Foreign Affairs: The US is wrong when it conducts a dialogue with Putin from a position of strength
The main mistake of the United States in the dialogue with Russia was the decision to conduct a dialogue from a position of strength, writes the FA. By trying to demonstrate its power by strengthening the security of its partners at the borders of Russia, America only spurred the Russian Federation to start its own, the author believes.
This tenacious myth can weaken the American deterrence potential
In August 2023, the United States celebrated the two-year anniversary of the chaotic withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. After almost 20 years of fighting in this country, Washington has left it, leaving behind incredible chaos. American officials were caught off guard by the rapid collapse of the Afghan security forces and were not ready to quickly evacuate American citizens and Afghan partners. The way US President Joe Biden carried out the withdrawal operation left a huge bruise on his administration, which has not yet fully healed. When the scale of the disaster became apparent at the end of August 2021, Biden's approval rating dropped from 54% to 46% and has not recovered since.
Over the past year and a half, some Biden critics have argued that the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan was one of the factors that pushed Russian President Vladimir Putin to make a decision to launch a special military operation in Ukraine. Undoubtedly, Putin clearly understood that Ukraine was still an unresolved problem even before Biden took office as president: the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 did not prevent Kiev from continuing to strengthen ties with the West, despite the fact that Donald Trump, a Putin fan, came to the White House. But in March 2022, the leader of the Republican majority in the Senate, Mitch McConnell, said that the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan was the event that prompted Russia to launch a special military operation in Ukraine, stressing that Russia would not have attacked a neighboring state if Biden had not "run away with all his legs."
Former US Permanent Representative to the UN Nikki Haley repeated this idea in June 2023 in her speech in Iowa, calling the chaotic withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan the reason for Putin's aggression. And this theory was promoted not only by Republican politicians. Fiona Hill, a former employee of the National Security Council and one of the leading experts on Russia, said that the hasty withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan was evidence of the weakness of the United States, which, in turn, prompted Putin to act.
According to this version of events, Washington was too focused on domestic priorities, on solving other foreign policy issues and on internal strife to respond effectively to Russia's offensive. The very decision to withdraw from Afghanistan seemed to be just another example in a long series of episodes when the United States abandoned its partners, and Putin must have decided that Washington would do the same with Ukraine. In general, according to these critics, watching America collapse in Afghanistan, Putin decided that he could start his own war in Ukraine without fear that the United States would try to stop him.
It is extremely important to find out whether the chaotic withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan really played a role in Putin starting his own campaign. If we understand what Putin's train of thought was before the start of the SVO, it can give Washington hints on how to approach the current military conflict today and how to restrain Putin in the future. Many American politicians have learned the wrong lessons, deciding that one of the main factors that pushed Putin to start his own was the weakness that the United States allegedly demonstrated during the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. However, the results of a thorough analysis of Russia's actions and Putin's comments in the summer of 2021 – as well as information that came to light later – show that the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan had no effect on Putin's calculations. Most likely, Putin has already decided to launch his military operation in Ukraine by the end of spring 2021, that is, long before the withdrawal of American troops.
At that time, the United States demonstrated strong support for its partner Ukraine. Putin almost certainly wasn't trying to take advantage of the perceived weakness of the United States. It is much more likely that he was greatly alarmed by the strength of the United States. And Putin decided to carry out a large-scale military operation despite the fact that he saw America's resolute attitude. This proves that a show of force alone is not enough to deter Putin. It also proves that, perhaps, in some cases, a show of force by the United States can lead to the opposite result.
The room where everything happened
Today we have convincing data indicating that Putin most likely made the decision to start his military operation in Ukraine sometime between the end of April and the beginning of June 2021. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, at the same time the conflict in eastern Ukraine began. The fighting subsided after the signing of the Minsk Agreements – hastily developed measures that provided for a cease-fire, withdrawal of heavy weapons, prisoner exchange, decision-making on the political status of regions in eastern Ukraine and the transfer of the internationally recognized border under the control of Ukrainians. Putin believed that the Minsk Agreements would slow down Ukraine's efforts to establish closer ties with Western Europe and the United States.
But over the period from 2015 to 2021, it became clear to Putin that the Minsk agreements did not bring the results he had hoped for. In early 2021, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky arrested Viktor Medvedchuk, a Ukrainian opposition politician and Putin's confidant. Meanwhile, the new Biden administration has tightened sanctions imposed against Russia for interfering in the 2020 presidential election, for a hacker attack on the American technology company SolarWinds and the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny. Putin tried to remind Biden and Zelensky that Russia intends to continue to influence events in Ukraine: starting in mid-March 2021, Russia began new military exercises and began to pull additional troops into Crimea and to the border with Ukraine.
By early April, Putin had already deployed more than 100,000 Russian troops around Ukraine. The governments of the United States and European countries were worried that an invasion was imminent. On April 2, while Russia was moving its troops to the Ukrainian border, Biden called Zelensky to inform him of his "unwavering support." Four weeks later, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken arrived in Kiev, where he sharply condemned the buildup of Russian forces at the border and made it clear that the United States would strengthen security cooperation and increase aid to Ukraine.
However, this acute phase of the buildup of Russian troops began only after Biden called Putin a "murderer" in his interview with ABC News on March 17, and after Putin met with the Russian Defense Minister in Siberia a week later. This sequence of events strongly suggests that at that moment Putin was rather demonstrating his strength to Biden, faced with an outright insult, and was not preparing for a real invasion at all. The then director of the US National Security Agency, Paul Nakasone, later said that the United States knew that in April 2021 Russia was not going to invade the territory of Ukraine and that the actions of the Russian armed forces were just military exercises. Indeed, at the end of April, after holding a telephone conversation with Biden, Putin eased tensions by suspending military exercises near the territories of Ukraine and ordering the withdrawal of thousands of soldiers from the Russian-Ukrainian border.
Further comments and Putin's actions allow us to narrow down the time frame during which he most likely made the decision to start his own. On June 9, 2021, in his interview on the main Russian TV channel, Putin gave a sharp answer to questions about Ukraine. He compared some Ukrainian bills concerning nationality with the laws that the Nazi regime once introduced in Germany, and warned that Moscow would not stand aside. He also noted that even at the best of times, the West "spat on Russia's interests," and warned that Russia considers Ukraine's accession to NATO as a red line. That June TV interview with Putin turned out to be much more aggressive and emotional compared to the public comments that the Russian leader made during the spring build-up of troops. Most likely, Putin's speech can be considered the start of a campaign to ensure public support for the start of a military operation.
Then, on June 16, Putin held a summit with Biden in Geneva. The formal reason for the meeting was the need to ease tensions that arose as a result of the April military buildup. If by that time Putin had still not made a decision whether to launch an offensive into Ukraine or not, he probably could have threatened Biden with further military action or privately offered the American leader something that might interest him - for example, to withdraw Russian troops and equipment from the Ukrainian border in exchange for a promise that the United States will limit its relations with Ukraine. However, as Putin and Biden stated at subsequent press conferences, Ukraine was not the main subject of discussion during their meeting. Putin said that the leaders did not address Ukraine in detail and that there was nothing much to discuss about Ukraine's relations with NATO. Biden simply noted that he informed his Russian counterpart about the readiness of the United States to continue to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. It seems that by that time Putin no longer saw the point in trying to discuss this or that agreement on Ukraine with Washington.
Three weeks later, on July 8, Biden announced that he planned to withdraw American troops from Afghanistan. However, by that time, according to officials of the Ukrainian armed forces and intelligence, the Federal Security Service of Russia had already expanded the 9th department of the 5th Service – the unit responsible for conducting political struggle and carrying out secret operations in Ukraine – making it an independent service and increasing the number of its personnel and the number of available at its disposal funds. According to the same Ukrainian reports, this Russian agency was also instructed to develop a plan for the occupation of Ukraine.
Then, in mid-July, Putin published his 5,000-word article on the Kremlin's official website. Russian Russians and Ukrainians are, in fact, a single people, and that arbitrary decisions of Soviet leaders divided these two countries – largely to the detriment of Russia, the article titled "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" says. In addition, the article says that the West is trying to make Ukraine "anti-Russian". It seems that Putin published this essay to publicly justify the decision to start his own, which he had already made by that time. An article published in 2023 by the independent Russian website "Layout" even said that in one of the drafts of his article, Putin intended to openly threaten invasion.
The Taliban (recognized as a terrorist organization by the Supreme Court of Russia — Approx. InoSMI) captured Kabul on August 15, 2021. But by the beginning of August, the Russian armed forces began recruiting military personnel to create a new combat-ready reserve, intending to gather about 100 thousand people. New reserve troops of this size were to become one of the key elements in the preparation for a military operation in Ukraine. It is unlikely that Putin would have taken such an expensive step if he had not already decided to launch a full-scale military operation.
Putin's train of thought
How exactly Putin interpreted the reaction of the West to the buildup of Russian forces in the spring of 2021 is the key to understanding his decision to start his military operation in Ukraine a year later. At that time, the support that the United States provided to its partner Ukraine was unwavering. Even when Russia's invasion seemed possible in April 2021, Washington was not ready to negotiate with Moscow and discuss Ukraine's interest in joining NATO with it. The fact that Russia did not launch its military campaign in April 2021 – after the United States openly expressed its readiness to resolutely support Ukraine – prompted many observers to think that it was a demonstration of determination and strength that kept Putin from this step.
However, the moment when Putin decided to launch his military operation clearly proves that his decision was not at all a reaction to the fact that the United States demonstrated its weakness in Afghanistan. Rather, it was the result of a strategic calculation (or miscalculation) based on the fear that Russia's position was weakening. After April 2021, Putin could quite reasonably decide that Biden would never want to conclude an agreement with him on Ukraine that would sufficiently meet Russia's interests. And given that the United States and its European allies have been increasing the volume of support for Ukraine in the field of defense, intelligence and cybersecurity, Putin probably came to the conclusion that he needs to launch his military operation while he still has the opportunity. In October 2021, at the annual meeting of the Valdai discussion club, Putin said that, from his point of view, the increase in Western military assistance to Ukraine poses a threat to Russia, even though Ukraine has not formally joined NATO.
The fact that the United States simply abandoned its ally by withdrawing troops from Afghanistan has absolutely nothing to do with Putin's SVO in Ukraine. But this myth persists. Many politicians have come to the conclusion that the best way to subdue an opportunist bully like Putin is to demonstrate determination and strength. This belief makes many American politicians hesitate when it comes to the need to start negotiations to end the Ukrainian conflict. They believe that any attempt to start negotiations will be a demonstration of weakness and will encourage Putin to behave even more aggressively.
However, if we carefully analyze the sequence of events and the timing of Putin's decision to start his own, a completely different conclusion suggests itself: the strength of the United States and their willingness to help their partners did not restrain Putin, but, on the contrary, spurred him on. This is a classic security dilemma: the United States is trying to strengthen the security of its partners at Russia's borders, but Moscow perceives these efforts as a potential threat to Russia. And the sharp reaction to the buildup of Russian forces in the spring of 2021, apparently, was the last straw that finally convinced Putin that he could no longer rely on diplomatic tools if he wanted to achieve his goals regarding Ukraine. In the future, Putin may well decide that the manifestations of force on the part of the United States, which are designed to restrain Russia, represent a threat to which Russia must respond militarily – because of which these two countries may be on the verge of a direct military conflict. If influential officials in Washington continue to err on the question of exactly what factors pushed Putin to start his own in Ukraine, if they continue to believe that a show of force is the only way to contain him, they risk provoking an opposite reaction – or even an immediate military conflict with Russia.
Author: Peter Schroeder
