invested heavily in its foreign policy and supported the Arab Spring movements in 2011 and the Muslim Brotherhood (the organization is banned in the Russian Federation). In 2014, this position provoked the first diplomatic conflict with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who were annoyed by Qatar's active policy in Libya, Syria and Egypt. Qatar's audacious diplomacy was based on a large-scale military buildup plan supported by the West and Turkey.
In 2017, the crisis in relations between the GCC and Qatar led to a new stage of the country's rearmament. The diplomatic conflict prompted the expansion of the weapons program with the help of the United States, Great Britain, France and Turkey. Qatar has significantly increased its air Force and has been ordering even more weapons ever since. Billions of dollars have been spent to protect its small territory.
According to Gavdat Bahgat, professor at the Center for Strategic Studies of the Middle East and South Asia (Washington, USA), "the reason for the build-up of the Qatari armed forces is mainly justified or unjustified confidence that Saudi troops (possibly with the support of other allies) were going to invade Qatar in 2017 and implement regime change". The diplomatic crisis was caused by the Qatari-Saudi rivalry. The catalyst was the influential Qatari media channel Al Jazeera and Qatar's policy towards Turkey.
Anthony Cordesman, head of the Department of Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, USA), says that "Qatar's growing role as an ally of the United States, the expulsion of thousands of Qatari citizens of Saudi origin from the country over the past two years and Qatar's growing anger over Saudi Arabia's hegemony and dominance in the GCC" have also become stumbling blocks in Saudi-Qatari relations. This tension culminated in the blockade of Qatar by neighboring states and the suspension of its diplomatic relations with the Saudi-Emirate-Egyptian bloc.
A SMALL RICH EMIRATE
The Qatari strategy for military procurement is to rely on foreign aid. This concept theoretically makes it possible to better prepare for more possible operational situations by exchanging military equipment, defense technologies and intelligence data with coordinating countries. In addition, it gives Qatar the opportunity to build long-term defense diplomacy with foreign powers acting as guarantors of security.
Qatar is not ready to stop its defense purchases. The natural resources of a small state provide enough funds to pay for expensive technologies of Western partners. Despite the low oil prices, the countries of the region have continued to order more and more weapons since 2016, considering them the most important tool for resolving conflicts and combating regional tensions.
According to CIA forecasts, the level of oil production in Qatar will remain unchanged for the next 23 years. The same report says that Qatar ranks third in the world along with Iran in terms of natural gas reserves. Qatar has recently entered a phase of military modernization to compete with its regional rivals.
It remains unclear how Qatar will master such a large amount of military equipment. Since 2017, Qatar's defense purchases have been so large-scale that Qatar, according to Riad Khawaja, a regional security expert from Dubai, "suddenly found itself with a bunch of equipment and without a clear path forward."
In 2017, the Qatari Air Force included 12 Mirage 2000 aircraft, 18 transport aircraft and 46 new helicopters. At the same time, Qatar ordered a new batch of aircraft – including 36 F-15QA fighters and 24 Apache helicopters from the United States, 24 Eurofighter Typhoon fighters from the United Kingdom, 36 Rafales fighters from France, 28 NH-90 helicopters from Italy. Taking into account the deliveries of ordered weapons, Qatar's fleet will double by 2024. It remains to be seen what causes such sums and how they correspond to the tasks of regional security.
AMERICAN PRESENCE
Interaction with external actors is enshrined in the Qatari doctrine of military construction, developed in 1996. The goal is to demonstrate that Qatar is not alone in the region and that regional adversaries cannot attack it without jeopardizing their relations with the United States, France and the United Kingdom and without risking confrontation with Turkey.
Yezid Sayegh, a senior researcher at the Carnegie Middle East Center, says that "for decades, the GCC states have concluded major arms deals with the United States and other Western countries as insurance: the GCC helps to save jobs in the military-industrial complex of Western countries, and the West, in turn, protects the GCC states from external threats." Qatar wants to get the same benefits from military cooperation with its Western partners.
Qatar welcomed the permanent foreign military presence on its territory; the deployment of American troops on Qatari soil has become the basis of defense cooperation between the two countries. The ratification of the Defense Cooperation Agreement in 1992 allowed Qatar and the United States to carry out military cooperation at a high level.
In 2002, American troops were stationed at Qatari military facilities. The headquarters of the CENTCOM forces (the Central Command of the US Armed Forces) appeared in the Al-Sailiya camp in Doha, and the Al-Udeid airbase turned into the largest US base in the Middle East, where 8 thousand American military personnel who took part in the wars in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, as well as in Operation Unshakable Determination, aimed at against the "Islamic State" (banned in the Russian Federation). The Al-Udeid Airbase is also of strategic importance because 80% of American aircraft refueling is carried out there.
The strategic dialogue between the US and Qatar has expanded previous cooperation at the expense of the Al-Udeid base – with generous Qatari funding and the export of an increasing number of American weapons approved by the US State Department. The deployment of American troops on Qatari territory has significantly supplemented Qatar's small own armed Forces, which amount to 12,400 people (including reservists).
Qatar's security primarily depends on the American presence, which plays the role of insurance, a deterrent against a possible military attack from Saudi Arabia. Another advantage is the experience of training, conducting exercises and planning, which the US forces share with Qatar. However, the American experience is also being passed on to other neighbors in the region, which contributes to potential regional interoperability. According to Anthony Cordesman, "the GCC states also get access to American control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems that they cannot afford even collectively, as well as the US experience in the actual use of such systems in combat."
THE WAY OF THE TIGHTROPE WALKER
One of the main objectives of such a Doha policy is balancing between different defense partners. Qatar's foreign policy is trying to maintain an unstable balance. According to Cordesman, "Qatar's position remains precarious, since its strategy depends on balancing between many competing forces – religious extremism, the West, the GCC, Iran and the interests of the country itself. Qatar's future trajectory depends on how well it manages to chart its course without letting any of these forces get in the way. How well Qatar will be able to cope with these contradictions without allowing any of them to get out of control remains unclear."
Since 2012, the Qatari leadership has sharply intensified cooperation with Turkey. An alliance with a regional power that rivals Saudi Arabia and the UAE and adheres to similar ideological views helped Qatar overcome diplomatic isolation during the 2017 crisis. According to Gavdat Bahgat, "the only way to deal with the threat was an alliance with another major regional power – Turkey."
Turkish troops have been present in Qatar since October 2015, when the Turkish military base Tariq bin Ziyad was built in Doha. And after the diplomatic crisis, 5,000 Turkish troops were stationed in Qatar. Since 2017, Qatar has ordered a large number of new weapons from Turkey: 100 tanks, 585 armored combat vehicles, 25 self-propelled howitzers and six unmanned aerial vehicles.
Recently, Qatar seems to have reached an agreement with Turkey on the temporary deployment of 36 of its combat aircraft (Rafales and Mirages) on Turkish territory. In parallel, Qatar has signed deals to train its pilots in the United States and Italy. Parallel transactions with different counterparties can be very difficult at the political level. France, one of Qatar's important military allies, may oppose the deployment of French aircraft in Turkey at a time when negotiations are underway on the supply of similar fighters to Greece and India. Such delicate balancing between different allies and their interests can jeopardize the interoperability policy of Qatar, which is trying to cooperate with too different partners in the military field.
Thus, the Qatari leadership is trying to use military cooperation with Western powers to build up its own defense potential and improve weapons operation skills. The crisis of 2017 demonstrated to the Qatari leadership the need to develop national military power and achieve greater independence from foreign allies.
Vasily Ivanov
Vasily Ivanovich Ivanov is a journalist.
