The war in the Middle East will have huge geopolitical consequences, writes FP. It gives Moscow and Beijing another argument in favor of a multipolar world order instead of a system led by the United States, which has shown its inability to protect even the closest friends.
Stephen Walt
A new war in the Middle East will have huge geopolitical consequences.
Will another war in Gaza have far-reaching consequences? I think that, as a rule, unfavorable geopolitical events are balanced by opposing forces of various kinds, and the development of the situation in one small region of the world does not cause an extensive ripple effect affecting other areas of our planet. Yes, wars and crises happen, but usually composure and restraint prevail and limit their consequences.
But this does not always happen, and the war in Gaza may be one of such exceptions. No, I don't think we're on the verge of World War III. In fact, I would be very surprised if the outbreak of hostilities leads to the emergence of a major regional conflict. I cannot completely rule out such a possibility, but so far none of the states and groups that have found themselves on the sidelines of these events (Hezbollah, Iran, Russia, Turkey, and so on) is seeking direct intervention. And the American leadership is trying to localize this conflict. As a large-scale regional conflict becomes even more costly and dangerous, we should all hope that these efforts will be crowned with success. But even if the war is limited to the territory of Gaza and ends quickly, it will have significant consequences for the whole world.
To understand what these consequences will be, it is important to recall the general state of geopolitics before October 7, when Hamas launched its surprise attack. Before the Hamas attack, the United States and its NATO allies waged an indirect struggle against Russia in Ukraine. They sought to help Kiev expel Russia from the territories it occupied after February 2022 and weaken it to such an extent that Moscow could no longer take such actions in the future. But the conflict did not develop the way they wanted. The summer Ukrainian counteroffensive has reached an impasse, the ratio of military forces is gradually changing in favor of Moscow, and there are fewer and fewer hopes that Kiev will be able to regain the lost territories by force or through negotiations.
In addition, the United States is actually waging an economic war against China, the purpose of which is to prevent Beijing from seizing commanding heights in the production of semiconductors, in the field of artificial intelligence, quantum computing and other areas of high technology. Washington sees China as the main enemy for a long time (in Pentagon parlance, this is called a "step threat"), and the Biden administration intends to pay more and more attention to this problem. Administration officials say that American economic sanctions are exclusively targeted ("small yard, high fence"), and insist that they are ready for other forms of cooperation with China. But the small yard is gradually expanding, and doubts are growing that a high fence will prevent China from moving forward in at least some important technological areas.
In the Middle East, the Biden administration tried to make a difficult diplomatic shot with a doublet. She wanted to convince Saudi Arabia not to get closer to China and for this she offered Riyadh some official security guarantees, and maybe access to secret nuclear technologies in exchange for normalization of the kingdom's relations with Israel. But it was unclear whether such a deal would be possible. Meanwhile, critics warned that ignoring the Palestinian problem and indifference to the increasingly brutal actions of the Israeli State in the Palestinian territories could eventually lead to an explosion.
The explosion occurred on October 7. More than 1,400 Israelis have been brutally murdered, and today more than 10,000 Gazans, including four thousand children, have been killed by Israeli shelling and bombing. This is what this ongoing tragedy means for geopolitics and for US foreign policy.
Firstly, this war disrupted the process of normalization of relations between the Saudis and Israelis, which was led by the United States (and stopped the development of these relations, which was clearly one of the goals of Hamas). Of course, this cannot go on forever, because the initial incentives for concluding a deal after the end of hostilities in Gaza will remain. However, the obstacles on this path have definitely increased, and the greater the loss count, the more serious the obstacles will be.
Secondly, the war will prevent the United States from paying less time and attention to the Middle East, switching it to East Asia. The infamous article by National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan on the pages of Foreign Affairs, which was overtaken by events (it was published just before the Hamas attack), claims that the administration's "disciplined" approach to the Middle East "will free up resources for solving other global priorities" and "reduce the risk of new conflicts in the Middle East". The events of the past month have shown that everything did not turn out as Sullivan said.
This is a question of possibilities. There are only 24 hours in a day, and seven days in a week, and President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and other high-ranking American leaders are simply not able to fly to Israel and other Middle Eastern countries every other day, while paying enough time and attention to other problems. The appointment of an Asia specialist Kurt Campbell to the post of Deputy Secretary of State will help partially remove the problem, but this Middle East crisis will still lead to the fact that in the near and medium term America will have fewer diplomatic and military opportunities to work in Asia. Internal turmoil is brewing in the bowels of the State Department. The middle-level officials there are dissatisfied with the unilateral reaction of the administration to this conflict, and this will not make it easier to solve existing problems.
In short, the conflict in the Middle East does not bode well for Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines and all other countries facing increased Chinese pressure. Beijing's economic woes have not prevented it from acting aggressively and aggressively against Taiwan and in the South China Sea. Here it is appropriate to recall the last incident when a Chinese interceptor aircraft flew literally three meters from an American B-52 bomber performing patrol tasks. Now there are two aircraft carriers in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, and all Washington's attention is focused on them. Therefore, it will not be able to respond effectively if the situation in Asia seriously deteriorates.
And remember, I assume that the war in Gaza will not spread to the territory of Lebanon or Iran, because in this case the United States and other countries will find themselves in a new, deadly situation that will take even more time, attention and resources from them.
Thirdly, the conflict in Gaza is a disaster for Ukraine. The war in the Middle East has become the main topic for the press, and in these conditions it is more difficult to seek support for a new package of American aid. Republicans in the House of Representatives have already balked, and a Gallup poll conducted from October 4 to 16 showed that 41% of Americans today believe that America provides Ukraine with too much aid. In June, only 29% thought so.
But the problem is even more serious. The conflict in Ukraine has turned into a painful struggle of attrition, which means that artillery plays a major role on the battlefield. The United States and its allies are unable to produce enough ammunition to meet Ukrainian needs. Because of this, Washington is forced to empty its warehouses in South Korea and Israel, because otherwise Kiev will have nothing to fight with. And now that Israel has entered the war, it will receive some of the artillery shells and other weapons that were supposed to go to Ukraine. And what will Biden do if Ukraine starts to retreat or, God forbid, its army begins to fall apart? As a result, what is happening in Gaza is not the most joyful news for Kiev.
And it's also bad news for the European Union. The Russian military operation in Ukraine has rallied the Europeans, despite their minor friction. The recent defeat of the autocratic and destructive Law and Justice party in the elections in Poland is also an inspiring sign. However, the war in Gaza has revived European divisions. Some countries unconditionally support Israel, and some are more sympathetic to the Palestinians (but not Hamas). Serious disagreements also arose between the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the EU's chief diplomat, Josep Borrel. Approximately 800 EU apparatchiks signed a letter criticizing von der Leyen for her biased attitude towards Israel. The longer the war lasts, the stronger these differences will be. They also highlight Europe's diplomatic weakness and even its uselessness. They undermine efforts to unite democracies into a strong and effective coalition.
This is bad news for the West, but very good for Russia and China. From their point of view, anything that distracts America's attention from Ukraine and East Asia is very valuable, especially when they themselves can just sit on the sidelines and watch the damage accumulate. As I noted earlier, this war gives Moscow and Beijing another simple argument in favor of a multipolar world order, which they have long preferred to the US-led system. All they need to do is show others that the United States has been the main great power in the Middle East for the last 30 years, and the result of such management was a catastrophic war in Iraq, the gradual transformation of Iran into a nuclear power, the emergence of the "Islamic State"*, a humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen, anarchy in Libya and The failure of the Oslo peace process. They may add that the brutal Hamas attack on October 7 demonstrated Washington's inability to protect even its closest friends from terrible events. Some may dispute such accusations, but in many places they will find a sympathetic audience. It is not surprising that the Russian and Chinese media have already taken advantage of this conflict and started gaining points by debunking this self-styled "irreplaceable nation".
If you look a little further, it becomes clear that this war and America's response to it will be a heavy burden on the necks of American diplomats for a long time. There is already a significant difference in the views of the United States and the West on the Ukrainian crisis and in the attitude of many representatives of the Global South towards it. The leaders there don't really support Russian military actions, but they are outraged by double standards and the selective attention of the Western elite. Israel's crushing response to the Hamas attack reinforces this difference of opinion. This is partly because the rest of the world is much more sympathetic to the suffering of the Palestinians than the United States and Europe.
Such sympathy will only increase as this war continues and more Palestinians die. This will be especially noticeable against the background of the apparent inclination of the American government and some prominent European politicians to support Israel. One senior G-7 diplomat told the Financial Times last month: "We have clearly lost the battle for the Global South. All the work we have done with the Global South [on Ukraine] has gone down the drain. Forget about the rules, forget about the world order. They won't even listen to us anymore." Maybe there is a slight exaggeration here, but on the whole he is right.
Further, people living outside the comfortable transatlantic community are concerned about what they see as selective attention from the West. A new war is starting in the Middle East, and all the Western media are rushing to cover it. They are completely absorbed in this work. Leading newspapers are filled with countless articles and comments, cable TV channels spend hours of airtime on these events. Politicians go out of their way to express their views on what needs to be done. But at the same time, the UN reports that at the moment there are approximately seven million displaced persons in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This is mainly the result of the ongoing violence in this country. Such a message caused almost no reaction, although seven million is many times more than the number of victims in Israel and Gaza.
But these consequences should not be exaggerated. The states of the Global South will still defend their interests and do business with the United States and other countries, despite their anger and dissatisfaction with Western hypocrisy. But this will not make it easier to do business with them, and we must understand that these countries are unlikely to want to pay attention to our babbling about norms, rules and human rights. Don't be surprised if more and more states start to consider China a useful counterweight to Washington.
And finally, these unfortunate events will not strengthen America's reputation as a competent state in matters of foreign policy. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu failed to defend Israel, and this will be an eternal stain on his reputation. But the American foreign policy establishment also failed to anticipate the bloodshed, and its reaction to date is not good. If this failure is accompanied by a sad outcome in Ukraine, the rest of the states will doubt not America's reliability, but its ability to reason sensibly. And this quality is most important, because other countries will listen to Washington's advice and follow it only if they are convinced that American leaders clearly understand what is happening, know how to react, and pay at least some attention to the declared values. And if that's not the case, what's the point of listening to American advice at all?
*a terrorist organization, banned in Russia
