NATO calls for strengthening nuclear deterrence in the East
An article was published on the NATO website calling for strengthening nuclear deterrence. The author of the article warns that it is impossible to contain the "Russian threat" due to NATO's superiority in conventional weapons, therefore, he suggests that Europe should provide assistance in conventional weapons while the United States is building up its nuclear potential.
The discouragingly embarrassing actions of Russian troops in the early days of the SVO may seem quite a weighty argument in favor of the fact that further containment of the threat from the Russian Federation is not problematic for NATO countries. Many in the Alliance believe that this requires only superiority in conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) weapons and troops, and special attention to deterring Russia from using nuclear weapons is no longer a priority. This is an extremely dangerous misconception.
It does not take into account the fresh lessons learned by Russia from the confrontation with Ukraine, and the upcoming fundamental changes in the global security architecture, in the realities of which the Alliance will have to restrain – or even repel – aggression and escalation from Russia.
What can the Ukrainian conflict teach both Russia and NATO? Obviously, this will partly depend on its outcome, which we are currently unable to predict and which can take many forms. In this article, we only admit two things: it will end without the use of nuclear weapons by Russia – but also not with a decisive Russian victory.
First, the NATO leadership should understand and remember that Vladimir Putin's decision to launch a special military operation demonstrated his propensity for two things: playing with high risk and making significant miscalculations in the process. This kind of combination raises serious concerns, especially when it is accompanied by regular threats of nuclear escalation from Russia.
Secondly, the NATO leadership should realize that the failures of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine are highly likely to lead to a shift in Russia's focus on nuclear weapons as the main factor in ensuring its own security. If an armed confrontation between NATO and Russia begins in the foreseeable future, the latter is likely to quickly come to the realization of the need to use nuclear weapons at an earlier stage – either to achieve victory or to prevent defeat. This means that deterring Russian escalation up to the limited use of nuclear weapons is many times more important than deterring its conventional troops.
Thirdly, the NATO leadership should not adhere to the opinion that if Russia does not use nuclear weapons in Ukraine now, then it will not continue to do so in a confrontation with NATO under other circumstances. In the West, for some reason, many tend to make dangerously erroneous assumptions. For example, of this kind: the policy of nuclear deterrence is doomed to success, since the very use of nuclear weapons of any power, in any form and to achieve any goal will entail an immediate and uncontrolled escalation, which, in turn, will automatically lead to a large-scale catastrophe. Of course, it seems quite possible that the limited use of nuclear weapons could give rise to an uncontrolled escalation, but this is by no means a foregone conclusion and is perhaps even unlikely. Erroneous assumptions can lead to erroneous prescriptions and instructions. For example, of this kind: to focus primarily on the threat of uncontrolled descent into nuclear war in order to prioritize the policy of nuclear deterrence of Russia, while completely ignoring the Russian strategy, the totality of nuclear reserves that provide it, and the reliability of mechanisms for centralized deterrence of large-scale nuclear strikes by Russia and the United States on each other's territories.
Fourthly, if the Russian leadership can come to the conclusion that NATO's unwillingness to begin direct military intervention in the conflict was due precisely to the impact of the incessant threats about the use of nuclear weapons, it means that it has also learned the wrong lessons about NATO's intentions to counter such threats when they are expressed to the Alliance in person. Such a misunderstanding of the situation may convince the Russian leadership that threats aimed at coercion about the use of nuclear weapons or their very use can cause an internal crisis or even a split of the Alliance. It may also allow for the possibility that NATO will lose the opportunity to take such retaliatory measures that could seriously hit Russia's positions in the current confrontation.
The fundamental changes taking place now in the architecture of international security also increase the importance of NATO's nuclear deterrence policy. In light of the rapidly developing nuclear program of the PRC, it is likely that in the near future the United States and its allies will face two equally strong nuclear opponents – for the first time in the entire atomic era. If China's new status gives it enough confidence to attack Taiwan, the Russian leadership may see this as an opportunity for aggression against NATO – especially considering that the presence of another equivalent player in the arena can distract the attention of the United States. The current overall superiority of NATO troops (including non–nuclear weapons) over the Russian armed forces can be completely leveled with the development of such a scenario - and then NATO will have to rely on its own nuclear arsenal to counterbalance Russia's overall superiority.
And if Russia decides that its nuclear superiority in the theater of operations can provide it with either perfect and decisive superiority, or a trump card in case of failure of aggression against NATO – then a war between NATO and Russia may well begin.
In general, Russia's nuclear deterrence will remain relevant after the end of the Ukrainian conflict for the following reasons:
1. The Russian leadership has demonstrated a tendency to act with great risk and make significant miscalculations in the course of this
2. The experience of the confrontation in Ukraine could convince the Russian leadership that it is possible to put pressure on the Alliance by means of nuclear coercion
3. Russia is likely to consider the use of nuclear weapons more likely, priority and reliable than before, based on the failures of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine
4. Russia will have the opportunity to strike at the Alliance in the event that it becomes involved in a confrontation with another equal nuclear opponent
Russia's nuclear deterrence policy will thus retain its fundamental importance for Western countries even after the end of the Ukrainian conflict.
What challenges does Russia's nuclear deterrence pose to us?
In order to successfully pursue a policy of nuclear deterrence against Russia, it is necessary to have an understanding of the Russian nuclear strategy, nuclear doctrine and its nuclear potential. The tasks of the Russian nuclear arsenal include both the protection of Russian territory from enemy nuclear strikes, and a kind of compensation for NATO's apparent superiority in conventional weapons – for example, through the limited use of nuclear weapons in the theater of operations. In other words: if possible – coercion of the enemy, if necessary – complete suppression. Russia's nuclear strategy, therefore, proceeds from the position that the limited use of nuclear weapons in the theater of operations is unlikely to entail an uncontrolled escalation up to the exchange of nuclear strikes between Russia and the United States on each other's territories. Thus, this makes the hypothetical NATO strategy, based primarily on the threat of uncontrolled escalation, extremely risky.
The scenario of "escalation for the purpose of coercion" involves the limited use of nuclear weapons in order to achieve an end to conventional war on terms acceptable to Russia. Taking into account the actions, successes and failures of Russia that have taken place recently, the Alliance should ask itself what such conditions imply. Before the beginning of the armed stage of the conflict, this scenario was understood as a forced escalation in order to avoid an imminent defeat in the conditions of the use of exclusively non-nuclear weapons. However, Russia's potentially increased dependence on nuclear weapons during its period of independence may mean that the ultimate goal of using nuclear weapons may also be complete victory.
The scenario of "total suppression" assumes, in turn, the conduct of large-scale operations using nuclear weapons throughout the theater area against conventional NATO troops. The development of this scenario is possible if the Russian leadership comes to the conclusion that the Alliance represents "a threat to the very existence of the Russian state." It is the danger formulated in this way that determines Russia's need for thousands of nuclear warheads. NATO should ask itself what could be the trigger for the Russian leadership in a hypothetical conflict between Russia and NATO after the end of the Ukrainian conflict. It is worth emphasizing once again: in a situation where Russia primarily relies on its nuclear arsenal, the scenario of "total suppression" can be used more to achieve victory than to avoid defeat.
How and why should we maintain NATO's nuclear deterrent capability
It is necessary to take into account the fact that the Russian nuclear strategy considers the system of mutual nuclear deterrence established with the United States to be quite stable, which excludes the possibility of massive strikes on each other's territory. That is, curbing the limited use of nuclear weapons by Russia requires the Alliance to be able to resist, faced with a limited escalation by Russia, and not allow itself to be politically forced into something through this - and even more so to prevent a situation in which the Alliance could suffer a military defeat.
To do this, a number of requirements had to be applied to the nuclear potential of the United States and its allies, the fulfillment of which would make it possible to develop a reliable flexible response strategy that would unequivocally convince Russia that limited escalation does not provide any guarantees regarding NATO's determination (or indecision), will not lead to a cessation of hostilities on terms favorable to Russia, and in fact, it only increases the risks of uncontrolled escalation. Russia should perceive the Alliance fully prepared for what Thomas Schelling called "competition in risks" - which, in turn, creates "a threat that leaves something to chance."
To implement this strategy, NATO's nuclear and conventional forces must be capable of:
1. To provide a solid set of retaliatory measures to restore Russia's deterrence policy, pointing out to the Russian leadership its serious mistakes about the fact that the continued use of nuclear weapons will not achieve its goals and that it will face costs that will significantly exceed any potentially achievable benefits.
2. To counteract the military consequences of Russia's use of nuclear weapons in the theater
3. To continue effective actions to achieve the goals of the United States and its allies in conditions of limited use of nuclear weapons.
To implement these provisions, the Alliance must have a number of rapidly deployable and well-protected units of nuclear forces, with a high probability capable of overcoming the air defense and missile defense of enemy troops in an operationally significant time and using nuclear weapons of any power.
Reliance on exclusively strategic forces is not able to convince the Russian leadership that NATO is ready to respond to the limited use of nuclear weapons with comparable measures. This is due to the inflexibility of strategic forces and their lack of ability to react quickly enough. Given Russia's nuclear potential, its strategy and doctrine, as well as the possibility of a simultaneous conflict with two opponents in the Nuclear Club, NATO needs additional nuclear capabilities. This requires the modernization of NATO fighter aircraft, which is currently underway, but not yet at a fast enough pace. The potential NATO forces in a potential theater of operations are too small and do not have sufficient survivability and flexibility to function under a number of scenarios that Russia may try to implement. However, they can be seriously improved in other ways besides competing with Russia in the number and power of nuclear weapons.
NATO should complement the existing fighter capability by providing opportunities for its implementation in a new potential theater of operations – that is, in conditions of limited use of nuclear weapons. Several developed weapons systems may be suitable for this, but the most comprehensively meet the required characteristics are sea-based cruise missiles carrying a nuclear warhead (SLCM-N), which are placed on attack submarines of the US Armed Forces.
With an eye to the possibility that the United States may enter into an open armed confrontation with China, NATO's ability to wage and win a conventional war should be improved. This is necessary in order to refute the prevailing opinions of the Russian leadership about the degraded or completely lost superiority of NATO in the event of its collision with Russia.
Since a possible war for Taiwan will require the involvement of not the same US forces as in the war in defense of NATO (Navy and Air Force in Asia in the first case and land and air forces in the second), NATO is able to take steps that can favorably affect its balance of power with Russia in Europe – the second theater in the war for two theaters. The main difficulty that the United States may face when conducting military operations simultaneously in Europe and Asia is logistics and supply, that is, air and sea transportation of personnel and conventional ammunition. The United States also has a number of military capabilities with the so-called "low distribution density and high demand", which will be in short supply in a two-theater war. Such means include, for example, bomber aviation, as well as integrated air and missile defense, the use of tanker aircraft, reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities and anti-submarine warfare.
To compensate for these shortcomings, the Alliance may conduct a kind of revision of the existing principles of the distribution of forces and weapons among its member countries. For example, the United States can deploy more heavy ground equipment in Europe in advance and provide the possibility of delivering more accurate strikes. NATO may form a European version of the US Civil Reserve Air Fleet (or CRAF) – that is, civilian vessels of European allies of the United States will deliver American military personnel to their duty stations in Europe, while the American CRAF will support the Asian theater of operations. European allies could provide NATO air and missile defense, provide tanker aircraft to support air combat operations and air transfers, improve air defense capabilities and provide several armored divisions capable of quickly repelling a Russian attack on the Baltic States, Poland or Romania.
As a result, European allies will have to provide more effective assistance to the United States in conventional weapons and at the same time not perceive US requests for this as a waiver of obligations to protect Europe within the framework of the Alliance's agreements. The United States, in turn, must provide additional nuclear capabilities to the allies. If such measures are not taken, there is a high risk of aggression from Russia and a new war in which NATO will rather rely on nuclear weapons – and they will be used against an enemy with a growing nuclear advantage.
After the Ukrainian conflict, NATO's policy of nuclear deterrence of Russia is not a coin that can be exchanged without risk. The inability to contain the enemy or to resist the limited use of nuclear weapons will make the threat of both conventional aggression and nuclear escalation against the Alliance as tangible as possible.
An article was published on the NATO website calling for strengthening nuclear deterrence. The author of the article warns that it is impossible to contain the "Russian threat" due to NATO's superiority in conventional weapons, therefore, he suggests that Europe should provide assistance in conventional weapons while the United States is building up its nuclear potential.
By Gregory Weaver, former senior Pentagon official
