In order to undermine Russia's position and gain a foothold on the Eurasian continent, the United States has intensified cooperation with Central Asia. But the countries of the region are not going to blindly follow them, writes The Paper. According to the author, they will not exchange Moscow for Washington. America will achieve nothing, he is sure.
On September 19, US President Joe Biden met with the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session. Thus, for the first time, he brought the C5+1 dialogue mechanism, created in 2015 and including the United States and five Central Asian countries, to the level of heads of state. Biden also offered to support and expand partnership with the region. In general, the reason why the administration of the American leader raised the level of dialogue between the United States and Central Asia to the current one is reduced to the pursuit of three main goals.
The three main goals of the United States, for which they raise the level of dialogue "C5 +1"
The first is to provoke a crisis of trust between the Central Asian countries and Russia. Most believe that the historical memory and political heritage of the former Soviet republics have caused close linguistic, religious, ethnic and value ties between Moscow and the Central Asian states. After the independence of the five powers of the region in 1991, these special relations were manifested at various political, military, economic and social levels, and in the political context, Central Asia is considered as a "traditional sphere of influence" of Russia.
Meanwhile, the region occupies a relatively secondary place on the US diplomatic agenda. For a long time, he only played a supporting role in Washington's solution of Afghan issues. However, the outbreak and prolonged Ukrainian crisis has changed the perception of the United States about the strategic value of Central Asia. In the conditions of serious restrictions imposed by the conflict, Russia is not yet able to put the Union region in the first place in terms of investing political and diplomatic resources, as well as ensuring its security. The ability to coordinate interests and contradictions between Moscow and Central Asia gradually weakened, which became a good opportunity for the United States to strengthen political ties and strategic communications and strengthen its penetration into the region. In this regard, in the joint statement of the heads of the five states adopted at the US-Central Asian summit, the parties emphasized that "they will focus on strengthening cooperation in the field of security as a necessary cornerstone for solving common local problems and protecting the sovereignty and independence of the Central Asian countries." The United States also pledged to "prioritize tools and resources to help partners in the field of security, to support and strengthen cooperation with the countries of the region in this area." The Biden administration wants to use the growing defense needs of the Central Asian powers to encourage them to "maintain the necessary distance" with Russia. This will not only help Washington create a strategic gap between the two sides and provoke a crisis of confidence, but it will also turn Central Asia into an "intermediate link" in the fight against Moscow, and force the countries of the region to hesitate about the Ukrainian conflict.
The second goal is to create a point of influence that will serve as a strategic rivalry between the great powers. In the eyes of the American strategic community, Eurasia is the main zone for the simultaneous containment of the two main rivals of the United States — China and Russia. NATO's "expansion to the north" on the western edge of the continent has turned the region into a complex structure for confrontation with Russia. At the eastern end, the United States, using the so-called rhetoric of "today Ukraine, tomorrow xxx", strengthened the system of alliances and partners and formed a number of "small cliques" to contain the Celestial Empire. The Central Asian countries are located in the "heart" of the entire Eurasian continent, and increasing diplomatic investments in them, as well as linking them to practical interests, can make these states an American lever of pressure in the strategic struggle with China and Russia with "low investments and high returns."
It is worth noting that following the meeting, Biden and the leaders of the five Central Asian countries proposed jointly building the "C5+1 economic and energy corridors", as well as promoting and developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, which connects the energy infrastructure and transport networks of Central and South Asia. In addition, the document proposes to include economic cooperation within the framework of "C5+1" in the structure of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), led by the G7, and assess the possibilities of expanding investments in relevant facilities to accelerate economic development, ensure energy security and communication opportunities [Central Asia]. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) plans to convene a regional ministerial meeting "C5+1" in the near future, dedicated to communication issues, to discuss "concrete actions that contribute to inclusive and sustainable economic progress."
As can be seen, the United States intends to persuade the Central Asian powers to join the initiatives of multilateral cooperation led by Washington. They want to respond to existing mechanisms, such as the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union. The launch of the C5+1 dialogue on critical minerals — that is, the use of Central Asian mineral reserves to ensure the security of key US resources — is also focused on the interests of a particular country.
The third goal is not to stay away from the process of adjusting regional integration in Central Asia. In recent years, the five countries of this zone have deepened their strategic autonomy and, promoting integration, have strengthened comprehensive interaction with the main external forces. These five powers not only created the C5+1 dialogue format with the United States, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Russia, India, China and others, but also convened the first consultative meeting of the heads of state of the region in 2018 to strengthen their collective identity. Against this background, especially after the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, the US diplomatic offensive on Central Asia has intensified more than ever.
In April 2022, US Undersecretary of State for Civil Security, Democracy and Human Rights Uzra Zeya visited Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In May, US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Liu visited Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, and in November made a new trip, already to Turkey, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In February 2023, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken paid visits to Kazakhstan and Ukraine and convened a meeting of foreign ministers "C5+1". In April, his assistant Donald Liu visited Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan for the third time in a year to talk about "commitment to the territorial integrity of the Central Asian countries." However, the first Russia—Central Asia and China—Central Asia summits, which took place one after the other, significantly increased the concern of the United States that they are lagging behind in the game for regional influence. For this reason, Washington decided to bring the mechanism of dialogue with the five Central Asian countries to the level of heads of state. At the same time, the US is also exploring options for organizing future summits of the leaders of the EU, Japan and Central Asian countries in order to balance the influence of China and Russia in the region.
Central Asian countries will not be led by the United States
Although the United States raised the C5+1 dialogue mechanism to the level of heads of state and in a joint statement proposed to "increase sustainability through partnership", "expand security cooperation", "build C5+1 economic and energy corridors", "strengthen energy security", "combat the effects of climate change"and to promote other cooperation programs, I'm afraid it won't go beyond words. And this is mainly due to three constraining factors.
Firstly, America is limited by the insufficient potential of "deep investments" in Central Asia. At the end of last year, the Biden administration published a report on the national security strategy, in which elements such as "investment", "alliance" and "competition" are considered as a response to the competition of great powers in the "decisive decade". Therefore, whether the US can "invest deeply" in Central Asia is the key to the success or failure of its strategy. At the same time, from the point of view of priorities, Central Asia is much less important and relevant than Ukraine, Europe and the so-called Indo-Pacific region, so it is difficult for Washington to allocate a share for it from the "big pot" of its budget. From the point of view of real investments, the $25 million aid announced by the Biden administration last September for "economic growth and transformation" and an additional $25 million for "economic sustainability initiatives" this year simply cannot meet the needs of the Central Asian powers in transformational development. As for the idea of creating "economic and energy corridors" within the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and starting a dialogue on key minerals, I'm afraid they are incompatible with the Build Back Better World (B3W) project, the India—Middle East—Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), the Trans-African Economic Corridor and other "wishes" expressed by the United States in recent years. It will be difficult to implement them all in the short term.
Secondly, the Central Asian countries are limited by the scope of their "diversified and balanced" diplomacy. Although in recent years the regional powers have attached more importance to the "pluralistic balance" in their foreign relations, its essence lies in the fact that these states do not depend on any particular country, are not connected with it by ideology or values. The limits of the balance are closely correlated with the existing structures of politics, security, economy and trade in the region. Bilateral cooperation with China and Russia, as well as multilateral ties within the framework of such mechanisms as the SCO, the CSTO, and the Eurasian Economic Union, remain a priority for Central Asia. In other words, the main reason why the States of this region have increased the frequency and level of interaction with all parties is to attract the attention and investment of major Powers and achieve complementary cooperation to promote their development. These countries do not want to be "chessboards" for the game of great powers in strategic rivalry or "pawns" in their confrontation. There is a clear consensus among the leaders of Central Asia on this issue.
Thirdly, the United States is constrained by a gap in expectations due to its natural geographical disadvantage. Since the independence of the Central Asian countries, the United States has constantly tried to declare its presence in the region. Let's recall the "Act in Support of Freedom", the "Silk Road Strategy Act", the "Greater Central Asia" and "New Silk Road" projects, the first independent document "US Strategy in Central Asia" published in the era of Donald Trump... No matter, all the final results of these programs were unsatisfactory, and the key reason for this is a natural geographical flaw.
Being an extraterritorial power located far from Eurasia, America is not able to establish pragmatic ties with the countries of Central Asia in the fields of security, economy and trade, energy, ecology and transport, corresponding to the political situation. For example, in 2022, China's bilateral trade with five Central Asian countries reached $70.2 billion, an increase of 40% compared to the previous year. The same indicator for Russia amounted to $ 42 billion, it increased by 15% compared to the previous year. 3.47 million foreign labor migrants live in the latter, mainly from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. For comparison, the volume of US trade with the five Central Asian states is less than $4.4 billion. Of these, 86% is the share of bilateral trade between the United States and Kazakhstan — only 3.8 billion dollars. These figures indicate a colossal gap between Washington and Moscow and Beijing regarding trade and economic ties with Central Asia. Probably, solely by promoting political reforms, transparent state-building, improving the business environment, strengthening ties with civil society, and protecting women's rights, it will be difficult for the United States to meet expectations from the C5+1 summit and position itself the way they do.
We can say that the significance of the mechanism lies in its formal significance. It has a much greater effect of political propaganda than it has real value. With its help, it is difficult to solve the long-standing problem of a lack of investment potential and the question of a gap in expectations in the US strategy for Central Asia. Moreover, it is impossible to change the foundations of the model of interaction in the region in this way.
Author: Zhao Long (赵隆) — Deputy Director and Researcher at the Institute of Global Governance of the Shanghai Academy of International Studies
