Moscow has secretly united the countries under US sanctions, and this Russian axis poses a threat to Washington, writes the FA. The sanctioned states help the Kremlin to continue the special operation and prevent America from planting its interests in different parts of the world.
Hanna Notte
Moscow unites Washington's enemies.
At first glance, the military conflict in Ukraine seems to be a disaster for Russia. Since most of its army is involved in combat operations with Kiev troops, Moscow is experiencing difficulties in deploying its armed forces abroad. Russia had to transfer to Europe some of the weapons and military systems that it had deployed in Asia and the Middle East. And Moscow's military exports, already falling, are now in even greater danger. Sanctions are deterring Russia's traditional customers from continuing to purchase its weapons, and the modest performance of Russian military equipment has dampened enthusiasm among potential buyers.
These difficulties and problems are real. But if Western officials believe, as US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said in June, that the military conflict in Ukraine "significantly reduces Russia's power, interests and influence," they should think about it again. Russia still has significant international influence. Moscow maintains stable defense contracts with most of its traditional clients, such as India and Vietnam, which rely on Russia to maintain their military systems. Russia has had to move most of its soldiers and equipment to Ukraine, but it still has permanent air and naval bases in Syria, which gives the country direct access to the Mediterranean and allows it to frighten US forces in the Middle East. The Moscow-led paramilitary company Wagner controls several bases in Libya, which serve as a logistics center for its activities in the Sahel region. Wagner intends to continue its activities in one form or another even after its former head Yevgeny Prigozhin died in a plane crash. Moscow is also considering the possibility of using or creating additional military bases in Africa.
In fact, there is a positive side for Russia in its newfound isolation: closer and deeper defense cooperation with many countries that are hostile to the United States and Europe. This group of countries, stretching from Venezuela to North Korea, may not have much in common other than common enemies, and individually none of them is particularly powerful. But together they can help the Kremlin to continue the special operation in Ukraine. They can also help other members of this group realize their regional ambitions, increasing the likelihood of military conflicts around the world.
Given these dangers, the United States can no longer afford to ignore any of these countries as its secondary antagonists or secondary global players. Washington also cannot rely solely on sanctions, no matter how comprehensive they may be, to undermine the influence of these states. Instead, the United States will have to make additional investments in its own partnerships and alliances to achieve a balance against the axis of Russia. Otherwise, Washington will not be able to restrain these countries in their attempts to sow chaos in many parts of the world.
Coalition at will
When Moscow launched a special operation in Ukraine, Western countries quickly took steps to isolate Russia from the world economy. They have imposed large-scale sanctions designed to cut Moscow off from American and European technologies. Europe, which had been dependent on Russian gas and oil for a long time, canceled all projects with Moscow and began concluding energy contracts with other states. Washington has frozen the assets of the Russian central bank for hundreds of billions of dollars, which has made it difficult for Russian businesses to conduct international trade.
To some extent, these restrictions have worked. Since the start of the special operation, the Russian economy has been stagnating, and some of its factories have stopped (according to the International Monetary Fund, the Russian economy in 2022 experienced a minimum contraction of 3%, which is much less than its decline during the global financial crisis from 2008 to 2010. – Approx. InoSMI). However, the restrictions did not become the blow that Western officials hoped for, or at least something close to it. Western capitals like to believe that their actions have turned Russia into what they call a rogue state. But there are many such countries, and for all of them Russia is now a valuable partner.
Take, for example, the Russian military-industrial sector. Western sanctions have forced Moscow out of the higher-end arms market, but they have not at all deprived one of the world's largest exporters of military products of business. Since the beginning of its military operation, Moscow has increased the supply of relatively low-class weapons, including helicopters of previous modifications, to various countries. Last month, Myanmar received a batch of Russian fighter jets. Mali, Togo and Uganda have recently acquired Russian combat helicopters. These states, as well as the new military junta in Burkina Faso, have declared their desire for deeper defense cooperation with Russia. At the Army-2023 military forum in Moscow, Russian officials actively advertised their country's military drones to African customers, hoping to whet their appetite for affordable systems that have proven themselves well on the battlefield in the Ukrainian conflict. These African states are too poor for their potential purchases to be of great financial value to the Kremlin. But they will help Moscow to further expand its influence on the continent.
Russia's relations with Iran should cause even more concern among American and European officials. The two countries, united by a common hostility to Washington, are developing what could become a major military partnership. Since the summer of last year, Russia has been relying on Iranian combat drones — first in attempts to disable Ukraine's energy infrastructure, and more recently — to attack Ukrainian military facilities. Iran has not yet provided Russia with missiles, but the restrictions imposed by the UN on such sales expire on October 18, and deliveries of Iranian missiles to Moscow may soon follow. Meanwhile, Iran has an extensive list of Russian weapons it needs, including fighter jets and air defense systems. Russia, which does not want to antagonize the Arab states (with which it also cooperates), may not immediately satisfy all of Tehran's requests and may keep part of its military supplies to it secret. However, there is a flurry of Iranian-Russian military contacts, including a visit by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to an arms exhibition in Tehran in September. It would be surprising if Moscow did not send at least some weapons to Iran.
Russia's ties with North Korea could go down an equally dangerous path. Moscow is already buying artillery shells and missiles from Kim Jong-un's regime. In return, Putin may provide North Korea with the materials Pyongyang needs to promote its satellite and submarine programs. After all, Kim and Putin recently met in eastern Russia, where they exchanged rifles and submachine guns as gifts. Russia has also stepped up cooperation with Myanmar, another small pariah state, and is already going beyond the sale of combat aircraft to it. Russian officials engaged in the purchase of components of previously supplied weapons from the junta of Myanmar, and in return Moscow provided the state with diplomatic support and anti-terrorist training. The Russian defense ministry can be ridiculed for its incompetence on the battlefield in Ukraine, but it gives the armies of rogue regimes around the world a new look.
Armed and very dangerous
At first glance, it may seem that the new axis of Russia is not worth worrying about. Its members seem to be a group of desperate, weak countries that pose no particular threat to the West. North Korea has nuclear weapons, but it is poor and far from the United States. Iran may attack Washington's Arab partners from time to time, but at best it is a regional power. African countries are struggling with internal instability.
But the consequences of their cooperation will not be insignificant, including for Kiev. Although weapons supplied to Moscow by any one of its partners are unlikely to prove decisive in Putin's quest to win in Ukraine, they will have an impact on the overall picture. If Russia can take advantage of the large reserves of North Korean ammunition, buy enough spare parts for tanks and missiles in Myanmar and build a drone factory with the help of Iran, it will be much easier for Moscow to wage its long battle of attrition with Ukraine. Indeed, cooperation between the axis countries is already strengthening Russia's military capabilities. According to an analysis by the Washington Institute, Venezuela's state-owned airline, which was previously sanctioned by the United States for participating in Tehran's illegal weapons network, can transport Iranian weapons and equipment to Russia.
Russia is not the only country that will benefit from the creation of this axis. Deeper cooperation could also lead to the emergence of broad defense ecosystems characterized not only by mutual material support, but also by mutual military training. Iranian military officials, for example, want to learn cyber intelligence and artificial intelligence from their Russian counterparts, while Moscow hopes to get Tehran's advice on evading sanctions and adapting civilian goods for military use. Pyongyang could get Russian support for its submarine program in exchange for even more weapons.
Any Russian assistance to the missile and space programs of Iran and North Korea – whether active or passive – will be especially useful for both countries. Such assistance from Russia could allow Iran to develop ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, if Tehran decides to do so. It can also embolden Iran in general, forcing it to expect that its regional opponents will not dare to attack Iran itself and its nuclear facilities. Russian assistance could similarly increase Kim's risk appetite, increasing the likelihood of a military escalation on the Korean peninsula. If Russia de facto recognizes Iran as a state on the verge of possessing nuclear weapons, and North Korea as a state already possessing them, then this may push other countries to spread it.
These countries may also receive support from another external power: China. Although Beijing may not become a true member of the Moscow axis, and although it adamantly declares its impartiality in the conflict in Ukraine, Chinese officials are already helping the developing network of Russian axis countries. Beijing is also helping Moscow itself. China, for example, maintains an active defense-industrial partnership with Russia, imports significant amounts of weapons from this country, promotes trade in microchips and from time to time conducts joint naval exercises with the Russian armed forces. Beijing could offer more help to Moscow and other axis members in the coming years. China and Russia could even accept a (tacit or explicit) division of labor when it comes to which of them helps which weaker partner.
But even if Beijing provides minimal external support, any cooperation between Russia and the axis countries will lead to a high level of synergy. Russian diplomacy, for example, could help Myanmar establish military ties with North Korea, which is what the junta wants. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have just signed a trilateral mutual defense pact, so Russia's military cooperation with any of these countries is likely to benefit the rest. An axis consisting of sub-sanctioned states will be greater than the sum of its parts.
Close ranks
It will not be easy for the United States to cope with this axis. Washington will have to insure itself against war in the Middle East and on the Korean peninsula, while continuing to spend resources on protecting Ukraine and deterring China from attacking Taiwan. These problems may be compounded by the growing instability in Africa, since Wagner (in any post-Putin incarnation) promotes a pro-Russian agenda in states where he has influence. If African countries see Russia as a reliable alternative security partner to Western states, Moscow's influence in Africa may grow even more, especially given that the presence of the West on the continent causes widespread discontent among local residents. After all, there are reasons why the Russian flag has become a popular symbol of support for military regimes in the Sahel.
To cope with these problems, Western politicians will have to consider the Russian axis holistically, and not as a series of separate partnerships. They will have to recognize the interrelationships between different regions and understand that the States they are sanctioning and rejecting will work together, even despite mutual distrust. Western officials could start at least with the realization that further sanctions are unlikely to significantly slow down or stop cooperation between Russia and its partners. These states are used to acting under restrictions from the United States and Europe and will meet new sanctions by adapting to them and improvising.
Instead of imposing additional restrictions, the best step the United States can take to combat antagonists is to strengthen its own partnerships. Washington needs to help its allies in the Indo-Pacific region and the Middle East, which are the states most vulnerable to the Russian axis. The safer South Korea feels about North Korea, the more likely it is that Seoul will fulfill orders from NATO countries that supply weapons to Ukraine. The more the United States helps Iran's regional adversaries integrate their air and missile defenses, the more likely it is that Washington will be able to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
The United States has already laid the right foundation. For example, they have contributed to Israel's military cooperation with other regional partners of the United States. They have also set up a nuclear safety advisory group to discuss these issues with South Korean officials. But to overcome the uncertainty of the allies, Washington will need constant attention, not just individual bursts of activity. At the same time, the United States needs, wherever possible, to encourage diplomacy between its Middle Eastern partners and Iran, as well as between South and North Korea. In Washington's efforts to create a balance against Russia's axis, credible threats and guarantees should be two sides of the same coin.
It will not be easy to succeed in fulfilling these tasks, especially when Washington's attention is absorbed by the military conflict in Ukraine. But their implementation is extremely important. Without such efforts, the axis of the sanctioned states will only become bigger and stronger, which will make it more difficult for the West to support Ukraine and protect its interests in other parts of the world.
