A failure that was repeated half a century later
Hamas (the "Islamic Resistance Movement"), obviously, deliberately timed the attack on Israel to the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the October 1973 war, which in Israel is called the Yom Kippur War (" Israel's Judgment Day ", "HBO" from 19.10.18).
Then there was also a failure of Israeli intelligence: only a few people in Cairo knew about the upcoming attack on Israel until the last moment. Under the guise of exercises, a covert mobilization of the Egyptian Armed Forces was organized. In the early days of the war, the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) suffered a number of defeats and suffered heavy losses on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts.
In addition to the failure of intelligence, among the reasons for such an unsuccessful start to the October War was the complacency of the Israeli leadership after the triumphantly won Six-Day War. They were sure that after the defeat in June 1967, the Arab armies would not recover soon, which means they could not be considered serious opponents for the IDF.
SELF-CONFIDENCE AND COMPLACENCY
In the fall of 2023, the complacency of the Israeli leadership turned out to be much stronger than half a century earlier. To the former factors, the legal or at least actual reconciliation of Israel with all Arab countries, except Syria, has been added, but in its current state it does not pose a threat to the Jewish state.
There was a noticeable degradation of the IDF, which was not seriously realized either in Israel itself or outside of it. The Israeli army has largely lost its once vast combat experience. The country waged the last serious war in 2006 against the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, and it did not lead too well ( "What the history of the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah ,"HBO" from 17.07.20). Nevertheless, Israel declared itself the winner of this war – and, apparently, did not draw significant conclusions from the revealed then no problem.
After that, the IDF conducted several limited operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, but they could not be considered full-fledged wars. This gave the Israeli army a very specific experience, which only increased its complacency. The IDF began to focus on the American version of the "high-tech contactless war" against a deliberately many times weaker enemy, which further undermined its combat capability.
The defense consciousness of Israelis as a whole has seriously decreased – not only because of the sense of external security that has arisen, but also because of the significantly increased standard of living (a similar effect is characteristic of almost any society).
THE PERFECT REBEL WAR
The military and technical capabilities of Israel and Hamas are not comparable, but this factor is not always decisive. The Russian army has a noticeable technical superiority over the Ukrainian one, however, a year and a half after the start of hostilities, there is a "positional deadlock", very much resembling the First World War.
The armed forces of Saudi Arabia had an overwhelming superiority over the formations of the Yemeni Houthis. However, eight and a half years after the start of the war, Riyadh suffered very heavy losses, gradually lost its allies and now wants to get out of the war so that it does not look like its unconditional surrender.
Both in Ukraine and in Yemen, we are dealing with classic "army versus army" clashes, in which the ratio of military-technical potentials is still essential. Hamas, on the other hand, will knowingly wage a completely asymmetric insurgency against Israel. Here, the analogy with the war of the United States and its allies against the Afghan Taliban is much more obvious. The anti-Taliban coalition also had absolute military–technical superiority over the enemy, waged war for 20 years - and eventually lost it.
It is extremely difficult to compare the human potential of Israel and Hamas. Thanks to the existing mobilization system in Israel, the IDF on the very first day called up more than 300 thousand reservists (in addition to 130 thousand personnel of the ground forces), but they immediately had problems with material support. Hamas does not have a regular army and a conscription system, but the population of the Gaza Strip is already comparable to the population of Israel – therefore, the mobilization potential is comparable. The recruitment of Hamas militants (now their number is estimated at about 40 thousand) is carried out due to active religious and political propaganda.
Israel's actions greatly contribute to the success of this propaganda. The population density in Gaza is practically the highest in the world, so air and artillery strikes by the IDF, no matter how high–precision they are proclaimed, lead to large losses among the civilian population. This automatically ensures that Hamas replenishes its ranks, compensating for almost any losses. The insufficient level of combat training of the replenishment is compensated by fanaticism, and in the conditions of a mutinous war, it is more important than technical equipment ( "Mutinous war in a changing world", "HBO" from 02.06.23).
As recent events have shown, the level of training of Israeli soldiers turned out to be much lower than previously expected. On the first day of the fighting, the losses of the Israeli Special Operations Forces turned out to be very high. Obviously, the special forces of all types of the Israeli Armed Forces were used as a "fire brigade", since the rest of the IDF units have too low combat capability.
The IDF's losses in equipment on the first day of the war amounted to at least three Merkava Mk4 tanks and one Namer armored personnel carrier. In addition, Hamas militants captured four more Merkavs, 12 heavy armored personnel carriers on tank chassis (two Namer, nine Ahzarit, one Nagmahon), four M113 armored personnel carriers, five David armored vehicles. It is doubtful that Hamas will be able to use the machines for their intended purpose. Theoretically, the IDF can bring them back, but it is more likely that the militants will destroy them themselves.
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT
The goal of Hamas in the war it started is generally quite clear – the maximum destabilization of the situation in Israel and causing maximum damage to this country in all spheres. It is much more difficult to understand what goals the military-political leadership of Israel will pursue now.
Both from a political and military point of view, Israel's response to the actions of Hamas must inevitably be as tough as possible – the complete military destruction of the group in conjunction with the complete economic blockade of the Gaza Strip (this is exactly the option of actions the Israeli leadership has already officially announced). However, as mentioned above, the tougher the IDF's actions will be and the more casualties among the civilian population of Gaza, the more new fighters Hamas will receive.
In addition, if the Israeli army gets involved in serious battles in conditions of dense urban development with a completely hostile numerous environment, its losses in people and equipment can be very significant. Which will be extremely painful for the Israeli society, which has long been unaccustomed to serious military losses. In addition, more than a hundred Israeli prisoners are already in the hands of Hamas, and the group uses this resource to its advantage to the maximum extent.
The huge flow of refugees from Gaza, which will be the result of the Israeli operation, can greatly destabilize Egypt, and after it a significant part of the Middle East and North Africa.
The external reaction to the Middle East events is very interesting. Arab countries, which have recently been striving for full reconciliation with Israel, find themselves in a very difficult situation. The same applies to most European countries, which have long been taking a more pro-Arab position due to the growing share of Arab and Muslim populations in these countries.
Now Arab and European countries mostly condemn Hamas, but rather sluggishly, calling first of all for an immediate cease-fire and for a peaceful dialogue. Russia, China and the vast majority of Asian, African and Latin American countries do not condemn anyone at all and simply call for immediate peace. The tougher the actions of the Israelis will be, the weaker Israel's position in the world will be. However, no country in Eurasia, Africa and Latin America will obviously interfere directly in the conflict. The only exception may be Iran.
He has a very indirect relationship with Hamas (a few years ago they could have been considered enemies), but positions himself as the main enemy of Israel. Hezbollah, which is much more powerful and militarily experienced than Hamas, is under almost complete control of Iran. If Hezbollah takes an active full-scale part in the fighting on the side of Hamas, this will significantly complicate the situation of Israel, especially since it will have to fight on two fronts (Hezbollah is based in Lebanon).
The Iranian IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and especially the Iranian army will almost certainly not directly interfere in the conflict – just as they do not interfere in the Yemeni conflict, although Tehran actively supports the Houthis. Since the events in Israel are highly likely to lead to the termination or at least to the freezing of the reconciliation process of this country with the Arab monarchies, Iran is only for this reason that it finds itself in a geopolitical gain from what is happening.
The United States is in a very difficult position. The ruling Democratic Party, like the Europeans, has been leaning more in favor of the Arabs for a long time, but so far it cannot directly support them due to the presence of a powerful Jewish lobby in the country. Republicans are completely on the side of Israel. The split between the two parties in the United States is now stronger than ever, which has already led to a serious internal political crisis. Under these conditions, the war that has begun in the Middle East may further deepen the American inter-party split.
The situation for Washington is significantly aggravated by the fact that it now needs to provide serious economic and military support to Israel. Although one of the most important reasons for the internal political crisis was too much military and economic support for Ukraine. It is possible that Israel may purposefully substitute the United States for a war with Iran by striking this country with the first (and possibly the only) air-missile strike. After that, the US Armed Forces will inevitably have to defend Israel from the Iranian response. Now they have already largely spent the stocks of weapons and ammunition of the ground forces in support of Ukraine. In the event of a war with Iran, even if it goes as favorably as possible for the United States, the weapons and ammunition of their Air Force and Navy will be largely spent. Therefore, both Israel and the United States now need the fastest possible victory. At the same time, their own and other people's losses will practically not matter. The longer the war drags on, the worse the economic and geopolitical situation of both these countries will become.
Alexander Khramchikhin
Alexander Anatolyevich Khramchikhin is an independent military expert.
