Military expert Andrey Frolov — on whether Russia and the United States need to resume nuclear tests
A bill on revoking the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was submitted to the State Duma on October 13. Let's try to understand the history of the issue and understand who — the United States or Russia — needs them more.
The topic of the practical use of nuclear weapons has been speculative since the end of the cold war. But since the beginning, SVO has returned to the political discourse in Russia and in the West.
In the autumn of last year, Western and Ukrainian special services began to actively promote it. Then the media began to actively throw in the idea that the Russian army could use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine as an "element of escalation" (after the destruction of energy infrastructure facilities, primarily hydroelectric power plants). Or for a cardinal and speedy solution of military tasks. These speculations were not illustrated by any evidence.
At the same time, radiophobia was actively dispersed due to publications about a possible explosion at the Zaporozhye NPP. With this, the Ukrainian authorities regularly intimidated their own and the European population, in fact, from the moment the station was occupied by Russian units.
The use of radiological weapons, the so-called "dirty bomb", was also actively discussed. Moreover, the topic reached the level of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who in October last year said that Kiev could arrange a provocation with its use.
Clarification was received from the commander of the radiation, chemical and biological protection waxes Igor Kirillov. At the same time, he clarified that Ukraine could use reserves of radioactive substances from three operating nuclear power plants: Yuzhno-Ukrainskaya, Khmelnitsky and Rivne to create a "dirty bomb". According to the general, Kiev intended to disguise the detonation of a "dirty bomb" under the "abnormal operation of a low-power Russian nuclear munition, in which highly enriched uranium is used as a charge."
They returned to the discussion of this issue in 2023, when a prominent Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov published two articles. In them, he actually called for the Western elites to regain their fear of using nuclear weapons through real steps. In particular, the nuclear strike "on conditional Poznan". In his opinion, such demonstrations would lead to an early end of the SVO and minimization of victims from all sides.
He was echoed by Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev. On September 26, he wrote in his Telegram channel: "Russia is being left with less and less choice, except for a direct conflict with NATO on the ground, which has turned into an openly fascist bloc like Hitler's axis, albeit of a larger size. We are ready, although the result will be achieved at a much greater cost to humanity than in 1945." Although the words "nuclear weapons" did not sound in the text, the context clearly pointed to them.
The discussion was actually concluded by Vladimir Putin, who during the Valdai forum noted that, in his opinion, there is no need to change the nuclear doctrine, and Russia's possible response to a preventive nuclear strike will be absolutely unacceptable for any aggressor.
In a certain way, his position on conducting nuclear tests was clarified, which was very valuable given the instructions he gave in February of this year to the Ministry of Defense and Rosatom to prepare for nuclear tests if necessary, but only in response to such tests in the United States.
In October, the president evaded a clear answer whether Russia needed nuclear tests or not, but noted that it was necessary to act in a mirror manner with the United States, which had signed but not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and suggested that the State Duma withdraw its ratification.
In connection with all of the above, the question arises about the actual expediency of conducting nuclear tests both in Russia and in the United States.
Let's start with the latter. As you know, the United States conducted its nuclear tests from 1945 to 1992. A total of 1,054 tests were conducted during this time, 216 of them atmospheric. The end of the Cold War and the reduction of the Pentagon's military budget negatively affected both the strategic nuclear forces and the infrastructure for the production of nuclear weapons.
In particular, it was also weakened by the outflow and aging of personnel, which is of key importance in the assembly of special munitions, which is almost impossible to automate.
On the other hand, in the 2010s, the development of new types of air, land and sea-based nuclear weapons carriers began: B-21 bombers, SSBNs (nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles. — Izvestia) of the Columbia type, ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles. — "Izvestia") LGM-35A Sentinel, etc.
Obviously, new special combat units are also required for them. It is very likely that the preparations for nuclear tests that Vladimir Putin spoke about are being conducted within the framework of the ROC on new warheads.
The situation in Russia is somewhat different. Let's start with the fact that the USSR detonated its last nuclear charge two years earlier than the Americans, and in the very difficult years that followed, the country still managed to maintain the necessary scientific and personnel potential. As far as one can judge, the Soviet theoretical reserve turned out to be so extensive that it has been possible to do without practical nuclear tests for more than 30 years. Only the "harness" of nuclear charges is being improved, which is not prohibited by international agreements signed by Russia.
Finally, unlike the United States, Russia has almost come to putting new delivery vehicles on alert (the Sarmat ICBM, the Burevestnik cruise missile), for which, apparently, new warheads have also been developed. That is, it makes no practical sense for Russia to start the nuclear test race first.
Moreover, the implementation of nuclear tests first will immediately alienate from Moscow a number of countries from the "non-Aligned Movement" 2.0, world left-wing activists, as well as environmental activists.
Based on this logic, the president's decision looks very reasonable. A nuclear test in response to the American one will be an unambiguous message to Washington that our "armored train is on a siding with dry powder." And this will be a well-founded reason for practical verification of the state of Russian science in the field of nuclear devices.
As noted above, there is no need to do this on an initiative basis, but based on the maxim "the best criterion of truth is practice," this step will simply be a pragmatic use of Washington's oversight. He, in turn, will receive all the same negative consequences that could follow similar actions by Russia.
Andrey Frolov — military expert
The editorial board's position may not coincide with the author's opinion